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Disclaimer: Some of the material in the section, Kierkegaard’s Dialectical Theology 
and Barth’s possible familiarity with Kierkegaard’s thought: The Kierkegaard 
Renaissance is taken from my M.A. thesis, Examining the Primary Influence on Karl 
Barth’s Epistle to the Romans. 
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INTRODUCTION: BARTH’S RELATION TO KIERKEGAARD: 
PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURE 
Introducing the Problem 
 
The Swiss theologian Karl Barth’s (1886-1968) relation to the Danish thinker 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) is one which has been touched upon repeatedly with 
regard to influence and parallels. It is an issue that has produced diverse conclusions 
ranging from that of T. F. Torrance, who believed Barth to have been influenced by 
Kierkegaard to an extent even unknown to himself,1 to the likes of Bruce 
McCormack2 who views the affinity as exaggerated.3 However, this intriguing 
relationship refuses a conclusive position regarding the extent to which Barth had 
been influenced by Kierkegaard; any attempt that seeks to resolve this question 
disregards both the complexity of Barth’s thought and the sheer range of thinkers 
who had contributed to his theological development.4 Moreover, Barth’s own 
comments on the influence of Kierkegaard on his development complicate the 
investigation into the relationship between the two.  Whereas in 1922 Barth admits a 
dependence on Kierkegaard in the second edition of The Epistle to the Romans, by 
1963 he has assumed a more cautious relation to Kierkegaard. 
In 1963, Barth accepted the Sonning Prize in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 
recognition of his role in facilitating Kierkegaard’s reception in both the German and 
                                                 
1 See, T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology 1910-1031 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1962), 44. 
2 See, Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its 
Genesis and Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 216-217. 
3The scholarship addressing this relationship, although not mentioned specifically here, will 
be mentioned throughout this work as relevant to the specific discussion at hand. Therefore, the 
various considerations given by both Barth and Kierkegaard scholarship which aid in both obscuring 
and/or clarifying this relationship between Barth and Kierkegaard will be noted at length.   
4 For a full discussion of Barth’s theological development see, Bruce L. McCormack, Karl 
Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995). 
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English speaking world.5  Commenting on this role Barth states, “The second edition 
of my Epistle to the Romans is the very telling document of my participation in what 
has been called ‘the Kierkegaard Renaissance.’”6  As is well known, Barth’s 
participation in the Kierkegaard Renaissance is confirmed in his own attributing of 
his methodology of the second edition of the Epistle to the Romans (hereafter 
Romans II) as one grounded in Kierkegaard’s concept of the infinite qualitative 
difference (hereafter IQD) between God and humanity. Continuing his speech, Barth 
notes what he, and others, had learned from Kierkegaard at that time: 
[What] attracted us particularly to him, what we rejoiced in, and what we learned, was the 
criticism, so unrelenting in its incisiveness, with which he attacked so much: all the 
speculation which blurred the infinite qualitative difference between God and man…all 
the attempts to make the scriptural message innocuous, all the too pretentious and at the 
same time too cheap christianism and churchiness of prevalent theology, from which we 
ourselves were not as yet quite free.7 
 
Yet the influence of Kierkegaard’s thought on Barth’s Romans II extends beyond the 
confines of this one concept alone. Romans II repeatedly makes use of 
Kierkegaardian terminology such as Paradox, Incognito, indirect communication, 
etc.8  Interestingly, however, after reminiscing those early days, Barth’s tone 
suddenly shifts in direction. He asks, “Did not a new anthropocentric system 
announce itself in Kierkegaard’s theoretical groundwork – one quite opposed to that 
                                                 
5 Although the name “Kierkegaard” is seen scattered and imbedded throughout the works of 
a few theologians at the dawning of the twentieth century, it was predominantly Barth who had 
introduced the theological world to Kierkegaard’s thought which found its debut in Barth’s better 
known second edition of the Epistle to the Romans (Der Römerbrief). For a further, but brief, 
examination of Barth’s role in the Kierkegaard Reception in Germany, see Heiko Schulz, “Germany 
and Austria: A Modest Head Start: The German Reception of Kierkegaard” in Kierkegaard’s 
International Reception Tome I: Northern and Western Europe, edited by Jon Stewart (Ashgate, 
2009), pp. 307-387.    
6 Karl Barth, “Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille” in Canadian Journal of 
Theology, Vol. XI.I (1965), 5.   
7 Ibid., 5. 
8 McCormack questions whether the presence of “Kierkegaardian language and concepts” in 
Romans II is suggestive of influence. It could be that Barth, suggests McCormack, merely borrowed 
Kierkegaard’s concepts but then received the “content” from others such as Heinrich Barth. See, 




at which we aimed?”9 In light of Barth’s own admission that his methodology is 
Kierkegaardian, coupled with his use of other Kierkegaardian language, his 
questioning, here, is intriguing.10  
 Kierkegaard’s influence on Romans II was, for Barth, significant when 
contrasted with the first edition, which Barth later thought yet too reflective of the 
liberal theological training he had acquired while studying at Bonn, Tübingen, and 
Marburg. However, with Barth’s break from this liberal tradition, somewhere around 
1914 to 1915, he sought fresh theological instruction in order to articulate what he 
thought problematic in the theological arena in his time. Later Barth’s Romans II 
articulated the problem of modern theology as one which has eradicated the infinite 
difference between humanity and God, hence the decision to appropriate 
Kierkegaard’s concept of the IQD.  
What is interesting about Barth’s 1963 reflections is that his opinion of 
Kierkegaard, then, was far different from that of the early1920’s. Barth’s speech 
evidences that a crucial shift had occurred in his view of Kierkegaard. Over time, 
Barth had come to regard Kierkegaard’s theoretical groundwork as one which is 
essentially anthropological rather than theological. But even more, Barth’s negative 
comments of Kierkegaard are indicative of yet another problem.   
Underlying Kierkegaard’s thought, Barth perceived the existence of an 
overwhelming negativity emanating from Kierkegaard’s IQD whereby humanity is 
left to ruin and despair. In other words, Barth suggests that the outcome of 
Kierkegaard’s IQD is one wherein the individual, as he states, “is caught in the 
                                                 
9 Barth, “Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille”, (1965), 6. 
10 Despite Barth’s (seemingly) favourable bestowment on Kierkegaard’s thinking at this 
time, the accession would prove to be short lived. Although Kierkegaard appears in Barth’s thought 
after 1922 – and might I add, still amiably – by 1925 Kierkegaard’s name all but disappears. 
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wheels of a law which can only deaden and makes one sour, gloomy, and sad.”11  
Later in 1967, Barth again expressed his reserve toward Kierkegaard’s thought, 
stating, “The infinite qualitative difference between God and man, with all its 
consequences, has eaten itself right into them [other theologians]…They [other 
theologians] see themselves and the others, the Church and the world, surrounded by 
nothing but threatening negations.”12   
 Barth concludes that insofar as Kierkegaard’s IQD leads to the annihilation 
of the human subject (who is therefore destitute of grace), Kierkegaard’s central 
concern is not that of “guarding the divine subjectivity”. Rather, according to Barth, 
Kierkegaard’s aim is ultimately an engagement with the human subject in and of 
itself.13 For Barth, Kierkegaard’s notion of truth is thus one whereby the individual is 
its own criterion; a truth rooted in the subject. In short, Barth views Kierkegaard’s 
                                                 
11 Barth, “Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille”, (1965), 6. 
12 Karl Barth, “Kierkegaard and the theologians” in Canadian Journal of Theology, Vol. XIII 
(1967), 64.  In order to make the point that Kierkegaard’s thought demands caution when 
appropriating it, Barth imagines three hypothetical theologians who had encountered Kierkegaard, and 
suggests a strong preference for the third. The first theologian has never bothered with Kierkegaard 
and, according to Barth, “these men are characterized by a cheerfulness of speech and conduct which 
in the long run never fails them.” The second is the one to whom the IQD has “eaten itself right into 
them” whereby all they perceive is negativity in themselves and the world around them. However, the 
third theologian is one who has gone through the school of Kierkegaard “but has passed through it.” 
According to Barth one should pass through the school of Kierkegaard, “Woe unto them if they do 
not”. But the key of Barth’s declaration is that they should move past it. The third theologian, as 
Barth’s ideal, has gleaned important lessons from Kierkegaard and as a result refuses to “return to the 
flesh-pots of a bourgeois ‘Christianism’.” For Barth there are positive things to learn from 
Kierkegaard, namely the infinite chasm between God and humanity which puts into question 
everything on this side of eternity. Thus, as Barth states, after one encounters Kierkegaard, they can 
“never again ignore or surpass the ‘No’ uttered in the gospel to the world and the Church.” However, 
this positive lesson, Barth thinks, can all too easily become negative if one does not hear the “Yes” in 
the “No”. In Barth’s view the second theologian tended only to the “no” and could not perceive the 
grace of God hidden therein. In the end, Barth thinks, the net effect of Kierkegaard is the creation of 
anthropology without a corresponding theology of grace insofar as, in hearing only the “no”, “the 
salvation of human existence is their concern in their ever fresh cognition of its absolute 
questionableness.”  
13 See, Karl Barth, ‘Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille’, (1965), 6. Although 
noting the positive points of parallel between Kierkegaard and Barth, such as that the distance 
between God and humanity is, for both thinkers, overcome in love, Daniel J. Price states, “In spite of 
his many positive contributions to the issues facing modern theology, Kierkegaard’s anthropology 
espoused a type of individualism that allowed the person to exist in cheerless isolation.” For more 
information see, Daniel J. Price, Karl Barth’s Anthropology in Light of Modern Thought (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 56-96. 
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experiment with the self as its own central concern; “an experiment with a faith 
founded in and moved by itself and thus groundless and without object.”14 Whilst 
there is an element of truth in Barth’s perception of a Kierkegaardian overwhelming 
negativity, this reading is fundamentally incorrect.  
Later, in Chapter One, I will suggest that Kierkegaard’s thought relies heavily 
on the notion of objective revelation, and that the notion of the self as being its own 
criterion for truth is not Kierkegaardian. Barth’s simultaneous influence by and 
misreading of Søren Kierkegaard creates one of the most complex, ambiguous, and 
yet, for this very reason, intriguing relationships within the realm of theological and 
philosophical history.  
 
The Barthian Lenses: The Problem 
 The dichotomous nature of Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard, involving this 
change from early favour to later reservation, requires an explanation. I believe two 
plausible reasons are detectable.  First, as mentioned, Barth’s diminishing regard for 
Kierkegaard stemmed from a gradual assumption that Kierkegaard’s theology 
exhibited a crushing negativity, insofar as it employed the IQD in a manner which 
left the human subject in despair. Second, by virtue of a one-sided reading of the 
IQD, Barth believed that Kierkegaard turned to the only option available: the human 
subject. With the self serving as its own criterion for truth, both the diagnosis of its 
condition and the solution to its own redemption are products of its own creation; 
hence “subjectivity is truth.” On account of these reasons Barth viewed 
Kierkegaard’s theology as nothing but a theological mask on the face of 




anthropology. With anthropological structures serving as Barth’s frame of reference 
in reading Kierkegaard, the result was an overt misreading, one which continues to 
be propagated within Barth scholarship and which reads Kierkegaard through the 
“Barthian lens.” Several factors contributed to Barth’s misreading of Kierkegaard.  
During his stay at Göttingen (1921-25), Barth encountered a 
Kierkegaardianism he had not known previously. As I shall discuss later, his gradual 
shift away from Kierkegaard is one partly indebted to his acquaintance with the likes 
of Emanuel Hirsch, Karl Holl, Fredrich Gogarten, and, especially, Paul Tillich and 
Rudolph Bultmann. These figures presented a Kierkegaard who bequeathed 
Christianity with more than mere parameters in halting unwarranted discourse of 
God. For them, Kierkegaard offered not so much the parameters of theology as he 
did the true starting place for theology, namely, the self.15  Whereas in the early 
1920s Barth had employed Kierkegaard in addressing his colleagues’ overt concern 
for human existence as the source of truth, divorced of revelation, by the end of the 
1920s Barth had relegated Kierkegaard to being a member, perhaps even the 
founding member, of this concern.16  In sum, Barth’s eventual disapproval of 
Kierkegaard can be understood as being rooted in two misguided beliefs.  
                                                 
15 As will be discussed later on in Chapter 2, the Kierkegaard Reception in Germany had 
been predominated by Christoph Schrempf’s translations of Kierkegaard’s work.  Rune Alf 
Engebretsen notes, in his Kierkegaard and Poet-Existence with Special Reference to Germany and 
Rilke (Stanford University: University Microfilms International, 1980), “It is unfortunate that so much 
of German Kierkegaard translation had to be undertaken by Schrempf in the period 1890-1922. His 
work teems with evidence that his efforts as editor and translator were keyed more to a personal 
exoneration than to the advancement of Kierkegaard’s writings.” Engebretsen states further, “Readily 
adopting earlier translations of others, he [Schrempf] felt quite free to adapt Kierkegaard to his own 
idiom”, see 28-29. 
16 In Karl Barth, The Paradoxical Nature of the “Positive Paradox”: Answers and questions 
to Paul Tillich, from Theologische Blätter, II (1923), Barth yet appears approving of Kierkegaard. 
Barth compares Tillich’s notion of the God’s relation to time as one which, negatively, resembles “the 
God of Schleiermacher and Hegel” which evidences no true concept of the paradox and therefore 
bears no affinity “to the God of Luther and Kierkegaard”.  In short, Barth states, “If Tillich is serious 
about the paradoxical nature of the positive paradox, then he cannot be serious about either the 
directness of the relationships he asserts between God and world.” Barth states Tillich’s problem as 
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One is that Kierkegaard’s IQD results in the self left to itself, without any 
means of overcoming its separation from God. Two, by turning inward to its own 
resources in overcoming this difference, the self reflects its own disregard for the 
reality of its situation as one whose means are utterly futile. Barth reveals this 
concern when, reflecting on his Romans II in relation to the Christliche Dogmatik of 
1927, he states, “Because I cannot regard subjectivity as being the truth, after a brief 
encounter I have had to move away from Kierkegaard again.”17  Therefore, whereas 
the Barth of the early 1920s had once endorsed Kierkegaard as an ally in placing the 
limits to human accessibility to God, Barth slowly adopted the belief that 
Kierkegaard himself had initiated a concern for human existence in and of itself and 
thus was responsible for theology’s anthropological focus. As will be examined 
below, although some commentators have recognized the presence of something 
Kierkegaardian in Barth, they have tended to address this influence as being auxiliary 
to mainstream Barth scholarship. It will be worthwhile briefly to highlight several 
works which have addressed this relationship directly.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
one which fears the relegating of salvation history to that one “place in history”. For Tillich, such a 
move, a move which Tillich thinks Barth makes, permits a breaking through of the “imperceptible, 
non-objective character of faith”. But Barth names Tillich’s unwarranted apprehension as one which 
confuses God’s relation to humanity as one of his divine initiative, freedom and love, to that of a 
reversal to the human initiative. Thus, Barth states, in contrast to his later criticisms of Kierkegaard, 
that Tillich “Runs the great danger of letting the justified polemic against the ‘man-god,’ once waged 
by Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, be converted into its opposite, the polemic against the God-man”, in 
short, Christ. (151). From this Barth states his interpretation of the significance of the positive paradox 
and its relation to history in the most Kierkegaardian of terms, writing: “Therefore it is obvious that 
the revelation in Christ is ‘imperceptible’ and ‘non-objective’ in the sense that the qualification of this 
history as salvation history (as the history of God’s becoming man) is concealed all along the line by 
the view of perceptible historical relations which ‘are’ in themselves nothing else than possibilities of 
offence.” (151) In a decidedly Kierkegaardian tone, Barth continues, “The whole historical ‘life of 
Jesus,’ for example, divorced from the testimony of those who encountered the majesty in this 
abasement, is in itself nothing else than the possibility, the great probability, of offence…as if the 
revelation were directly identical with the empirical fact, with what was then perceptible” (151-2). For 
more on this see, The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, vol.1, Edited by James M. Robinson 
(Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1968).  
17 Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. John 
Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 173. 
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The Problem Addressed 
Few have written specifically on Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard. In what 
follows, I would like to address, briefly, these works in both their contributions and 
deficiencies to this relationship. These works are: A. Messer’s book, Sören 
Kierkegaard und Karl Barth; William Walter Wells, III, The Influence of 
Kierkegaard on the Theology of Karl Barth; N.H. Søe’s, “The Legacy and 
Interpretation of Kierkegaard”, Alastair McKinnon’s, “Barth’s Relation to 
Kierkegaard: Some Further Light”, Peter S. Oh’s “Complementary Dialectics of 
Kierkegaard and Barth: Barth’s Use of Kierkegaardian Diastasis Reassessed, and 
finally, Bruce McCormack’s Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: 
Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936.”18  
In 1925, Barth commented to his friend Thurneysen on Messer’s attempt to 
examine his thought in light of Kierkegaard’s. Barth states: 
The book that A. Messer in Giessen has produced on Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth 
(I can only grin painfully!) is better than most of the theological ones descriptively, but in 
outcome simply touchingly naïve: I am a quite respectable follower of Kant and Fichte (!) 
who is to be genially pardoned a few theological extravagances such as the ‘qualitative 
difference’…original sin, justification (which in me must originate in a formidable 
‘primitive religious instinct’).19  
 
Unfortunately, Messer’s work is a product of his time wherein Kierkegaard was 
mainly understood through the lens of Christoph Schrempf (1860-1944) whose 
translations of Kierkegaard said more about him than Kierkegaard. Schrempf’s 
                                                 
18 See, A. Messer, Sören Kierkegaard und Karl Barth; William Walter Wells III, The 
influence of Kierkegaard on the theology of Karl Barth (A dissertation presented for PhD, University 
of Syracuse, 1970); Egon Brinkschmidt, Sören Kierkegaard und Karl Barth; N.H. Søe’s, “The Legacy 
and Interpretation of Kierkegaard”, in Biblioteca Kierkegaardian 8, 1981; Alastair McKinnon’s, 
“Barth’s Relation to Kierkegaard: Some Further Light” in Canadian Journal of Theology 13/1, 1967; 
Peter S. Oh’s, “Complementary Dialectics of Kierkegaard and Barth: Barth’s Use of Kierkegaardian 
Diastasis Reassessed”, in GechstraBe, 81 (Tubingen, Germany) as well as his Karl Barth’s 
Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Karl Barth’s Analogical use of the Trinitarian Relation (T&T Clark, 
2006); and Bruce McCormack’s Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis 
and Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
19 Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth—Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925, 
trans. James D. Smart (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1964), 233.  
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Kierkegaard is one which, as a philosopher and not a theologian, moves mainly in 
the realm of aesthetics. It is no surprise, then, that Messer’s work stays faithful to this 
Kierkegaard. As a result, although Barth thought Messer’s work was better than 
most, Messer’s objective missed the central tenets of Barth’s thought and thus says 
more about Barth in relation to Fichte and Kant than Kierkegaard.20  
Wells’ work, on the other hand, aims ultimately at uncovering Kierkegaard in 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics. Wells is convinced that Barth’s thought there has not lost 
its Kierkegaardian flavour. As with most discussions of this relationship, Wells 
recognizes Romans II as the catalyst for Barth’s use of Kierkegaard. But Romans II is 
not his concern. Instead, he follows suit in addressing Barth’s use of history, 
revelation, and paradox in its affinity to Kierkegaard, and then moves expeditiously 
to the 1927 Christliche Dogmatik. However, this work too is of little concern to 
Wells. Instead, Wells hastens to the Church Dogmatics in order to outline points of 
parallel in light of Barth’s later dismissal of Kierkegaard. Hindering his overall 
project, Wells fails to note, in his sweeping coverage from Romans II to the Church 
Dogmatics, the central criticisms Barth makes of Kierkegaard beyond just the well 
known suspicion that Kierkegaard’s theology permits anthropological tendencies.21  
Problematic about Wells’ investigation is its lack of evidence in 
substantiating his claims along with his use of irrelevant sources. For example, 
Wells’ consideration of Romans II looks to the 1923 Barth/Harnack debate to support 
his view of revelation in Romans II. This approach fails to account for the way in 
which the Barth of Romans II differs from that of 1923. Therefore, with such a 
                                                 
20 In Paul Schempp’s Marginal Glosses on Barthianism, pp. 193, he states that the 
concluding tone of Messer’s book, Sören Kierkegaard und Karl Barth, is one wherein “Messer has 
insisted on interpreting Barth’s theology in terms of Kant and Fichte.” 
21 William Walter Wells III, The influence of Kierkegaard on the theology of Karl Barth (A 
dissertation presented for PhD, University of Syracuse, 1970), 292. 
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methodology, Wells offers no differentiation between the concepts he is investigating 
in the Church Dogmatics from that of Romans II. In short, the complexity of Barth’s 
theological development is overshadowed by an urgency to show his relation, or 
even indebtedness to Kierkegaard.  
But what is probably most concerning about Wells’ examination is its lack of 
attention given to his thesis. Out of two hundred and sixty five pages, only fifteen of 
them address, specifically, a highly evident Kierkegaardian influence on Barth. The 
majority of the work instead hones in on other issues which, for the most part, are not 
relevant to the discussion. The amount of time given to the direct relationship 
between Kierkegaard and Barth also appears strange in that no time is spent in 
addressing the possible sharing of influences between Kierkegaard and Barth. In 
short, these pages, although helpful for a historical/contextual study, bear little 
relevance to his task. Whilst Wells is right to note that when one reads both 
Kierkegaard and Barth the parallels appear quite evident, I would not go as far as 
Wells in generalizing this affinity to “Kierkegaard’s writings and some of Barth’s 
work.”22  
Second, Wells notes that Kierkegaard had influenced Barth in his use of IQD, 
the paradoxical form of revelation, the relation of history to revelation, and the 
objective/subjective distinction. More commendable then anything else, although 
undeveloped, Wells notes that both thinkers believed revelation to be the only 
solution in overcoming the IQD. At least, here, with revelation serving as the only 
means in overcoming the difference between God and humanity does Wells offer 
something useful. This work, although noting some helpful places to start, fails in 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 292. 
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outlining the problem inherent within this relationship as well as flushing out the 
parallels, both positive and negative, between Barth and Kierkegaard within 
historical and developmental confines.   
In short, there is no reference to the cause of an appearance of a 
Kierkegaardian concern for the isolated human subject, namely, the despairing abyss 
of the IQD. Therefore, as a whole, Wells’ work offers very little in understanding 
Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard.   
On a smaller scale but no less significant are the efforts of N.H. Søe’s, “The 
Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard”, Alastair McKinnon’s, “Barth’s Relation 
to Kierkegaard: Some Further Light”, and Peter S. Oh’s “Complementary Dialectics 
of Kierkegaard and Barth: Barth’s Use of Kierkegaardian Diastasis Reassessed”.  
According to Oh, Barth read Kierkegaard in light of Kierkegaard’s discussion 
of “religiousness A” and not “religiousness B”. For Oh, religiousness A represents 
the esthetic individual whose existence, as one infinitely qualitatively distinct from 
God, is ultimately one of despair. However, what Barth had missed is that, with 
Religiousness B, Kierkegaard offers the reconciliation between God and the 
individual. Oh argues that one must first grasp the significance of Kierkegaard’s 
“three qualitatively different stages on life’s way”, namely, the aesthetical, the 
ethical, and the religious which are then categorized into two classifications of 
religiousness A and religiousness B.   
Oh posits that within the category of religiousness A exist the two stages of 
the aesthetical and the ethical which, for Kierkegaard represent what is specifically 
common to all religion.  Religiousness B, however, refers exclusively to Christianity.  
However, in contrast to religiousness A, religiousness B’s dialectic is paradoxical by 
12 
 
means of the person of Jesus Christ who is said to unite the opposing categories of 
eternity and existence, divinity and humanity.  Thus, Kierkegaard’s intention in 
employing the infinite qualitative distinction was to reveal the significance for faith. 
According to Oh, it is the dual nature of the infinite qualitative distinction as both a 
negative concept from which nothing can overcome (religiousness A) as well as, by 
means of this negativity, extends to the paradoxical nature of this dialectic wherein 
time and eternity meet in Christ as seen in religiousness B which Barth failed to 
grasp. Thus, “when he appropriates Kierkegaard’s dialectic, Barth refers only to the 
negative dialectic of religiousness A that eventually ends with despair.”23   
Regarding McKinnon’s diagnosis of Barth’s misreading he maintains that 
there are three different readings of Kierkegaard, and Barth adheres to the wrong 
one. First, there is the Kierkegaard of the pseudonymous literature wherein 
Christianity is defined as being illogical. Second, there is the real Kierkegaard 
wherein Christianity is illogical only to the unbeliever who needs faith to overcome 
the tension. And third, there is the phantom Kierkegaard who is Kierkegaard of the 
pseudonymous writings. Barth, McKinnon asserts, had bought into the wrong 
Kierkegaard, the pseudonymous one, and this accounts for his overall negativity 
toward Kierkegaard’s thought.  
Although McKinnon has rightly touched upon the problem with Barth’s 
reading of Kierkegaard as one being the “phantom Kierkegaard,” this is merely one 
aspect of the problem. True, by 1963, Barth’s problem with Kierkegaard concerns 
the anthropomorphic tendencies he thinks existent within Kierkegaard’s thought. 
However, I would argue that Barth’s central problem with Kierkegaard is what he 
                                                 
23 Peter S. Oh, “Complementary Dialectics of Kierkegaard and Barth: Barth’s Use of 
Kierkegaardian Diastasis Reassessed”, in GechstraBe, 81 (Tubingen, Germany), 507. 
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thinks is an overwhelming negativity of the human in relation to God, i.e. an absence 
of grace in Kierkegaard’s thought. Additionally, McKinnon appears to have 
misplaced where Barth actually begins to hold Kierkegaard in a negative light. 
McKinnon thinks it is in Romans II where Barth has incorporated the “phantom” 
Kierkegaard.24 However, it will become evident throughout this project that it is not 
in Romans II where Barth has misread Kierkegaard, but in the mid 1920’s after 
Romans II. I maintain that Barth has rightly understood and used Kierkegaard in 
Romans II. Barth’s suspicion of Kierkegaard comes later, 1924-25, as a result of his 
encounter with colleagues at Göttingen.25  
Looking to Søe, he states: “He [Barth] realized that he had been in danger of 
constructing a kind of anthropology by way of introduction to the principally 
theological task of elucidating what is involved in standing face to face with God’s 
self-revelation, that is, he saw that he was about to tread the same path that had led 
Gogarten and Bultmann astray.”26 As Søe suggests, the problem facing Barth was the 
apparent danger of ordering the divine/human relationship whereby priority was 
given to the human side over that of the divine side. He adds: “And this, of course, 
was bound to influence his view of Kierkegaard and the version of ‘human being 
first’, which he represented in his christianly oriented psychological studies.”27 And, 
although Søe recognizes Barth’s belief that Kierkegaard’s theology lacks a concept 
of grace, it is the anthropological motif which he thinks concerned Barth most. The 
                                                 
24 Alastair McKinnon’s, “Barth’s Relation to Kierkegaard: Some Further Light” in Canadian 
Journal of Theology 13/1, 1967, 38. 
25 See pages 5-6 of this thesis. Barth’s suspicion that Kierkegaard’s thought is or trends the 
line of theological anthropology will necessitate a post-Romans II position on Barth’s behalf in light 
of my endeavour to show the parallels which exist between these two thinkers. In fact, the objective of 
this project hopes to show that Barth’s suspicion of Kierkegaard is one without grounds which reveals 
a distinction between these two thinkers which exists only in Barth’s mind and not in their thinking. 
26 N.H. Søe’s, “The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard”, in Biblioteca Kierkegaardian 
8, 1981, 231. 
27 Ibid., 231-2. 
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problem with Søe’s examination, in my estimation, is that although he is correct in 
noting that Barth feared Kierkegaard’s theology as assimilating the theological 
anthropology of Gogarten and Bultmann, his aligning himself with Barth on this 
point is incorrect.  In the end, where this project differs from Søe’s is given in his 
own words. He states, “To what extent Barth is justified or unjustified...is not my 
task to investigate here.”28 
In sum, Oh, Søe, and McKinnon all share the view that Barth’s final reading 
of Kierkegaard’s IQD is one-sided. Therefore, their contribution to the articulation of 
Barth’s misreading of Kierkegaard is important. However, although these works 
articulate something amiss in Barth’s later reading of Kierkegaard, their aim is not to 
provide a shared conceptual analysis of Kierkegaard and Barth.  
McCormack’s contribution to this debate is indeed significant insofar as his 
work often takes precedence within Barth scholarship. McCormack’s consideration 
of this relationship is found in his book (revision of a dissertation submitted to 
Princeton Theological Seminary) Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical 
Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936. Moreover, McCormack’s 
discussion of this relation does not exceed the confines of Romans II.  Assessing at 
length both the cultural events and philosophical/theological influences on Romans 
II, McCormack concludes: 
In the English-speaking world especially, the prevailing assumption has long been that 
Søren Kierkegaard was the dominant influence leading to the changes introduced into the 
second edition.  European researches were divided on the question until fairly recently.  
A significant group of scholars working in the field of ‘early Barth’ research have 
concluded that Kierkegaard’s contribution, while not insignificant, was of much more 
limited value than was once thought.29 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 236. 
29 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936, 216-217. The group of scholars of whom McCormack references as 
providing research which minimizes Kierkegaard’s predominance in Romans II are Eberhard Busch, 




According to McCormack, Kierkegaard provided only the means of strengthening 
Barth’s commitment to a specific form of neo-Kantianism inherited from Barth’s 
brother Heinrich.30  McCormack admits that “Kierkegaardian language and concepts 
play a significant role in Romans II.”31  But what McCormack suggests is that 
Barth’s use of Kierkegaardian language and concepts should be seen as providing 
merely the form of Barth’s message and not the content. The content, Barth found 
elsewhere. Thus, McCormack questions whether Kierkegaard’s role in Romans II is 
                                                                                                                                          
The Young Karl Barth’s Critique of Pietism and its Response, trans. Daniel W. Bloesch (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2004), Busch endorses Franz Overbeck as the predominate 
influence on Barth’s Romans II, at least over that of Kierkegaard. Busch does not however provide 
evidence that would substantiate his claim. He merely argues that what Barth had discovered in 
Kierkegaard he had already learned in Overbeck. Against Busch’s view, it would appear strange that 
the concept Urgeschichte, which Overbeck had provided Barth, would predominate over the 
numerous concepts Barth had learned from Kierkegaard, specifically, Kierkegaard’s dialectic of 
veiling and unveiling. With regard to Spieckermann, there is not too much, if at all, which addresses 
Kierkegaard specifically. Rather, Spieckermann argues for the importance of neo-Kantianism on 
Barth’s shift from Romans I to II. For more on Spieckermann’s position, see Ingrid Spieckermann, 
Gotteserkenntnis: Ein Beitrag zur Grundfrage der neuen Theologie Karl Barths (München: Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1985). With regard to Werner M. Ruschke, he represents the common understanding 
that Kierkegaard’s thought is mainly philosophical and therefore moves in a different direction from 
Barth’s theological concerns. In fact, with regard to McCormack use of Michael Beintker, both 
Beintker and Ruschke agree on their diagnosis of Kierkegaard’s use of the concepts he and Barth 
share as differing in methodology, Kierkegaard being philosophical and Barth, theological. However, 
Ruschke does mention that “it is Kierkegaard who stressed the IQD between God and man, as well as 
the paradox of faith.”(62) However, Ruschke argues that although Barth may have taken these 
concepts from Kierkegaard, in the hands of Barth, these concepts operate differently in Romans II. 
Therefore, as Ruschke states, “Barth’s use of dialectic and paradox in Romans II are transformed from 
the philosophical into the theological. [Furthermore, for Barth], the condition for dialectical thought 
and paradoxical sayings rests in relation to Jesus Christ.” (64) In the end, Ruschke also sees 
Kierkegaard as Barth had in 1963. Ruschke is sure to mention that Barth believed Kierkegaard as one 
consumed with religious self-confidence and radical destructive negations. (66) Unfortunately, 
Ruschke does not offer any evidence that this is indeed Kierkegaard’s position but rather presupposes 
that this is the case and from there argues for a Barth who ultimately differs from Kierkegaard. As it 
will be demonstrated in this project, Ruschke’s position will be shown to be without ground by means 
of demonstrating that Kierkegaard too is theologically motivated with regard to his use of the IQD and 
paradox in relation to faith in Christ. For more on Ruschke’s argument see, Werner M. Ruschke, 
Entstehung und Ausführung der Diastasentheologie in Karl Barths zweitem “Römerbrief” 
(Neukirchener Verlag, 1987).  It comes to no surprise, as we shall discover later in our discussion of 
Paul Brazier’s examination of Romans II, that Brazier, inasmuch as he relies heavily on McCormack, 
also takes up Ruschke’s position that Kierkegaard’s influence on Barth was philosophical rather than 
theologically, hence the belief that Barth differs from Kierkegaard in their use of the same concepts. 
See P.H. Brazier, Barth and Dostoevsky: A Study of the Influences of the Russian Writer Fyodor 
Mikhailovich Dostoevsky on the Development of the Swiss Theologian Karl Barth, 1915-1922 
(Paternoster, 2007), 162. 
30 Ibid., 217. 
31 Ibid., 237. 
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indicative of his influence on Barth.32   
 The problem with McCormack’s argument is that little evidence is offered for 
his minimizing of Kierkegaard’s contribution.  Kierkegaard’s contribution is said to 
be “significant” but not primary or major when paired next to neo-Kantianism. To 
support his thesis, McCormack depends on the work of Michael Beintker who 
concludes “that most of the conceptual building blocks needed to produce the 
characteristic shape of dialectic in Romans II were already in place before the 
encounter with Kierkegaard through Barth’s reception of his brother Heinrich’s 
Ursprungsphilosophie.”33  McCormack’s contention that “certain modes of thought” 
were in place that could account for the dramatic shift from Romans I to Romans II 
raises the question as to which ones.  Assuming these “modes of thought” were 
rooted in neo-Kantianism, are we to believe that Kierkegaard only provided Barth 
with terminology that lacked any substantive relation to the theological method 
uniquely employed by Barth?  It appears strange that neo-Kantianism was the true 
inspiration for a theological system that reflects Kierkegaard’s thought—a “system” 
that, by Barth’s own admission, he owes to Kierkegaard.  
 
Task and Procedure 
Until now, I have suggested that the change in Barth’s view of Kierkegaard 
resulted in his suspicion that Kierkegaard’s theology expresses an inescapable 
negativity in humanity’s relation to God.  I have further suggested that due to the 
inescapable abyss of our predicament, coupled with the lack of true objective 
knowledge of God, Kierkegaard’s theology was understood as being decidedly 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 237. 
33 Ibid., 237. 
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anthropological. In short, Kierkegaard’s theology is one absent of grace. This 
misreading, accepted by most Barthians, I have called “the Barthian lens;” those who 
have read Kierkegaard in light of Barth’s lens have tended to accept uncritically 
Barth’s view on the matter.   
Amidst this unfortunate circumstance, I propose that although Barth acquired 
an incorrect view of Kierkegaard, his theology, nevertheless, betrays a strong 
likeness to Kierkegaard’s own. Although Barth thought he had moved away from 
Kierkegaard, in light of the influence Kierkegaard had on him (although probably 
unaware of the extent to which Kierkegaard had affected him) his conscious 
corrections to the deficiencies in the theology of the time had in the end resulted in 
his being one of the truest interpreters of Kierkegaard. Thus, despite the pursuit of an 
interpretation that leads Barth to draw away from Kierkegaard, his thought, 
ironically, ends up looking a lot closer to Kierkegaard than even he himself 
recognised; Barth had not gradually drifted from Kierkegaard’s thought but rather, 
by 1923, came to parallel it even more noticeably than in his early days. 
Therefore, this project seeks to provide an account of how Barth’s use of 
specific concepts in his Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics compare to 
Kierkegaard’s own use of these same concepts in order to reveal that Barth’s reading 
of Kierkegaard as being anthropological is fundamentally incorrect. In doing so, my 
task endeavours to come to terms with how different these two thinkers really are 
one from another. Of course there are difficulties which face my endeavour, namely, 
that the Barth of Romans II differs, partly, from the Barth of the Göttingen 
Dogmatics and beyond. Also, understanding Kierkegaard is no small feat. However, 
as I stated, if I am correct in my belief that Barth’s theological adjustments do not 
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further him from Kierkegaard but rather bring them closer, then his continuing 
theological development should facilitate this conceptual comparison rather than 
hinder it.  
Furthermore, my hope for this investigation is one which will account not 
only for the affinities between these two thinkers but also one that ultimately offers a 
correction to Barth’s criticisms of Kierkegaard. Whilst the concepts under scrutiny 
will vary between Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics, the main points of focus 
in this investigation will be the concepts of Revelation, Paradox, History, Faith, 
Subjectivity, and the IQD. Insofar as an examination of one or another particular 
concept, for example, revelation, necessitates a consideration of sub-categories 
which fall under its rubric, sub-categories such as indirect-communication, 
contemporaneity, Objectivity and offence, shall also be examined.   
As a whole, this investigation aims to respond to a series of key questions: are 
Barth’s later criticisms of Kierkegaard, as seen in the 1963 speech, directed to his 
understanding of Kierkegaard at the time of Romans II? Or are his criticisms directed 
against the later encroaching Kierkegaardian existentialism he located in thinkers 
such as Bultmann and Gogarten?  If Barth, in thinking he has moved away from 
Kierkegaard, has actually moved closer to him without realizing it himself, which 
concepts dramatically differ from Kierkegaard, and from his use of Kierkegaard in 
Romans II and beyond?  Moreover, if Barth was aware of both the negative and the 
positive components in Kierkegaard’s dialectic, we might ask whether his criticisms 
relate more to the dangers of certain readings of Kierkegaard, rather than 
Kierkegaard’s thought specifically. 
This project will proceed in the following manner; in light of the ambiguity 
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that not only shrouds Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard but Kierkegaard himself, it is 
paramount that an account of Kierkegaard’s thought first be offered. As it will soon 
be noted, this is a difficult task given the enigmatic nature of Kierkegaard’s writings. 
Despite the difficulty, Chapter One will endeavour to come to terms with 
Kierkegaard’s thought as being thoroughly Christian.  
Therefore, I shall first address the nature of his authorship as a whole with 
regard to its theological intention. Such a treatment is necessary since Kierkegaard’s 
authorship appears divided into two seemingly contradictory parts, the 
pseudonymous writings and the signed ones: these two must be read in light of each 
other as part of a unified theological corpus. From this, I will then proceed to 
examine the nature of his thought within its historical encounter with Hegelianism in 
order to promote a specific contextual questioning and response by Kierkegaard in 
relation to his contemporaries. This discussion provides an invaluable service to 
Kierkegaard interpretation insofar as many interpreters of Kierkegaard extract him 
out of his context only to translate him within the lexicon of the twentieth and, now, 
twenty-first century. Next, Kierkegaard’s conception of Christianity in relation to 
reason will be considered by means of examining those concepts mentioned earlier 
on.   
Chapter Two will undertake a thorough investigation of Barth’s Romans II in 
relation to Kierkegaard’s thought. As stated, this will be carried out in a conceptual 
comparison of those same categories discerned in Chapter One. In Chapter Two, a 
more thorough discussion of the problematic nature of Barth’s relation to 
Kierkegaard shall be offered which accounts for the numerous arguments offered by 
both Barth and Kierkegaard scholarship for or against a strong Kierkegaardian 
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presence in Romans II. Most problems surrounding Kierkegaard’s presence in 
Romans II do, however, pertain to a discussion of influence which, although related 
to conceptual analysis, usually places one or the other thinker at the centre of the 
investigation, which inevitably leads to an inadequate consideration of other 
influences; arguing for primacy of influence is something I hope to avoid.  
Following an examination of this problem, I shall offer a thorough discussion 
of Barth’s use of the IQD. This will consist of an investigation of the historical 
milieu of Barth’s day wherein his methodology of diastasis in Romans II will assume 
it significance. From here, I will then discuss Barth’s familiarity with Kierkegaard’s 
thought by means of examining the Kierkegaard Renaissance at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Following this examination, I shall then proceed to a specific 
examination of the concept of the IQD itself to that of a discussion of its ground, this 
supposedly being a decisive point of departure between Kierkegaard and Barth – as if 
the former grounding it in the self’s despair over the self in contrast to the latter’s 
grounding of this difference in sin. Inevitably, the issue of Barth’s dialectics emerges 
here in relation to whether or not there is an overcoming of this difference, and, if so, 
by what means. 
In the wake of this discussion, I will proceed on to an examination of Barth’s 
misapprehension of Kierkegaard’s dialectic in noting Kierkegaard’s adherence to a 
positive dimension of the IQD.  Aiding this examination is the work of Kierkegaard 
scholar Simon Podmore which understands Kierkegaard in light of his Lutheran 
heritage. Following this investigation, I will then examine Barth’s conception of 
revelation in relation to the IQD by means of examining how the concepts of history, 
paradox, and faith operate within this relation. The outcome of this investigation 
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intends to account for the parallel between Barth and Kierkegaard in their 
understanding of these concepts.  
Chapters Three and Four will initiate an investigation into unexplored 
territory, not only within Barth scholarship but also with regard to discussions 
addressing Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard, namely, Barth’s Göttingen Dogmatics, 
Instruction in the Christian Religion (offered first as lectures in from the summer 
semester 1924 to summer 1925).  This venture is unique in that, after Romans II, it is 
believed that Barth is finished in his utilization of Kierkegaard, generally speaking.34 
Therefore, Chapter Three will commence with an investigation into Barth’s 
anthropology within the Göttingen Dogmatics which should not only mark the 
intriguing parallels between these two thinkers but will also serve in concluding 
Chapter Three’s discussion of whether Kierkegaard’s dialectic of the IQD is wholly 
negative as Barth thought.  
Drawing on Podmore’s work in full, this examination of Barth’s 
anthropology will reveal that Kierkegaard’s use of the IQD exhibits both a positive 
and a negative aspect. It shall emerge that Barth’s reference to the “Yes” and the 
“No” differs little from Kierkegaard’s own insistence upon the positive side of the 
dialectic. From here the chosen concepts will once again be analyzed in order to 
account for their similarities and differences from Romans II demonstrating the 
extent, at this point, to which Barth parallels Kierkegaard. In conclusion, I shall draw 
the argument together by making some definitive statements as to Barth’s overall 
relation to Kierkegaard.   
                                                 
34 For example, in his The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology (Louisville, Kentucky: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), Gary Dorrien states, “Barth’s second edition Romans contained 
only a few references to Kierkegaard and these references soon disappeared altogether from his 





KIERKEGAARD’S DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY 
 
Introduction: Procedure 
This Chapter seeks to accomplish four objectives. First, in light of the 
numerous interpretations of Kierkegaard’s authorship, arising from the breadth of 
topics that he addressed, I shall endeavour to substantiate the most viable reading of 
his thought. Within Kierkegaard scholarship one will find that he is understood 
variously as a poet, philosopher, religious thinker, aesthete, and literary figure. 
Scholarship has divided his writings into a sporadic spectrum of genres and has thus 
obviated a sense of continuity within his authorship as a whole.  Although I think 
Kierkegaard must be understood primarily as a religious writer, it shall be argued 
below that he incorporates the aforementioned variety of genres into a unified 
theological project.  
From there, I will provide a brief sketch of Kierkegaard’s historical milieu in 
order to counter those inadequate, fragmentary readings which tend to arise because 
they are a-historical in nature. The brevity of this section owes its debt to the scope 
of Jon Stewart’s work, which has contributed to a re-reading of Kierkegaard within 
his historical context, a re-reading which procures a more coherent and consistent 
comprehension of his work.35 As Stewart’s work demonstrates, readings of 
                                                 
35 Complicating the attempt to provide a coherent understanding of Kierkegaard is the 
continuing debate about the latter’s relation to the philosopher Georg Wilhlem Fredrick Hegel. 
Although much of Kierkegaard scholarship paints this relationship negatively, there are those, 
particularly Jon Stewart, who question this common conception. In his book, Kierkegaard’s Relations 
to Hegel Reconsidered, Stewart articulates persuasively that this common conception has little textual 
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Kierkegaard which neglect the historical circumstances to which his writings respond 
result in inaccurate anachronisms, such as the false supposition that Hegel was the 
arch-enemy of Kierkegaard (rather than the Danish Hegelians Martensen and 
Heiberg).36  By providing a historical frame of reference, I hope to identify the 
questions and problems that faced Kierkegaard. In short, the over-arching goal of this 
discussion is to suggest that Kierkegaard is best understood as a contextually 
grounded religious writer. 
The second objective aims to provide an examination of Kierkegaard’s 
address to speculative philosophy’s encroachment on the theology of his day by 
means of his use of specific concepts. This section will address the following 
concerns: First, I will demonstrate Kierkegaard’s belief that reason has no claim to 
knowledge of God, since God and humanity are infinitely qualitatively distinct. From 
this, I will then show why Kierkegaard believed this to be the case, namely, as a 
                                                                                                                                          
support. In fact, what he finds central to this misconception is the inadequacy of most Kierkegaard 
scholars to produce a fruitful and faithful reading of Hegel’s work and intention.  As is well known 
among those familiar with this ongoing debate, Hegel is typically seen as the arch enemy of 
Kierkegaard and the central target of his polemics. This point can be observed in Stewart’s analysis of 
the work of scholars such as, Eduard Geismar, N.H Søe, Søren Holm, Gregor Malantschuk, Robert 
Bretall, and Niels Thulstrup, who remain firmly within the confines of the common conception; see 3-
32.  With Stewart’s engaging and critical analysis of the relation between these two prominent 
thinkers, the common conception has much to answer for. Whilst it would be wrong to negate all 
differences existing between Kierkegaard and Hegel (as Stewart himself is aware), Stewart’s work 
demonstrates the need for a re-evaluation of the “common conception.”  In line with Stewart, the 
position presented here is that although Kierkegaard does find disagreement with Hegel, much of his 
polemics are aimed not at Hegel himself, but rather are directed to those Hegelians with whom 
Kierkegaard was acquainted, namely, Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791- 1860), and particularly, Hans 
Lassen Martensen (1808-84) who had been Kierkegaard’s teacher and tutor. Even more surprising is 
the extent to which Kierkegaard had been positively influenced by Hegel. 
36 As Stewart convincingly argues, from the beginning Martensen’s desire to incorporate 
Hegel’s philosophy can be seen in various forms. In the context of Fragments, Kierkegaard, it seems, 
is addressing Martensen’s attempt to apply Hegel’s doctrine of mediation to speculative theology. 
Hegel’s doctrine of mediation proposes that “individual concepts generate their opposites, and these 
pairs of categories are mediated, thus producing new concepts” (see Stewart, 293). The result of 
Martensen’s attempts is to allow the basic doctrines of Christianity to be accepted by unaided reason 
by means of Hegel’s doctrine of mediation and immanence. Thus Kierkegaard finds that for 
Martensen certain doctrines beyond the grasp of human reason, such as the Incarnation, become 
accessible as mere objects for human knowledge. In this light it seems quite natural that Kierkegaard 
explicates the doctrine of the Incarnation as something which is an absolute paradox, claiming that no 




result of human sinfulness. To that end, I will further explicate the contradictions that 
ensue when reason ignores this difference. In concluding this discussion, I will 
examine Kierkegaard’s conception of the Incarnation which served him in placing 
the ultimate barrier to historicism and speculative philosophy’s encroachment on 
Christianity. This discussion will endeavour to demonstrate that, in light of the IQD, 
knowledge of God in Christ issues unaided human reason with nothing but both a 
conceptual and ontological paradox.  
The third objective of this Chapter entails outlining Kierkegaard’s qualms 
with historicism in its endeavour to overcome the contradictions central to the 
Christian faith. This investigation will commence with an examination of 
Kierkegaard’s notion of historical knowledge, specifically, as it relates to the 
historicity of the Incarnation. This discussion seeks to answer the question 
Kierkegaard poses, “What does history tell us about Christ with regard to his deity?” 
Finally, in light of the barriers Kierkegaard places on the human apprehension of 
God, I will demonstrate that such barriers exist in order to allow for faith as the 
human response to revelation, not reason.  Only in light of this interpretation of 
Kierkegaard will the conceptual comparison between him and Barth be accessible 
and enlightening.  
Kierkegaard’s Authorship 
Introduction 
As stated, Kierkegaard’s authorship has been nothing less than controversial. 
The debate continues with regard to the nature of his authorship in general, the 
relation of his authorship to his epistemology, and of the relationship between his 
authorship and Christianity. Considering whether or not Kierkegaard’s thought 
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represents an overall theological continuity, Louis Mackey states, “that there can be 
no such ‘point of view’ for Kierkegaard’s writing, only points of view.”37  In the 
debate regarding the shape of his epistemology, Kierkegaard has been linked to a 
range of thinkers such as Luther, Kant, Fichte and Hegel.38 Complicating matters is 
Kierkegaard’s insistence that Christianity can only be approached “subjectively”, 
resulting in the designation of his epistemology as being “subjective”.39 In my 
estimation, however, the most controversial of all the authorship debates is that of the 
nature of Kierkegaard’s conception of Christianity and his authorial relation to it. 
Kierkegaard has been associated with irrationalism, rationalism, fideism, and supra-
rationalism.40 The question of Kierkegaard’s personal relation to Christianity has also 
                                                 
37
 C. Steven Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical 
Fragments (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 4.  Against Mackey’s view, Louis Pojman, 
in his work, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, (Alabama: University 
Press, 1984) offers that “Sometimes Kierkegaard is interpreted as a poet, sometimes as the Father of 
Existentialism, sometimes as the scourge of Idealism.  The important thing is to see that Kierkegaard’s 
fundamental purpose was to make eminently clear what Christianity is all about.”  
38 For more on this, see Ronald Green’s Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1992) and C. Stephen Evans, “Kant and Kierkegaard on the 
Possibility of Metaphysics” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, edited by D.Z. Phillips and 
Timothy Tessin (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), 5-20. 
39 Insofar as Kierkegaard speaks against the rational and historical methodology in seeking to 
objectify and make more certain the truths of Christianity, coupled with his belief that such 
approaches inevitably lead to a mere objective adherence to the Christian faith, Kierkegaard’s 
conception of  “subjectivity as Truth” has been grossly misunderstood. This discussion shall be 
addressed throughout this thesis. For a reading which offers this subjective/relativistic interpretation 
see, Frithiof Brandt, Søren Kierkegaard: His Life – His Works, translated by Ann R. Born 
(Copenhagen: Frede Rasmussens Bogtrykker, 1963). On the other hand, as David J. Kangas points out 
in his work, J. G. Fichte: From Transcendental Ego to Existence, Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
“truth as subjectivity” must be understood within the context of Kierkegaard’s relation to Fichte. 
Kangas argues, for both Kierkegaard and Fichte, “To think philosophically is to accomplish within 
oneself and for oneself the very event through which objectivity is first given; it is to think 
subjectivity it its constitutive power.”(79) Kangas further notes, for Kierkegaard, “To say that ‘truth is 
subjectivity’ is not merely to oppose subjective truth to objective truth…[rather]…what is at stake for 
both Fichte and Kierkegaard in prioritizing interiority or subjectivity is to uphold, not some subjective 
content of truth, but the conditions for any objectivity. Both thinkers were seized by the profound 
conviction that objective truth constitutes a derivative mode of truth.”(79) For more on Kangas’ 
argument see, David J. Kangas, “J.G. Fichte: From Transcendental Ego to Existence” in Kierkegaard 
and His German Contemporaries, Tome I: Philosophy, edited by Jon Stewart (Ashgate: 2007). 
40 Against those who view Kierkegaard as endorsing some form of irrationalism, George 
Pattison, in his work, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard (Acumen, 2005), holds that “If we read 
Kierkegaard as a whole he does in fact create a context in which the Christian claims are meaningful, 
if not reasonable.” He adds, “It is merely intellectual laziness to declare that Kierkegaard is a fideistic 
irrationalist;” see pp. 134, 165 Furthermore, most debates concerning Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
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produced varying opinions.41 In light of a range of hypotheses about Kierkegaard's 
faith, Stewart’s contribution is indeed helpful.42  Stewart rightly diagnoses the mass 
of interpretational confusion as resulting from a-historical readings, and instead seeks 
                                                                                                                                          
the rationality of Christianity inevitably revolve around his presentation of Christian tenets as being 
paradoxical. In this light many understand Kierkegaard as an irrationalist. However, as Time Rose 
argues in his book, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology, (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), “the 
paradox can best be understood as a mystery instead of a logical contradiction.”  This is not to say that 
the paradoxical unity of God and man is somehow solved, but it does help to reveal a complex entity 
which reason cannot comprehend.  Hence, the theological retention of mystery is quite appropriate. In 
light of Kierkegaard’s favour of mystery, the supra-rational reading has found support in scholars such 
as George Pattision, C. Stephen Evans, and even Jon Stewart.  Most irrationalist or fideist 
interpretations erroneously substantiate their claims with reference to Kierkegaard’s pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus. Climacus profusely argues against rational and historical investigations of 
Christianity insofar as Christianity evades such investigation. On this reading it would appear that 
Kierkegaard’s view of Christianity is both un-historical and irrational. However, most fail to 
acknowledge Stewart’s observation that “It must be noted that Climacus has nothing against the fields 
of philology, history, per se or even against the knowledge of religion or Christianity that results from 
them. What he objects to is the use of their results in an attempt to ground faith discursively.” For 
more, see Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 467. 
Arguing in the same supra-rational vein as Stewart are Nerina Jansen and Bruce Kirmmse. Jansen 
states, “Kierkegaard certainly did not deny the need for scientific and philosophical truth in modern 
society. When he objects that everything has become objective he is referring to a confusion created 
by modernity, namely that the art of existence is now communicated as scientific knowledge.” For 
more see, Nerina Jansen, “Deception in the Service of the Truth: Magister Kierkegaard and the 
Problem of Communication” in the International Kierkegaard Commentary Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, edited by Robert Perkins (Mercer University Press, 1997), 
115-122.  Kirmmse, in his book, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1990), argues “Reason can come to the understanding that all 
these attempts to understand the key to divinity as being lodged in history, etc. are unreasonable and 
wrong, while faith, on the other hand, can see that these efforts to limit God’s absolute transcendence 
by assimilating him to human categories of historical understanding are mockery of God, blasphemy.” 
For more discussions against a relativistic reading of Kierkegaard’s notion of Truth, see David E. 
Mercer, Kierkegaard’s Living Room: The Relation between Faith and History in Philosophical 
Fragments (Montreal: McGill – Queens University Press, 2001); Georg L. Strengren, “Connatural 
Knowledge in Aquinas and Kierkegaardian Subjectivity in Kierkegaardiana udgivne af Søren 
Kierkegaard, translated by Niels Thulstrup, Vol. X (København: C.A. Reitzel Boghandel, 1977); 
Sylvia Walsh, Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 28-39; Steven Emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation (Albany,  NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1996); and C. Stephen Evans, Subjectivity and Religious Belief: 
An Historical, Critical Study (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian University Press, 1978). 
41 For further reading on  both Kierkegaard’s relation and view of Christianity see, David R. 
Law, “How Christian is Kierkegaard’s God?” in the Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 48, No. 3, 
edited by A.I.C. Heron and I.R. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 301-314; Paul Sponheim, 
Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence (London: SCM Press LTD, 1968); and G.E. and G.B. 
Arbaugh, Kierkegaard’s Authorship: A Guide to the Writings of Kierkegaard (London: George Alllen 
& Unwin LTD, 1968), specifically pages, 11-18. 
42 My work relies heavily on Stewart’s historical analysis of Kierkegaard’s thought.  For a 
full discussion of the foundation on which my claims rest see Jon Stewart’s, Kierkegaard’s Relations 
to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); A History of Hegelianism in 
Golden Age Denmark, 3 Volumes, Tome I: The Heiberg Period: 1824-1836; Tome II: The Martensen 
Period: 1837-1842; Tome III: Kierkegaard and the Left-Hegelian Period: 1842-1860 (Copenhagen: 
C.A. Reitzel, 2007). 
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to place Kierkegaard in relation to his contemporaries, contemporaries who 
expressed similar concerns as well as employing similar methodologies as 
Kierkegaard.  
Following Stewart’s lead, Jamie Turnbull’s contribution, which shall be 
discussed later, focuses on the significance of the 1839 Rationalism and 
Supernaturalism debate as the impetus for Kierkegaard’s authorship, insisting that it 
is “essentially informed by his theological, super-naturalist, and Christological 
commitments.”43 This debate is significant for a sound understanding of Kierkegaard 
since it forms the context against which Kierkegaard’s obsessive consideration of 
concepts such as Paradox, Subjectivity, Objectivity, Faith, Offence, and History etc., 
can be understood as part of the placement of Christianity beyond the grasp of 
speculative philosophy. As will soon be discussed, this debate commenced with the 
questioning of the legitimacy of the Hegelians’ efforts to apply a Hegelian logic to 
the Christian tenets of faith (an exercise the Hegelians thought would benefit 
Christianity by making sense of its contradictions). As Turnbull notes, “if Hegel 
were correct, it would seem that the terms ‘God’ and ‘man’ cannot be held to be 
absolutely different, but are, ultimately, different predicates of one and the same 
thing. In this respect Hegel’s logic appeared to resolve the paradox of the 
incarnation.”44  It was against the attempts of the Hegelians to explain away 
Christian mystery and paradox that Kierkegaard employed concepts which insist 
upon the limitation of human reason. These concepts are designed to show that in 
relation to the central tenets of Christianity, reason comes to a halt.45  
                                                 
43 Jamie Turnbull (Unpublished manuscript) Kierkegaard’s Supernaturalism: Making Sense 
of the Project of Indirect Communication, Chapters, 2 and 3. 
44 Ibid., 2. 




Historical Backdrop: Hegelian Christianity 
All thinkers exist in a context conditioned by social, religious, philosophical 
and political factors, and are thus historically conditioned. Kierkegaard was born into 
the politically, religiously, and socially volatile time of “Golden Age Denmark”.46 
Stewart rightly insists, therefore, that much of Kierkegaard’s polemics is historically 
conditioned, particularly by his relation to certain contemporaries such as Hans 
Lassen Martensen and Johan Ludvig Heiberg.47 Kierkegaard believed that the efforts 
of Heiberg and Martensen jeopardized the true nature of Christianity, through the 
incorporation of their understanding of Hegel’s thought into Christianity in order to 
mediate the paradoxes of the Christian faith. Kierkegaard employed pseudonyms to 
address the threat facing Christianity posed by speculative philosophy. As Stewart 
states: 
Here Climacus argues against Heiberg’s (and Martensen’s) claim that mediation is the 
principle of Christianity, and that dogmas such as the Incarnation and the Trinity cannot 
be made sense of without it. Climacus’ central plea is to avoid confusing the two spheres 





In the mid 1820s, Heiberg returned from Berlin where he had met Hegel 
personally.  After this encounter he enthusiastically sought to introduce Hegel’s 
thought to his fellow Danes. This task was pursued in his many articles, as well as in 
                                                 
46 For a further discussion of the climate  pervading nineteenth century Denmark in 
Kierkegaard’s time see the following: Bruce H. Kirmmse’s Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990); Jon Stewart’s, Kierkegaard’s 
Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); A History of 
Hegeliansim in Golden Age Denmark, 3 Volumes, Tome I: The Heiberg Period: 1824-1836; Tome II: 
The Martensen Period: 1837-1842; Tome III: Kierkegaard and the Left-Hegelian Period: 1842-1860 
(Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 2007). 
47 For a full account of Kierkegaard’s thought in relation to his contemporaries and the issues 
that consumed the day, see Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
48 Jon Stewart, “Johan Ludvig Heiberg: Kierkegaard’s Criticism of Hegel’s Danish 
Apologist” in Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries, Tome I, Philosophy, Politics and Social 
Theory Vol. 7, pp. 35-71. Edited by Jon Stewart (Ashgate, 2009), 63. 
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the debates resulting from such articles, where he incorporated Hegel’s thought 
within his own philosophy.49  Sensitive to Heiberg’s own merit as a philosopher, 
Stewart shows how this often neglected figure had influenced “an entire generation 
of literary scholarship and was profoundly influential on the young Kierkegaard.”50 
Stewart substantiates his claim that Kierkegaard’s efforts were historically 
conditioned by demonstrating the importance of Heiberg’s thought on the former; 
along with Martensen, Heiberg’s work demanded a response from Kierkegaard.  
As Stewart notes, many of Heiberg’s writings were controversial given his 
adaptation of Hegel’s thought for his own philosophical purposes, particularly his On 
the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age.51  Here Heiberg argues that only 
Hegel’s philosophy offers the remedy for an age in which its people have become 
                                                 
49 Jon Stewart’s, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 50-54. Kierkegaard’s complaint was that Hegelian philosophy had made 
Christianity into a system of objective adherence which was the result of philosophical speculation.  
However, this had not always been the case.  However, in his work, In the Twilight of Christendom: 
Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History, Stephen Crites notes how the early Hegel understood 
Christianity in a way not so different from Kierkegaard. His argument is as follows. Hegel conceived 
religion as having two poles: one objective, the other subjective.  The objective side of Christianity is 
related to its objective, historical, and doctrinal nature which is in turn related to the uninterested 
observer.  However, the subjective side only concerns the religious man for it is the essence of 
Christianity. (30) Unlike Kierkegaard, by 1800, Hegel “had already become convinced that 
subjectivity and objectivity were not irreconcilable and indeed had come to consider it a chief task of 
religion to unite them.”(30) Eventually, Hegel would discover that the Greek model of society offered 
the example he needed for his unification. According to Hegel, the Greeks offered a perfect example 
of subjectivity and objectivity united within civilization. (36) It was from this conception of 
“civilization” that he developed his concept of “folk religion.”  This concept was for him the unifying 
principle which acted as a “mediating structure in the cultural existence of a people, binding its 
otherwise fragmented experience and conflicting motives and purpose into an integrated common 
life.”(37) It also gave rise to his philosophy of spirit which “arises immanently out of the actual 
development of human consciousness in history.”(44) Thus, having abandoned his earlier conception 
that the essence of Christianity already exists at its founding, the truth of Christianity results from all 
of humanity working together through a historical process of thesis and antithesis, resulting in a 
synthesis. (41) “Christianity, like any other expression of spirit, can only be comprehended in its 
entire historical development: And the significance of this development is revealed, not in its 
beginnings, but in its results.”(41)  The result Hegel had created was a religion which existed in the 
mass, where the common spirit of all is nourished.  It was this form of Christianity that became the 
object of Kierkegaard’s attack. For more, see Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel 
vs Kierkegaard on Faith and History (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: American Academy of Religion, 
1972). 
50
 Stewart, “Johan Ludvig Heiberg: Kierkegaard’s Criticism of Hegel’s Danish Apologist”, 
35. 
51 Ibid., 45. 
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alienated from their culture.52 Ultimately Heiberg’s allegiance to Hegel’s thought 
demonstrates a preference for philosophy over theology as a means for cultural 
redemption.53 Furthermore, as Stewart notes, Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture to the 
Logic Course of 1835 inflamed this controversy through the suggestion that since all 
thinking is the result of the categories, religion becomes subsumed under the task of 
philosophy inasmuch as religion itself employs categories (God, sin, self, salvation, 
etc) to contemplate its content.54 Given the force of this controversial line, it can be 
of little wonder that Kierkegaard’s writings directly confront many of Heiberg’s and 
Martensen’s attempts to advance a rational Christianity. 
However, of greater significance for contextualizing Kierkegaard was the 
1839 Rationalism and Supernaturalism debate. It was initiated as a result of Johan 
Alfred Bornemann’s review of his friend Martensen’s dissertation On the Autonomy 
of Human Self-Consciousness55  which pays homage to Martensen’s efforts in 
advancing Hegel and speculative theology at the University of Copenhagen. In short, 
Bornemann attributes to Martensen the position that modern Christianity need no 
longer operate as the “older supernaturalism” whereby supernaturalism and 
rationalism stood in stark contrast to each other. Martensen states, “In theology both 
rationalism and supernaturalism are antiquated standpoints which belong to an age 
which has disappeared.”56 Martensen’s position implies that although theology had at 
one time maintained a separation between knowledge and faith, rationalism and 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 47. 
55 Stewart, “Johan Ludvig Heiberg: Kierkegaard’s Criticism of Hegel’s Danish Apologist”, 
59. 
56 Jakob Peter Mynster, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” in Mynster’s ‘Rationalism, 
Supernaturalism’ and the Debate about Mediation, Edited and translated by Jon Stewart, Texts from 
Golden Age Denmark, Volume 5 (Soren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009), 95. Quote also in Bornemann’s review, pp. 61. 
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supernaturalism, reason and revelation, this opposition is no longer necessary for 
Christian thought (in light of Hegel’s philosophy), since  the Incarnation is seen as 
providing a supreme model of mediation.57  
The 1839 debate centred on the consequences such a position has for 
Christian thought. Certain individuals, like Sibbern and Mynster, with whom 
Kierkegaard was acquainted, had issued a response to Martensen’s thesis. In his 
essay, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism”, Mynster argues in favour of the law of 
excluded middle, and thus against Martensen. Coming to both Martensen and 
Hegel’s defence, Heiberg responded with an article, “A Remark on Logic in 
Reference to the Right Reverend Bishop Mynster’s Treatise on Rationalism and 
Supernaturalism.” According to both Martensen and Heiberg, “the incarnation or the 
person of Christ requires that there be no law of excluded middle since it states that 
Christ is both human and God at the same time.”58 Both thinkers attest, if one insists 
on the law of excluded middle, then one must either deny the humanity of Christ or 
his deity.59  Martensen’s portrayal of the Incarnation as evidence of mediation 
between the opposing terms of God and man is not problematic in and of itself, for 
this adheres to the basic logic of the Incarnation.  
However, what Mynster, and later Kierkegaard, contest is Martensen’s 
apparent grievance against the older theology’s reducing Christianity “to a foreign 
authority for consciousness, an impenetrable mystery that could be grasped by faith 
                                                 
57 Hans Lassen Martensen, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the principium exclusi medii” 
in Mynster’s ‘Rationalism, Supernaturalism’ and the Debate about Mediation, Edited and translated 
by Jon Stewart, Texts from Golden Age Denmark, Volume 5 (Soren Kierkegaard Research Centre, 
University of Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009), 130, 133. Preceding this quotation, 
Martensen argues that the law of excluded middle, “cannot be a final court of appeals for 
theology…when we see how Christianity continually sublates it.” 
58 Stewart, “Johan Ludvig Heiberg: Kierkegaard’s Criticism of Hegel’s Danish Apologist”, 
60. 
59 Ibid., 60. 
32 
 
but not knowledge.”60 In short, Christianity demands the adherence to Christ’s nature 
as being both human and divine. This adherence however does not entail a logic 
explanation as to the rationality of this union in Christ. 
Martensen’s position presents dangerous implications for Christian thought, 
as Mynster shows: “In each case, subjective human reason is the sole organ through 
which the truth expresses itself.”61 Mynster argues that Martensen accedes too much 
to human reason and thus affirms the ability of the self to achieve that which it 
cannot, namely, a logical mediation. Such human mediation of truth is both logically 
and ontologically antithetical to basic Christian belief. The central tenets of Christian 
faith have always been held as being accessible exclusively to faith, not reason, and 
thus recognize “man’s drive to another and higher help.”62 In the forthcoming 
discussion of Kierkegaard’s thought, the problematic nature of Martensen’s position 
will be pertinent in understanding why Kierkegaard sees the definition of the infinite 
qualitative difference between God and humanity as urgent. According to 
Kierkegaard, this difference was jeopardized by Martensen’s criticism of Jacobi’s 
view of revelation as being “one-sidedly as object and… not recognized in its 
subjective immanence in consciousness.”63 In response to Jacobi, Martensen holds 
that we recognize that revelation is “self-consciousness’ own essence, its inner true 
self.”64  
To anticipate, Kierkegaard’s concepts of paradox, faith, subjectivity, etc. 
appear to be conditioned by the jeopardy into which Martensen had placed Christian 
                                                 
60 Martensen, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the principium exclusi medii” in Mynster’s 
‘Rationalism, Supernaturalism’ and the Debate about Mediation, 136. 
61 Mynster, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” in Mynster’s ‘Rationalism, Supernaturalism’ and 
the Debate about Mediation, 101. 
62 Ibid., 105. 
63 Martensen, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the principium exclusi medii” in Mynster’s 
‘Rationalism, Supernaturalism’ and the Debate about Mediation, 142. 
64 Ibid., 142. 
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orthodoxy. Below, it will be demonstrated how Martensen’s conception of history 
and the meaning of the Incarnation are refuted by Kierkegaard’s own treatment of 
these issues. As Stewart points out, Kierkegaard was obviously aware of this debate 
and the problem posed to orthodox Christianity.65  One sees, then, how the 
intellectual atmosphere in which Kierkegaard operated was one heavily immersed in 
the discussion of Christianity’s relation to Hegelian philosophy.66   
In light of the problems presented by Danish Hegelianism, Kierkegaard’s task 
can be described as offering a rational defence of the limits of Christian knowledge. 
Just as Luther had demurred the reduction of Christian life to nothing more than 
habitual practices divorced from true spiritual significance, so Kierkegaard believed 
that the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), at the hands of 
his followers, had damaged the Christianity of the early 19th century.  Drawing on 
Luther’s context as an analogy for the problems facing Danish Christianity, 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, describes pre-Reformation 
Catholicism as one characterized by a surfeit of objectivity: “Did not the papacy have 
objectivity and objective definitions and the objective, more of the objective, the 
objective in superabundance? What did it lack? Appropriation, inwardness.”67  But 
why should Kierkegaard find objective Christianity so appalling? It would seem that 
adherence to a faith without objectivity would be more appalling in that such a faith 
would be rationally unwarranted.  
                                                 
65 Stewart, “Johan Ludvig Heiberg: Kierkegaard’s Criticism of Hegel’s Danish Apologist”, 
61. 
66
 It is important to note that before Kierkegaard ever begin his critique of Danish 
Hegelianism, others, such as Fredrik Christian Sibbern (1785-1872), Poul Martin Moller (1794-1838), 
and even the Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster (1775-1854), among others, had already entered the arena of 
critical analysis regarding the elusive and brilliant work of Hegel. If there was anyone more 
enthusiastic about introducing Hegel to Denmark, it was Heiberg. Yet even Heiberg himself was 
critical of Hegel, rejected the notion of being Hegel’s disciple (Stewart, 55).  
67 Søren Kierkegaard, CUP, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 366. 
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According to Kierkegaard, objective truth could be understood in two ways.  
The first is historical truth, the second, philosophical truth.  Historical truth is 
established by historical evidences or reports whereas philosophical truth is 
established in relation “to the eternal truth.”68  The question then, for Kierkegaard, is 
in what sense are such notions of truth related to Christianity? It is not that he 
believed Christianity existed without objective or historical truth as if it was a mere 
belief divorced from reality. Concerning the historicity of Christianity, Kierkegaard 
says, “Objectively viewed Christianity is a given fact,”69  meaning, “Christianity is a 
historical truth; it appears at a certain time and certain place and consequently it is 
relevant to a certain time and place.”70  But his concern is with the inevitable 
consequences from which the “inquiring, speculating, knowing subject accordingly 
asks about the truth but not about the subjective truth, the truth of appropriation,”71  
and to what extent, if any, historical investigation and rationalism inhibit or promote 
appropriation. Thus, for Kierkegaard, “The objective issue, then, would be about the 
truth of Christianity. The subjective issue is about the individual’s relation to 
Christianity.”72   
But even more, as will be developed later, the centre of Christianity itself 
poses an impenetrable barrier to the nonchalant acceptance of Christianity, namely, 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 21. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Søren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, Volume 2, F-K, Edited and Translated by 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), 232. 
71 Kierkegaard, CUP, 21. 
72 Ibid., 17. For Kierkegaard, if Christianity is not about objective adherence but rather about 
subjective appropriation, true Christian living, then the obsessive efforts of theological scholarship 
and historicism fail to even understand the history of Christianity with regard to its infiltrating the 
world. He asks, “Or was it perhaps objective doctrine, the objective, which triumphantly penetrated 
the whole world? What infinite nonsense! No, the objective has nothing to do with such things; it 
never moves from the spot. No, it was not doctrine, it was not the objective which conquered the 
world, but it was the blood of the martyrs and the sacrifices of the faithful – in short, it was the 
subjectivities who triumphantly fought the doctrine through.” (357) See, Søren Kierkegaard’s 
Journals and Papers, Volume 4, S-Z, edited and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 1975. 
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the Incarnation. To accept this doctrine as just another objective truth claim similar 
to that of other historical phenomena, would result, according to Kierkegaard, in an 
objective relationship to Christianity. “To objective reflection, truth becomes 
something objective, an object, and the point is to disregard the subject.  To 
subjective reflection, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the 
point is to immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity.”73   
If Christian truths exist in a way that parallel empirical truths, then 
Kierkegaard believed that the outcome would consist of a position of constant 
deliberation, whereby one would continually seek to ascertain more knowledge about 
the credibility of the object.  Thus the result would be a dispassionate and blasé 
relation to Christianity.  Since Christianity makes claims which could never be 
historically or conceptually verified, Kierkegaard believed that not only was the 
objective position untenable but that it also stood in stark opposition to what was 
central for the Christian faith, namely, subjectivity i.e., active Christian living. The 
significance of this objective/subjective distinction originated from Kierkegaard’s 
central concern presented in the work preceding CUP, Fragments.  There 
Kierkegaard is concerned with the relation of historical evidences and scholarship to 
Christianity. At the beginning of Fragments, he asks:  “Can a historical point of 
departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be 
of more than historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical 
knowledge?”74   
In CUP, with succinct clarity, Kierkegaard addresses the issues he had posed 
earlier in the Fragments.  In sum, Kierkegaard considered objectivity, which 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 192. 
74 Søren Kierkegaard, PF, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 3. 
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represents impersonal, uninterested acceptance, the antithesis of true Christian faith.  
Faith had become a hybrid of an acceptance of historical facts and continual 
speculation, which sought to ascertain the historical truth more secularly by way of 
evidence and demonstration. As similar to the papacy of Luther’s time, Christianity 
in Denmark had become an everyday objective fact requiring no personal 
commitment.  And since there exists a debate regarding Kierkegaard’s conception of 
subjectivity, in that some read Kierkegaard as a proponent of fideism, it is important 
to reiterate that Kierkegaard is not denying the objective/historical reality of 
Christianity.  
What he denies Christianity is the ability of historical evidence and 
rationalism to provide any objective certainty equal to that of other historical events 
or realities; this would be to deem faith superfluous.  Kierkegaard sums up the whole 
problem of objective adherence to Christianity, stating, “The entire confusion and 
tragedy of the modern age can be expressed in one sentence: it has taken Christianity 
in vain.”75 
 
The Authorship’s Task 
In 1848 Kierkegaard had written The Point of View for My Work as an 
Author. In this book Kierkegaard feels it necessary to explain the task of his 
authorship. “A point has been reached in my authorship where it is feasible, where I 
feel a need and therefore regard it now as my duty: once and for all to explain as 
directly and openly and specifically as possible what is what, what I say I am as an 
                                                 
75 Søren Kierkegaard, JP, Volume 1, A-E. Edited and Translated by Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 187. 
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author.”76 Since the publication of his pseudonymous work, Either/Or, Kierkegaard, 
so he thought, had primarily been understood as an esthetic author. As a result of 
Either/Or’s success, most people had not taken notice of his following, signed work, 
Two Upbuilding Discourses.77   
From the outset, Kierkegaard’s authorship contained a duplicity consisting of 
both signed works and pseudonymous works. In 1843, he had published 
pseudonymously Either/Or, Repetition, and Fear and Trembling. This same year he 
also published, in his name, what he calls “religious” works, namely, Two 
Upbuilding Discourses, Three Upbuilding Discourses, and Four Upbuilding 
Discourses. In 1844, he published, pseudonymously, Philosophical Fragments, The 
Concept of Anxiety, and Prefaces. The signed works of that year were nine more 
Upbuilding Discourses. In 1845, he published, again pseudonymously, Stages on 
Life’s Way, and A Cursory Observation Concerning a Detail in Don Giovanni, side 
by side with three more Discourses. 1846 would see the last pseudonymous work 
until 1848 with the publication of Concluding Unscientific Postscript to 
Philosophical Fragments. The signed works of 1846 included Two Ages: A Literary 
Review, Upbuilding Discourse in Various Spirits and Works of Love.   
From 1848 until his death in 1855, Kierkegaard would publish only four more 
pseudonymous works in contrast to many more signed ones. The interesting point 
about Kierkegaard’s division of his authorship into two different classes is that the 
difference is merely an illusion. Uniting these two classes is, according to 
Kierkegaard, one theme which is the overall objective of his authorship. This theme 
                                                 
76 Søren Kierkegaard, POV. Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 23. Note that this was not apparent to 
Kierkegaard at the outset of his authorship. 
77 Ibid., 30.  
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is “Christianity”.  The overall objective of both the religious and the esthetic, as 
Kierkegaard states in My Point of View for My Work as an Author, is “That I am and 
was a religious author, that my whole authorship pertains to Christianity, to the issue: 
becoming a Christian, with direct and indirect polemical aim at that enormous 
illusion, Christendom, or the illusion that in such a country all are Christians of 
sorts.”78 And herein with Kierkegaard’s distinction between a “direct and indirect 
polemical aim”, lies the significance of the esthetic works in relation to the task of 
“becoming a Christian”.  
Against the backdrop of what Kierkegaard thought inherently problematic 
with the mingling of speculative philosophy and theology (that Christianity ends in 
being equal in certainty to that of any other science, and is therefore to be 
approached like any other science, with disinterest or as “matter of fact”) 
Kierkegaard believed the Christianity of Christendom to be an “enormous illusion”. 
He writes: 
What does it mean, after all, that all these thousands and thousands as a matter of course 
call themselves Christian…People who perhaps never once go to church, never think 
about God, never name his name except when they curse…Yet all these people, even 
those who insist that there is no God, they all are Christians, call themselves Christians, 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 23. In understanding the mystery surrounding Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms, 
with regard to his overall intention, Merold Westphal provides some helpful insight. He states, “He 
[Kierkegaard] wants the reader to see for herself and to choose for herself…[thus]…he resorts to 
pseudonyms so as not to place himself, his opinions, and his arguments between the reader and what 
Hegel would call die Sache (the matter at issue).” (15) With regard, then, to readers of Kierkegaard, 
Westphal continues stating, “A responsible reader will try to make sense of the author’s self-
interpretation rather than simply setting it aside on the basis of personal antipathy to his central 
concerns.” (24) See, Merold Westphal, “Johannes and Johannes: Kierkegaard and Difference” in the 
International Kierkegaard Commentary, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, Vol. 7, 
edited by Robert Perkins (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1994). Furthermore, even 
Kierkegaard’s contemporaries understood his task as seeking to explicate what it means to be a 
Christian. Writing in 1856 to C.K. F. Molbech, Kierkegaard’s good friend, Hans Brøchner, writes 
about Kierkegaard’s view of Christianity. He states, “For him [Kierkegaard], Christianity was 
unconditionally incompatible with the world; it was absurd to the understanding; it could be embraced 
only in the passion of faith; its requirement was to die away [from the world]; its hallmark was 
suffering ; its constant companion was the possibility of offense.” See, Encounters with Kierkegaard: 
A life as seen by His Contemporaries. Collected, edited, and annotated by Bruce H. Kirmmse. 
Translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse and Virgina R. Laursen (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1996. 
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are recognized as Christians by the state, are buried Christians by the Church, are 




In short, Kierkegaard’s authorial objective was one which sought to introduce 
Christianity once again into Christendom, thereby destroying this illusion. According 
to Kierkegaard, however, this task needed to be handled delicately. The delicacy of 
the matter pertained to the means in achieving the objective. Kierkegaard believed 
that if one makes a direct attack on an illusion, “he only strengthens a person in the 
illusion and also infuriate[s] him.”80 Kierkegaard perceives that “there is nothing that 
requires as gentle a treatment as the removal of an illusion.”81  
For Kierkegaard, a direct attack was not an option.  “Consequently, in 
Christendom the religious author, whose total thought is what it means to become a 
Christian, properly starts out with being an esthetic author.”82 In his view, 
Kierkegaard’s task would be best served “by concurrent esthetic and religious 
works.”83 Therefore, whereas the religious writings served as direct communication 
to the task of removing the illusion, the esthetic served this task indirectly 
incognito.84 On this designation of the esthetic as serving the objective incognito, 
Kierkegaard writes, “But from the total point of view of my whole work as an author, 
the esthetic writing is a deception, and herein is the deeper significance of the 
pseudonymity.”85 In using the pseudonymous writings as a form of deception, 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 42. 
80 Ibid., 43. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 47. 
83 Ibid., 48. See pp. 49. 
84 Ibid., 53. 
85 Ibid. With regard to Kierkegaard’s intention in employing pseudonyms, Bruce Kirmmse 
notes, “The intent of this pseudonymity was not to obscure the actual facts of authorship, which were 
obvious enough, but to allow for the proper sort if ‘dialectical distance’ between Kierkegaard’s own 
position as an ‘ordinary’ person and the radical critique permissible for an author who was not 
embarrassed to wield ‘the ideal’.” See, Bruce H. Kirmmse’s Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990). Kierkegaard, himself, notes in his 
work, The Moment and Late Writings, “In the books by me or by pseudonymous authors, I have 
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Kierkegaard calls to mind how Socrates deceived people into the truth.86 But what 
does it mean to deceive in relation to Kierkegaard’s task? 
It means that one does not begin directly with what one wishes to communicate but 
begins by taking the other’s delusion at face value. Thus one does not begin in this way: I 
am Christian, you are not a Christian—but this way: You are a Christian, I am not 
Christian. Or one does not begin in this way: It is Christianity that I am proclaiming, and 
you are living in purely esthetic categories. No, one begins this way: Let us talk about the 





This explanation of the pseudonymous writings sheds some light on the confusion 
surrounding Kierkegaard’s own relation to Christianity.  
In his writings, one can find statements which support the belief that 
Kierkegaard was not himself a Christian. However, this assumption fails to read 
Kierkegaard in the context of his overall authorial continuity, and in light of his 
explanations in My Point of View for My Work as an Author. In light of the quotation 
above, it becomes clear why Kierkegaard can claim that he is not a Christian; such a 
claim is a theological and authorial device designed to disturb the illusions of his 
readers.88  And here one can recall the relationship between Johannes Climacus and 
                                                                                                                                          
thoroughly, as I always work, expressed and described the different stages before reaching where I am 
at present. Thus one will find, especially in the pseudonymous Johannes Climacus, what 
approximately may be said in defence of the kind of Christianity that is closest to that of the 
established order, and will find it described in such a way that I would like to see whether any of my 
contemporaries here in the country can do it better.” See, Kierkegaard, The Moment and Late 
Writings. Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1998, 66. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 54. 
88
 In the Journals and Papers to On my Work/Point of View, 220-221, Kierkegaard not only 
explains the deception presented through the pseudonyms in relation to his project, but also explains 
the deception of his personal existence. When Kierkegaard indicates that he is not a Christian, he is 
saying that he is not a Christian of the sort typical in contemporary Christendom. Kierkegaard 
understood himself to be a “spy” a “traitor” in the service of true Christianity. For example, he states, 
“What Christianity needs for certain is traitors. Christendom has insidiously betrayed Christianity by 
wanting not to be truly Christian but to have the appearance of being so. Now traitors are needed” 
(notice the distinction Kierkegaard makes between a false Christianity (Christendom) and true 
Christianity). For Kierkegaard, the traitor, the spy, has a specific mission; to introduce true 
Christianity by attacking false Christianity. Kierkegaard distinguishes between attacking Christianity 
and Christians by contrasting his own mission with that of the devil and his spies, “who do not attack 
Christianity but attack the Christians – with the express purpose of getting more and more to fall 
away.” It is not Kierkegaard’s intention to attack Christians, but to attack those who purport to be 
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Anti-Climacus to which Kierkegaard states, “The pseudonym is Johannes 
Anticlimacus (SUD and PC) in contrast to Climacus, who said he was not a 
Christian. Anticlimacus is the opposite extreme: a Christian on an extraordinary level 
– if only I myself manage to be just a simple Christian. ‘Practice in Christianity’ can 
be published in the same way, but there is no hurry…On the whole, I must now 
venture in quite different directions. I must dare to believe that through Christ I can 
be saved from the power of depression in which I have lived.”89   
As the author of CUP, Johannes declares himself an observer who possesses 
a better understanding of Christianity than those in Christendom. In this light, 
Kierkegaard’s intention in writing CUP appears congruent with his project as a 
whole. He states: “In December 1845 I had completed the manuscript of Concluding 
Postscript…This book constitutes the turning point in my entire work as an author, 
inasmuch as it poses the issue: becoming a Christian. Thereafter the transition to the 
second part is made, the series of exclusively religious books.”90  The same 
explanation also serves SUD and PC. Here Kierkegaard uses a pseudonym for SUD 
                                                                                                                                          
Christians whilst demonstrating through the vacuity of their faith that they are not. His call is for 
Christendom to become once again true Christianity. He writes, “God, too, has his traitors: God-
fearing traitors, who in unconditional obedience to him simply and sincerely present Christianity in 
order that for once people may get to know what Christianity is.” Interestingly, Kierkegaard sees 
Johannes Climacus as this sort of traitor. Johannes Climacus appears as one who is not a Christian, 
admits he is not. He appears to relentlessly attack Christianity insofar as he speaks of nothing else but 
limits, the absurdity of Christianity, it existence as negation. Thus, Johannes is the traitor. But he is 
not a traitor to true Christianity but to Christendom, a false, established Christianity which exits in 
contradiction to true Christianity. In this light, Johannes is a traitor indeed, but a spy in the service of 
God, in the service of true Christianity. Kierkegaard writes, “Dialectically Johannes Climacus is in 
fact so radical a defence of Christianity that to many it may seem like an attack. This book [CUP] 
makes one feel that is Christendom that has betrayed Christianity.” The same journal entry offers 
support for the argument that Kierkegaard saw himself as striving to become a true Christian. He 
states, “‘Johannes Climacus’ was actually a contemplative piece, for when I wrote it I was 
contemplating the possibility of not letting myself be taken over by Christianity, even if it was my 
utmost honest intention to devote my whole life and daily diligence to the cause of Christianity, to do 
everything, to do nothing else but to expound and interpret it, even though I were to become like, be 
like the legendary Wandering Jew – myself not a Christian in the final and most decisive sense of the 
word and yet leading others to Christianity.”  
89 Kierkegaard, POV, 199-200. 
90 Ibid., 63. 
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and PC not in order to align himself with being a Christian but rather to separate 
himself from being equated with the ideal, the ideal Christian, which no Christian 
can be. He states, “When the demands of ideality are to be presented at their 
maximum, then one must take extreme care not to be confused with them himself, as 
if he himself were the ideal…The difference from the earlier pseudonyms is simply 
but essentially this, that I do not retract the whole thing humorously but identify 
myself as one who is striving.”91   
And so, with regard to his authorship, Kierkegaard writes, “Here was a 
religious author, but one who began as an esthetic author, and this first part was the 
incognito, was the deception.”92 Interestingly, with the completion of this book, 
Kierkegaard faced the dilemma as to whether or not to publish the manuscript. In 
1849, Kierkegaard stated, “In God’s name, then! What worries me most is ‘The Point 
of View for My Work as an Author’.”93  What concerned him was that, in this work, 
he had addressed, as directly as possible, the nature of his authorship and was thus 
concerned with how such a revelation would affect his authorial objective.  In the 
end he decided against publishing the manuscript given its openness with regard to 
his position as an author. He adds: 
The Point of View for my Work as an Author must not be published, no, no! And this is 
the deciding factor: I cannot tell the full truth about myself. Even in the very first 
manuscript, I was unable to stress the primary factor: that I am a penitent, and this 
explains me at the deepest level…The fact that I cannot give the full truth in portraying 
myself signifies that essentially I am a poet – and here I shall remain…I thank God that it 
was precluded and that I did not go ahead and publish ‘The Point of View for My work as 
an Author’…The book itself is true and in my opinion masterly. But a book like that can 
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Kierkegaard’s hesitation resulted in the publication of The Point of View for my work 
as an Author posthumously in 1859. Instead, Kierkegaard wrote and published a 
condensed version of this work in 1851 title, On My Work as an Author.  
In conclusion, Kierkegaard’s task was to offer a corrective to Christendom’s 
reformulating of what it means to be a Christian. For Kierkegaard, Christianity is not 
as Christendom perceived it to be, as the mere accumulation of historical facts and 
continual speculation of its doctrines. Furthermore, the attempts of “Hegelians” like 
Martensen and Heiberg to apply Hegelian methodology to Christian concepts would 
in the end result in reducing divinity to humanity, Christianity to social relations, 
and, in light of the use of speculative and historical methods, produce a Christianity 
which demands only mere objective adherence rather than the uncertainty of faith 
and passion.95 In seeking to combat these results, Kierkegaard commenced an 
authorship which would be able to treat these issues on two sides. One side was the 
religious whereby he communicated directly under the rubric of theological 
terminology. The other side was the esthetic writings whereby he communicated 
indirectly in order to deceive subtly the reader into considering the issues of the day 
without repelling them. It was from Socrates that Kierkegaard had learned and 
employed this art. However, Kierkegaard’s use of Socrates served a higher end: “I 
can very well call Socrates my teacher—whereas I have believed in only one, the 
Lord Jesus Christ.”96 
Having painted a picture of Kierkegaard’s historical context, I shall now 
move to an examination of his thought in relation to this context. I shall assess the 
significance which some of the concepts attained in placing a barrier to the efforts of 
                                                 
95 Jamie Turnbull (Unpublished manuscript) Kierkegaard’s Supernaturalism: Making Sense 
of the Project of Indirect Communication, 3. 
96 Kierkegaard, POV, 55. 
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speculative philosophy to produce a rational theology. As stated in the introduction, 
the concepts under investigation are Reason, History, Contemporaneity, Paradox, 
Subjectivity, Objectivity, the IQD, Faith, and Offence.  
 
Speculative Philosophy and Knowledge of God: The Infinite Qualitative 
Difference 
As noted in the Introduction, Barth accuses Kierkegaard with presenting a 
self which is left to ruination brought on by the IQD between itself and God. In short, 
Barth’s view of Kierkegaard’s self is a self left to its own despair, existing without 
grace. Recently, Simon Podmore’s work, Kierkegaard & the Self before God: 
Anatomy of the Abyss, offers a correction to this specific reading of Kierkegaard’s 
notion of the self.97 In what follows, I will, with the aid of Podmore’s work, seek to 
offer what Kierkegaard truly holds to regarding the self in relation to itself and, more 
importantly, to God.  
Indispensable to understanding Kierkegaard’s conception of the self in both 
its relation to itself and to God is his concept of the IQD.98 According to 
Kierkegaard, “God and man are two qualities separated by an infinite qualitative 
difference.”99 Initially, the IQD serves Kierkegaard in reminding humanity of both its 
ontological difference from God as well as its relational separation from God, but 
                                                 
97 For a full treatment of Kierkegaard’s concept of grace given in the forgiveness of sin, see 
Simon D. Podmore, Kierkegaard & the Self Before God: Anatomy of the Abyss (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011). 
98 Note that it is not merely in his pseudonymous literature that Kierkegaard concerns himself 
with the God-relation but also in his signed Discourses. See “To Need God is a Human Being’s 
Highest Perfection” and “To Gain One’s Soul in Patience” in Søren Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding 
Discourses: Edited and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 307. 
99 Søren Kierkegaard, SUD. Edited and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 126. Kierkegaard repeatedly expresses the IQD 
in his Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, with the phrase, “You are on earth and God is in heaven.” 
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this is not its only purpose. As Podmore notes, the IQD contains both a positive and 
negative function. Podmore states, “The theme of Kierkegaard’s infinite qualitative 
difference between humanity and God – in both its negative and positive 
connotations – is employed throughout as the prime hermeneutical key through 
which to explore a Kierkegaardian vision of the self before God.”100 Podmore’s aim 
is to relate that Kierkegaard’s use of the IQD is, at its core, to first unveil the self’s 
coming to knowledge of its separation from God in order to then understand that it is 
not a true self.  
In light of the self’s coming to this knowledge, Kierkegaard’s use of the IQD 
transitions in emphasis to the positive component whereby the self is both reconciled 
to itself and to God, namely, by means of God’s forgiveness. This dual aspect of the 
IQD is therefore nothing less than the biblical narrative of repentance and 
forgiveness. To this point Podmore writes, “The true expression of the infinite 
qualitative difference is found, not in the initial sense of sin and estrangement, but in 
the Holy mysterium of forgiveness.”101 Kierkegaard himself acknowledges this dual 
function of the IQD of sin and estrangement to that of forgiveness stating,  
As sinner, man is separated from God by the most chasmic qualitative abyss. In turn, of 
course, God is separated from man by the same chasmic qualitative abyss when he 
forgives sins. If by some kind of reverse adjustment the divine could be shifted over to 
the human, there is one way in which man could never in all eternity come to be like 




In sum, as it will be demonstrated shortly, the force of the IQD is felt, first, in the 
self’s awareness of its separation from God. With the coming of this knowledge, the 
self thus despairs over this abyss separating himself and God. The self despairs 
insofar as this separation serves in revealing to him that it is not a true self,  for a true 
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self is one which exist in relation to God, or as Kierkegaard maintains, one can only 
truly come to know oneself before “the mirror of the Word…To stand before the 
mirror means to stand before God.”103  
In that the self is without the truth of both its own fragmented condition as 
well as the power to establish itself, our existence therefore is one shrouded in 
despair. In short, as will be demonstrated, for Kierkegaard, the category of despair 
relates to the helplessness of the human condition in attaining both the truth of its 
dual existence as well as the remedy for it.  
 
The Self with/without Self-hood and God 
Kierkegaard’s examination of the self can primarily be found in his 
Fragments and SUD. Although differing in approach, these two works ultimately 
share the same diagnosis of the human condition, namely, that the self is without 
God and thus is without true selfhood. Furthermore, these two works share the view 
that the self is unable by its own powers to reconcile itself to itself as well as to God. 
But what is the self? According to Kierkegaard, “A human being is spirit …and … 
Spirit is the self.”104 For Kierkegaard, that the self is defined as spirit denotes the 
eternal nature in the self as one who is to exist in relation to God.105  
Therefore, in light of this relation, for Kierkegaard, “A human being is a 
synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal.”106 However, 
insofar as every human being exists before God as a sinner, the self is IQD from 
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God.107 The infinite distance which separates us from God therefore disrupts the 
self’s obtaining true selfhood insofar as, according to Kierkegaard, only in 
relationship to God can the self obtain true selfhood.108 He writes: 
Paganism required: Know yourself. Christianity declares: No, that is provisional – know 
yourself – and look at yourself in the mirror of the Word in order to know yourself 
properly. No true self-knowledge without God-knowledge or [without standing] before 
God. To stand before the mirror means to stand before God.109 
 
He adds: 
What is Christianity? – it is God’s will that each man relate himself before God to Holy 
Scripture in this matter, and in particular God does not want all this chattering and 
prattling between man and man. Such an individual who relates himself to God in this 
way becomes an authentic individual.110 
 
In light of our situation, as one out of relation with ourselves and God, Kierkegaard 
maintains that the self has nothing at its disposal in order to rectify the situation. 
Only by God’s revelation can the self become aware of its situation.111  It is here, 
with the necessity of revelation in order to make known the IQD, and its 
consequences for the self, where Kierkegaard takes up the notion of despair.  
For Kierkegaard, sin is thus defined dialectically as existing before God, to 
“despair not to will to be oneself, or before God in despair to will to be oneself.”112  
This distinction in the dialectical nature of sin is, on one hand, not to will to be the 
true self (new man) over against the self conditioned by sin (the old man) or on the 
other hand to want to be oneself (the new man) and unable to do so by human effort. 
Concerning the first notion of despair, Kierkegaard poses the self as one who is 
unaware of the chasm which separates itself from God. Unaware of its separation, the 
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self continues in the self-delusional existence that it is established by itself.113 In 
other words, the self, unaware that it can only become a self in relation to God, 
thinks that it is a self by virtue “of a synthesis that relates itself to itself”, and this 
misrelation, is despair.114 It is this notion, of the utter powerlessness of the self in 
obtaining the truth about itself as a self as well as in relation to God, which 
Kierkegaard discusses in PF.  
In PF, Kierkegaard, experimenting with the Socratic model, investigates the 
self’s relation to the truth with regard to its awareness of both its existence as 
fragmented by sin as well as its ability to retrieve true self-hood.  According to the 
Socratic definition, “Sin is ignorance.”115  But the problem for Kierkegaard is the 
ambiguity which encompasses this definition with regard to how the ignorance itself 
is to be understood, specifically concerning the origin of this ignorance.116  
Kierkegaard wonders, if sin is nothing more than mere ignorance, then can it be said 
that sin really exists at all.117  Thus the Socratic conception of sin appears deficient in 
that it lacks a distinction between knowing and willing in regard to what is right and 
wrong.   
If one, knowing the difference between right and wrong, acts wrongly, then 
ignorance is not the issue. Rather, the issue is that of the will whereby, in knowing 
the difference between what is right and what is wrong, one yet wills to do what is 
wrong.118 In noting the deficiency inherent in the Socratic conception of sin, 
Kierkegaard looks to Christianity. “Christianity”, he states, “begins in another way: 
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man has to learn what sin is by revelation from God; sin is not a matter of a person’s 
not having understood what is right but of his being unwilling to understand it, of his 
not willing what is right.”119  And here, in light of the necessity for revelation to 
make known the human condition, Kierkegaard believes the Socratic view fails. 
According to Socrates, “all learning and seeking are but recollecting.”120  The 
truth is therefore something that is within the human.  However, Kierkegaard poses 
the question as to whether man has the truth at all.121 If this is the case (that man is 
not in possession of the truth) he asks by what means and from whom man is to 
obtain such truth.   
His solution to the problem is explicated in his notion of the “teacher”.  But 
one might question what role the teacher would have in the Socratic Method, for one 
who needs not to be taught but only to be reminded. Kierkegaard writes, “The 
teacher merely helps the pupil to realize what he had known all along.  In such a 
case, the individual is in the truth rather than in error.”122  As we can see with the 
Socratic approach, the teacher, ultimately, is insignificant.  For he does not teach nor 
present new truth but serves only as a medium, an instrument to help the individual 
recall what he has forgotten.   
However, if man is in untruth, then what would this approach achieve?  
Kierkegaard’s response is that what would be achieved is untruth.123  Our existence 
as those without the truth is thus not grounded in our unawareness that we already 
possess it. Rather, for Kierkegaard, our existence is the very condition which 
prohibits our very ability and desire for truth:   
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Now if the learner is to obtain the truth, the teacher must bring it to him, but not only that.  
Along with it, he must provide him with the condition for understanding it, for if the 
learner were himself the condition for understanding the truth, then he merely needs to 
recollect because the condition for understanding the truth is like being able to ask about 




Kierkegaard’s point here is that humanity in and of themselves cannot serve each 
other in obtaining the truth of their existence, not in its diagnosis or remedy. Such 
endeavours, Kierkegaard thinks, reflect the despair of our existence in our not 
knowing that we are in despair.  
At this point, Kierkegaard proposes that if the teacher is to be any help at all 
then he must be more than a mere teacher, more than a mere human being 
conditioned in sin. 
He states, “The teacher, then, is the god, who gives the condition and gives the truth. 
Now, what should we call such a teacher, for we surely do agree that we have gone 
far beyond the definition of a teacher,...let us call him a savior, for he does indeed 
save the learner from unfreedom, saves him from himself.”125  The role of the 
Saviour in Kierkegaard’s discussion of the human condition can in no way be over 
emphasized. Even with the condition for the truth, without the truth itself, the self is 
yet left to its own despair insofar as the condition only initiates the process of the 
self’s returning to true self-hood. Thus, if one is unaware that they are sick then they 
will fail to seek a remedy for this sickness, and this is to despair.  In sum, as Podmore 
states, “Before the self can behold itself through this divine mirror [the self as a self 
before God], it must first recognise its own solipsistic disintegration – its own failure 
to know itself according to its own powers, and consequently its need to orient self-
knowledge in relation to a divine other.”126  
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In his examination of the deficiencies in the Socratic conception of sin, 
Kierkegaard seeks to re-establish the infinite distinction between God and humanity 
which Enlightenment thought had so quickly diminished.  If, by theoretical reason, 
one is able to be its own ground for the morally imperative, then God, as the 
supposed ground of morality, is ultimately superfluous.  However, if reason be made 
to account for its limits, then, as Kierkegaard says, “the older dogmatics was right in 
maintaining that because sin is against God it is infinitely magnified.”127 That is, sin 
infinitely magnifies reason’s powerlessness to discover the ultimate ground for our 
existence.  Provided that such a distinction exists between God and humanity, the 
question arises as to what access, if any, human understanding has with regard to 
knowledge of God?   
Of our mere knowledge of God’s existence, Kierkegaard asks, “But what is 
this unknown against which the understanding in its paradoxical passion collides and 
which even disturbs man in his self-knowledge?” and responds, “It is the 
unknown.”128  According to Kierkegaard, human thought is confronted with the 
ultimate paradox when conscious of its inability “to discover something that thought 
itself cannot think.”129  In this case, the unknown which thought seeks to penetrate is 
God.   
In light of this discussion, Kierkegaard seems to suggest that all human 
beings possess an innate knowledge of God.  From the selected Journal entries on 
Fragments, Kierkegaard notes a section that was deleted from the final copy of this 
work which suggests some form of an innate knowledge of God with us.   
                                                 
127 Kierkegaard, SUD, 80. Kierkegaard’s reference to the “older dogmatics” is to contrast the 
“later dogmatics” which “frequently took exception to it (sin) because it did not have the 
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128 Kierkegaard, PF, 39. 
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52 
 
Discussing the “fantastic” desire to want to demonstrate that God exists, “and 
then have an atheist accept it by virtue of the other’s demonstration”130 Kierkegaard 
says, “So has there never been an atheist.”131  In reference to the innate knowledge of 
God he says, “Therefore there has never been a man who has not believed it, but 
there certainly have been many who have been unwilling to let the truth conquer in 
their souls, have been loathe to allow themselves to be convinced, for what convinces 
me exists, but the important thing is that I become immersed in it.”132   
The demonstration of God’s existence appears a futile task since all possess 
some notion that God exists.  Nevertheless, reason’s attempt to know God is to no 
avail. In fact, Kierkegaard thinks demonstrations for God’s existence betray a 
contradiction in the desire to demonstrate God to begin with. He writes: 
If, namely, the god [Guden] does not exist, then of course it is impossible to demonstrate 
it.  But if he does exist, then it is foolishness to want to demonstrate it, since I, in the very 
moment the demonstration commences, would presuppose it not as doubtful-which a 
presupposition cannot be, inasmuch as it is a presupposition-but as decided, because 
otherwise I would not begin easily perceiving that the whole thing would be impossible if 
he did not exist.133 
 
What Kierkegaard finds amusing is that in seeking to prove God’s existence, one 
must possess the presupposition that God first exists, otherwise the desire to 
demonstrate it would have never been initiated.  In short, “the whole process of 
demonstrating continually becomes…an expanded concluding development of what I 
conclude from having presupposed that the object of investigation exists.”134  
Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the proofs for God’s existence stand under his harsher 
criticisms of apologetics.   








Discussing the correlation between God and his works, Kierkegaard wonders 
if a relation is detectable.”135  He concludes that, yes, “an absolute relation.”136  But 
is this relation immediate? He writes: 
The works from which I want to demonstrate his existence do not immediately and 
directly exist, not at all.  Or are the wisdom in nature and the goodness or wisdom in 
Governance right in front of our noses?  Do we not encounter the most terrible spiritual 
trials here, and is it ever possible to be finished with all these trials?  But I still do not 
demonstrate God’s existence from such an order of things, and even if I begin, I would 
never finish and also would be obliged continually to live in suspenso lest something so 
terrible happen that my fragment of demonstration would be ruined.137 
 
If empirical reality, immediate and sensate, adds nothing in aiding our concept of 
order within nature in relation to God, then from where does this relation emerge?  In 
that the concept of God exists ideally or presupposed, so too does the uniformity of 
his existence to his creation.   
However, it is in the ideality of reason where meaning is imposed, or more 
specifically, the connection between God and his works are made to exist 
relationally.  Therefore, Kierkegaard says, “I do not demonstrate it from the works, 
after all, but only develop the ideality I have presupposed.”138  However, if there is 
no immediate, or direct correlation between God and his works, wherefrom does the 
transition take place from what was once unknown to what is now known?   
This transition, according to Kierkegaard, results from a leap.139  For 
Kierkegaard, a “leap” signifies that faith has become aware of the presupposition 
allowing us therefore to make the connection between Creator and creation.  Nothing 
from nature or reason tells us, explicitly, that God exists or that the world reflects his 
existence.  To some extent, Kierkegaard seems to reflect a certain amount of Kantian 
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and German Idealist influence upon his thought with regard to reason’s limits.  
Where Kierkegaard differs from the Idealist tradition is in the belief that the 
limitations posed by the Kantian and Idealist notion of reason are overcome by some 
other means. 
For Kierkegaard, although the understanding is unable to transcend from 
what is known to that of the unknown, human understanding cannot but desire to do 
so.  The unknown exists, as Kierkegaard says, as “the frontier that is continually 
arrived at.”140  It is the frontier of the “absolutely different.”  But this distinction of 
that which is absolutely different is not a distinction arrived at outside of the 
understanding itself.  Rather, it is the understanding that “consequently thinks the 
difference in itself, which it thinks by itself.  It cannot absolutely transcend itself and 
therefore thinks as above itself only the sublimity that it thinks by itself.”141   
In the end, human reason affords us nothing with regard to our knowledge of 
God.  In fact, as was demonstrated, for Kierkegaard it is quite the opposite. 
Therefore, left to its own powers, the self exists both without God and true self-hood 
thus consumed in the despair brought on by the IQD. However, amidst this 
discussion of the sheer negativity of the self divorced from self-hood and God, grace 
has been present. In his insisting that revelation is needed in order to overcome the 
effects of the IQD; that the self needs the “Saviour” in order to both receive the 
condition for the truth and the truth itself, Kierkegaard does not leave the self to its 
own ruin in the abyss. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, the IQD between God and 
humanity is not comprised of merely sin but also of the forgiveness of sin. 
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Kierkegaard’s objective in highlighting the negativity of human existence is 
to point beyond the hopeless endeavours of the modern self to establish self-hood. To 
this objective, Kierkegaard was compelled to first expose the inability of human 
reason in reconciling itself to itself and to God in order to point to God’s grace in his 
revelation, thus making known the human need for redemption. And herein with the 
necessity of revelation in making known the plight of human existence Kierkegaard 
explicates the form of despair which arises in light of our coming to the 
consciousness of our separation from God. Podmore explains the situation, stating: 
If sin forms the infinite chasmic abyss that separates the self from God, then despair over 
sin, is venturing a potentially mystifying image, a second and more fatal abyss. Yet, 
whereas the consciousness of sin is revealed by God, this second fracture is a 
supplementary abyss which the self has willed of itself by despairing over this revelation. 
It is a second abyss born from despairing over the revealed abyss of sin.142 
 
When the self is made aware of its separation from God, there follows the inevitable 
awareness of its inability to overcome this separation and thus, in light of revelation, 
despairs.143   
Indeed, for Kierkegaard, “forgiveness is … viewed as the means by which the 
estrangement of the infinite qualitative difference between the self and God is 
reconciled and transformed into the relational possibility of the self before God”144 as 
demonstrated above. In short, “the consciousness of sin is, in this schema, a vital step 
on the road to faith.”145  However, according to Kierkegaard,  
Sin was despair, the intensification was despair over sin. But now God offers reconciliation in 
the forgiveness of sin. Nevertheless, the sinner still despairs, and despair acquires a still 
deeper manifestation: it now relates to God in a way, and yet precisely because it is even 
further away it is even more intensively absorbed in sin.  When the sinner despairs of the 
forgiveness of sins, it is almost as if he walked right up to God and said, ‘No, there is no 
forgiveness of sins, it is impossible’.146 
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With the impossibility of the offence maintained by the IQD being breached on this 
side of eternity, humanity is “reminded that God has accomplished ‘the impossible;’ 
a gift which requires the consent, not of human comprehension, but the consent of 
the free will to a forgiveness which is revealed by God.”147 Kierkegaard heeds us to 
take comfort in the divine possibility whereby, as he states, “the self is healthy and 
free from despair … when, precisely by having despaired, it rests transparently in 
God.148  
It is this similarity between Kierkegaard and Barth which, having been 
overlooked, has resulted in the assertion that Barth’s dialectic of judgement and 
grace reflects an affinity with Hegel rather than Kierkegaard. This reading of Barth’s 
dialectic, which is overcome by grace and thus representing some kind of synthesis, 
is said to differ from Kierkegaard’s dialectic which refuses resolution and is thus, as 
McCormack notes, “static in character, in which a synthesis can only be awaited.”149  
 It must be remembered that Kierkegaard’s examination of the self emerged 
within an intellectual and social context that demanded a thorough reminder of our 
helplessness in relating to the Divine based on our own abilities. On this, Stewart 
indicates that Fragments serves as an address to the abuses of speculative 
philosophy.150 But even in Fragments, although “the issue of the limits of human 
knowledge runs through the whole discussion,”151 it is evident that Kierkegaard is 
not ignoring the element of human redemption insofar as he poses the human need 
for the “Saviour”. Furthermore, the whole section at the beginning of Fragments, 
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“Thought Project” is nothing less than the biblical story of the Incarnation.152 
Interestingly enough, it seems that Kierkegaard was aware of the negative tone 
emanating from Fragments and Sickness unto Death given that, as Bruce Kirmmse 
notes, he had projected a sequel titled, Fundamental Recovery which suggest an 
amendment to our separation from God.153 Kierkegaard himself was concerned with 
the possibility that his intentions with the self would be misunderstood. He states: 
This self is no longer the merely human self but is what I, hoping not to be 
misinterpreted, would call the theological self, the self directly before God. And what 
infinite reality the self gains by being conscious of existing before God, by becoming a 
human self whose criterion is God!154 
 
In sum, the theological implications of Kierkegaard’s presentation should be 
quite clear.  Humanity is born into sin and thus is without hope by means of its own 
efforts.  They are without hope because they lack not only the truth but also the 
condition to receive it.  Therefore, Christ is both the teacher and Saviour who saves 
humanity from its condition.  By virtue of the Saviour’s initiation, the individual can 
now come to Christ and follow him in truth. In this light, the “teacher is the way, the 
truth, and the life.”155   
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conclusion of this section it is important to note that much of the interpretation of Kierkegaardian 
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entry dated 1835 where Kierkegaard says “The thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the 
idea for which I can live and die.  What would be use of discovering so-called objective truth, of 
working through all the systems of philosophy and [being able] to review them all and show up the 
inconsistencies within each system?  What good would it do me to be able to develop a theory of the 
state and combine all the details into a single whole, and so construct a world in which I did not live?  
What good would it do me to explain the meaning of Christianity if it had no deeper significance for 
me and for my life? What good would it do me if truth stood before me, cold and naked, not caring 
whether I recognized her or not, and producing in me a shudder of fear rather than a trusting devotion?  
I certainly do not deny...an imperative of understanding and that through it one can work upon men, 
but it must be taken up into my life.” The fact that this entry was recorded in 1835 and his work 
Philosophical Fragments was not written until 1844, could lead some to conclude a form of 
relativism, in the strict subjective sense of Kierkegaard’s early thought.  However, even if one is to 
adopt this view, it is clear that Kierkegaard refutes this particular philosophy derived from the 
statement that “the thing is to find a truth which is true for me” in his Philosophical Fragments.  This 
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Before moving on to a consideration of what the Incarnation affords reason 
regarding knowledge of God, I wish briefly to relate our present discussion to 
Kierkegaard’s notion that “Truth is Subjectivity”.  I mentioned earlier that among 
Kierkegaard interpretation this notion remains one of his most disputed claims.156  
Among philosophical and/or existential readings of Kierkegaard157, this 
notion is seen as Kierkegaard’s endorsement of a relativistic notion of truth. It is easy 
to find passages in Kierkegaard’s writings which could support interpreting him as 
maintaining a relativistic notion of truth, i.e. truth, with no regard to objectivity, is 
subjective, a matter of one’s own right to believe whatever without objective 
warrant. One of the most drawn on passage to support this reading of Kierkegaard is 
a journal entry he made in 1835. He writes, 
The thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and 
die.  What would be use of discovering so-called objective truth, of working through all 
the systems of philosophy and [being able] to review them all and show up the 
inconsistencies within each system?  What good would it do me to be able to develop a 
theory of the state and combine all the details into a single whole, and so construct a 
world in which I did not live?158  
 
Indeed, read outside of the context in which they were written, these words suggest 
that Kierkegaard is concerned with merely subjective truth, epistemologically 
                                                                                                                                          
form of truth, as we shall see later is the Socratic Truth.  Truth, as seen in Philosophical Fragments, 
does not lie in the subject, as Socrates taught, but is foreign to the subject and hence must be brought 
to the subject.  The subject is confronted with the object of belief and therefore appropriates the 
objective in the act of belief, being the act of subjectivity. Therefore the idea of Kierkegaard endorsing 
subjectivism as a form of relativism from this entry is clearly incorrect. 
156
 See James Fairley, ‘Method in Theology: Possibilities in the light of Barth, Kierkegaard, 
and Wittgenstein’, PhD dissertation, The British Library Document supply Centre, UK. Fairley offers 
a clarification to Kierkegaard’s notion of subjectivity which resonates in Peter S. Oh. Fairley argues 
that although both spheres A and B are concerned with “inwardness”, inwardness in B departs from A 
in B’s abandonment of personal resources. Furthermore, inwardness is the way in which one 
appropriates the truth, the Christian truth. Thus inwardness denotes a subjective approach versus an 
objective one in relation to truth. This, Fairley notes, is what Kierkegaard means by “Subjectivity is 
Truth”. Fairley continues, “Yet, he [Kierkegaard] goes on to say that this must be surpassed. This is 
accomplished by the realisation that ‘Subjectivity is untruth’.”  
157 See footnote, 31 and 32 of this manuscript. 
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 Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, Volume 1, Journals AA-DD, edited by Niels 
Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa 
Rumble, and K. Brian Söderquist (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 7. 
59 
 
speaking. However, this passage does not end with these words. Kierkegaard 
continues: 
What good would it do me to explain the meaning of Christianity if it had no deeper 
significance for me and for my life? What good would it do me if truth stood before me, 
cold and naked, not caring whether I recognized her or not, and producing in me a 
shudder of fear rather than a trusting devotion?  I certainly do not deny...an imperative of 
understanding and that though it one can work upon men, but it must be taken up into my 
life.”159 
 
The context of this passage is, for Kierkegaard, the nature of Christianity. 
With regard to the discussions of his time concerning Christianity’s relation to 
philosophy, and the efforts of rational theology to make Christianity “objective”, 
Kierkegaard is concerned with what significance Christianity could have then for his 
life. He is not questioning the objective truth of Christianity with regard to its claims, 
its historicity in relation to the individual as something outside of the subject’s 
creative power.  For Kierkegaard, issues concerning the truth of Christianity are not 
to be decided subjectively but are to be decided in a source outside the subject, 
namely, Scripture. He writes, “When the truth of Christianity is asked about 
historically, or what is and what is not Christian truth, Holy Scripture immediately 
presents itself as a crucial document.”160 This concern is therefore objective. 
However, this is not, according to Kierkegaard the issue of Christianity. He writes: 
If Christianity is viewed as a historical document, the important thing is to obtain a 
completely reliable report of what the Christian doctrine really is. If the inquiring subject 
were infinitely interested in his relation to this truth, he would here despair at once, 
because nothing is easier to perceive than this, that with regard to the historical the 
greatest certainty is only an approximation, and an approximation is too little to build his 
happiness on and is so unlike an eternal happiness that no result can ensue.161 
 
For Kierkegaard, if Christianity is truth, then its truth is not that equal to other 
objective truths which are accepted as a matter of fact. Rather, Christianity demands 
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more than objective adherence, it demands existence, an existence which exists in the 
truth. Nevertheless, even if one adopts this view, it is clear that Kierkegaard refutes a 
relativistic notion of truth from what he argues in PF. Truth, Kierkegaard argues in 
PF, does not lie in the subject, as Socrates taught, but is foreign to the subject and 
hence must be brought to the subject.  The subject is confronted with the object of 
belief and therefore appropriates the objective in the act of belief, being the act of 
subjectivity.  Therefore the idea of Kierkegaard endorsing subjectivism as a form of 
relativism from this entry is clearly incorrect.  
In sum, this interpretation, however, fails to recognize several factors central 
to Kierkegaard’s use of this phrase. First, this reading ignores the historical context 
wherein this notion assumes its meaning. Second, in that this reading relegates this 
notion to discussions of the religious, it fails to account for its epistemological 
implications in relation to then the religious connotation. Thirdly, and more 
importantly, any discussion of Kierkegaard’s notion of truth cannot be understood 
outside of his theological notion of the self. In short, Kierkegaard’s belief, that sin 
inhibits any access to supernatural claims, demands that the self must first be given 
the means to understand revelation and from there accept it.  
These three often neglected factors all fail to account for Kierkegaard’s 
inherited problem as posed by the 1839 Rationalism and Supernaturalism debate, 
namely, reason’s relation to faith. In order to correct such relativistic readings of the 
Kierkegaardian concept I wish to focus now on the specific issues that arose from the 
debate as recorded in Martensen’s reply to Mynster.  
Kierkegaard’s conception of the self as a self without truth stands in contrast 
to the Socratic notion that truth is innate within the individual. Kierkegaard also 
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discussed the self in terms of its dichotomous existence of the infinite and the finite, 
a dichotomy which can only find resolution in the power that has established it, 
namely God. Furthermore, insofar as Kirmmse notes that Kierkegaard had originally 
intended a sequel to PF and SUD which would have discussed the remedy of the self 
in more positive of terms, the shared themes and concepts between these two works 
are therefore not incidental. The reading I have provided is, of course, one among 
many, and stands in stark contrast to the relativistic interpretation. However, in light 
of the 1839 debate and the discussions ensuing thereof, the relativistic reading 
appears untenable. As noted, Bishop Mynster had published a reply to Bornemann’s 
review of Martensen’s work, On the Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness. What 
had “suddenly awakened his full attention and reflection” was Martensen’s claim that 
“In theology both rationalism and supernaturalism are antiquated standpoints, which 
belong to an age which has disappeared.”162   
In sum Mynster asks his readers to consider that the “new philosophy” had 
not made obsolete these two opposing positions. And therefore, given their 
continuing existence as being mutually opposed to each other, the choice was an 
“either/or”, either supernaturalism or rationalism. Implicit in Mynster’s calling for a 
choice, is his reliance to what Martensen criticizes as “the old supernaturalism” 
whereby Christianity “was reduced to a foreign authority for consciousness, an 
impenetrable mystery that could be grasped by faith but not knowledge.”163  
Martensen claimed that the crux of Mynster’s critique is that the old supernaturalism 
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was not antiquated to begin with.164  But what Martensen found ultimately 
problematic in Mynster’s critique was an unwillingness to perceive that Christianity 
itself offers a mediation of contradictories in the act of the Incarnation.  
Moreover, for Martensen, human self-consciousness reflects the non-
existence of the law of excluded middle insofar as “The identity of the subjective and 
the objective, of self-consciousness and revelation is the presupposition of all 
speculative theology. It is not pantheistic but truly Christian to believe that God 
would not be Spirit if He, who is object of our knowledge, were not Himself also the 
true knowledge in us.”165  What is evident about Martensen’s statement here is that 
he held an optimistic view of human reason in and of itself. Inasmuch as human 
beings were created by God, the religious consciousness allows human recognition 
of God.166  In contrast to Kierkegaard’s conception of sin and its consequences for 
the human and divine relationship, Martensen’s own view of the rational self is not 
as dire. Ultimately, Martensen maintains an innate, unqualified unity between the 
human and the divine, even if Bornemann presents him as adhering to the qualitative 
difference between Creator and creature.167  
In sum, the issue with Martensen’s sublation of the divine and human, is that 
it does not account for a true difference within this relation and thus appears 
somewhat reminiscent of the Socratic model of the self’s relation to the truth. For 
both Martensen and Socrates, our possession of the truth is telling of our unity with 
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the divine whether in the world of forms or as created in his image. The difference 
between them is that Socrates, it seems, maintains a more Christian view of the self 
than does Martensen, for whom sin is not as inhibiting to our access to the truth as 
the “older theology” presents. Regardless of the difference between the two, both 
Martensen and Socrates differ from what Johannes Climacus deems central to an 
understanding of human sinfulness in relation to God, namely, that we are in need of 
the truth. Thus, Kierkegaard’s truth as subjectivity does not endorse a subjective 
notion of truth that is relativistic, but rather a notion which exists as a specific 
response to the paradoxical nature of Christianity, specifically Christ. This response 
is nothing less than the passionate inwardness of faith.  
 
Christ as Knowledge of God 
Perhaps it was no accident that Danish Hegelians, specifically Martensen, 
honed in on the Incarnation as an example of Hegelian mediation.168  In that the 
Incarnation is said to express the coming together of transcendence and immanence, 
ideality and reality, infinitude and finitude, God and man, for Martensen, there was 
no better example than the Incarnation in demonstrating “that the basic doctrines of 
Christianity can be grasped by unaided human reason and thus can be objects of 
knowledge.”169  In other words, in Christ, we have not the Deus Nudus, God hidden 
in his divine majesty, but rather the Deus Revelatus, God as an object.  Against this 
Kierkegaard contends that the Incarnation, although offering us knowledge of God, 
fares our cognitive faculties no better in claiming knowledge of the Divine. For 
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Kierkegaard, “God cannot be an object for man, since God is subject.”170 Therefore, 
for Kierkegaard, the Deus Revelatus is also the Deus Absconditus, the hidden and the 
revealed God.171 
Because “God is pure Subjectivity”172 he must make himself known in a way 
which yet guards his divine subjectivity. God’s veiling and unveiling of himself is 
achieved in his taking on of human flesh in order to be an object for human knowing 
all the while remaining hidden in human flesh. It is the taking on of human flesh 
whereby God remains “incognito” within time. Kierkegaard writes, “He is God but 
chooses to become this individual human being. This...is the most profound 
incognito or the most impenetrable unrecognizability that is possible, because the 
contradiction between being God and being an individual human being is the greatest 
possible, the infinitely qualitative contradiction.”173  
Insofar as the human being bears no relation to that of the concept “God”, for 
Kierkegaard, the Incarnation expresses both a conceptual and ontological 
contradiction, and hence, constitutes a paradox.174  In fact, Kierkegaard thinks the 
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Incarnation offers the “Absolute” paradox in that “God became man.”175 In the most 
empirical and rational sense, the notion “that an individual human being is God, that 
is, claims to be God, is indeed the offence [in an eminent sense],”176 because, as 
                                                                                                                                          
assimilate Christianity as a doctrine for the understanding must be futile.” (63)  The “central feature” 
to which Geismar is referring is of course the paradoxical unity of God and man in Jesus Christ.  The 
mistake that Giesmar makes, concerning the paradox, is the confusion of distinguishing that which 
can be understood in history in contrast to that which can be understood by history.  The objective 
stance in the union of God and man, as Paul Sponhhelm writes, “tends to become a juxtaposition of 
realities for which no common ground is available, save the subjective ground of the believers’ 
passion.” See, Edward Geismar, Lectures on the Religious Thought of Soren Kierkegaard 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1937); Tim Rose Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology 
(England: Ashgate Publishing : 2001): and Paul Sponhelm, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian 
Coherance (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968). 
175
 For Kierkegaard, the absolute paradox of the Incarnation is that it constitutes a 
contradiction. In his Practice in Christianity, p. 125, Kierkegaard writes, “The qualitative 
contradiction—is between being God and being an individual human being.” See also p. 131. 
Furthermore, noting that for Kierkegaard, Christ is the “Absolute Paradox”, it is important to 
recognise that Kierkegaard understands the whole of Christian faith as “paradoxical”. This does not 
however, as it will be noted later, imply the absence of “non-paradoxical” elements within 
Christianity, as for example, concerning Christianity’s historicity. Furthermore, lending from 
Geismar, Kierkegaard does not view something “paradoxical” as meaning that it is irrational in and of 
itself. When Kierkegaard uses the word “paradox” it is to denote, not the character of a thing within 
the realm of knowledge and therefore rational enquiry. Rather, that something is a “paradox” denotes 
that its qualification lies beyond the realm of rational inquiry and thus is qualified as a “mystery”. In 
his Journals and Papers, [Soren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, Volume 1, A-E, Edited and 
Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 1967, 5] 
Kierkegaard’s notes this distinction concerning the “absurd”, or here, “paradox”, writing, “the absurd 
is composed in such a way that reason has no power at all to dissolve it in nonsense and prove that it 
is nonsense; no, it is a symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle about which reason must say: I cannot 
solve it, it cannot be understood, but it does not follow thereby that it is nonsense. But, of course, if 
faith is completely abolished, the whole sphere is dropped, and then reason becomes conceited and 
perhaps concludes that, ergo, the paradox is nonsense.”  And yet, for Kierkegaard, the “absurd” or 
“paradox” can also refer to Christian existence, or living, and not merely an epistemological relation 
to the doctrines of Christianity itself. Kierkegaard points to two works of his wherein this concept is 
used differently. He writes, “That there is a difference between the absurd in Fear and Trembling and 
the paradox in Concluding Unscientific Postscript is quite correct. The first is the purely personal 
definition of existential faith – the other is faith in relation to a doctrine…Finally, it is one thing to 
believe by virtue of the absurd (the formula only of the passion of faith) and to believe the absurd. The 
first expression is used by Johannes de Silentio, the second by Johannes Climacus.” (8) According to 
Kierkegaard, the absurd, or paradox, denotes a concept which human reason gives to something it 
cannot dissolve. In short, “reason has no power at all to dissolve it in nonsense and prove that it is 
nonsense.” (5) On the other hand, reason cannot just simply dissolve it whereby it makes sense. 
Therefore, for Kierkegaard, the paradox, the absurd “is a symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle about 
which reason must say: I cannot solve it, it cannot be understood, but it does not follow thereby that it 
is nonsense.” (5) Since reason can neither make sense or nonsense of the riddle, Kierkegaard thinks 
the inevitable result is reason’s despair. Thus, “the absurd is the expression of despair: that humanly it 
is not possible.” (6) Despair, however unfortunate a category it may be for human reason, is 
something Kierkegaard believes to be intrinsically related to faith and offence. Without faith, human 
reason “concludes that, ergo, the paradox is nonsense.”(5) This is a conclusion to which all human 
reason arrives in face of the absurd. In its inability to make sense of the paradox reason is offended. In 
short, “offence is the negative criterion of which confirms the quality between God and men” (6) – 
namely, that God and man are infinitely qualitatively different. 
176 Kierkegaard, PC, 26. 
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Kierkegaard states, it “conflicts with all (human) reason.”177  For Kierkegaard, the 
conflict emerges “by placing the eternal, essential truth together with existing.”178  
Therefore, in light of the IQD between God and a human being, reason has nothing at 
its disposal to logically unite these two opposing concepts. In neglecting the 
difference between God and humanity, speculative philosophy incorrectly perceived 
the Incarnation as an object, or idea, open to scrutiny.   
According to Stewart, Kierkegaard’s formulation of the paradox directly 
responded to Martensen’s Christological mediation wherefrom “the divine is 
immanent to human understanding and can therefore be known by human 
thought.”179 Furthermore, the distinction between God and a human being allows our 
understanding nothing more than the ability to affirm that which is only human. Does 
the human understanding ascertain the similarities existing between God and man, as 
if such categories of distinction exist a priori within reason?   
To these questions Kierkegaard responds that, “If God and man resemble 
each other to that degree, if they are to that degree kindred, consequently essentially 
within the same quality, then the conclusion ‘ergo it was God’ is humbug; for if to be 
God is nothing else than that, then God does not exist at all.”180 He states further: 
He [Jesus Christ] could say it [that he is God] to someone present, because someone 
present, by seeing the speaker, this individual human being, through this contradiction 
would nevertheless not receive a direct communication, since the contradiction is 
between what is said and what it seen, that is, who the speaker is according to 
appearances.181 
 
Therefore, the “paradox sensu strictissimo,”182 whereby we mock the claim that a 
mere human is deity, contradicts not only the empirical manifestation from whence 
                                                 
177 Ibid., 26 
178 Kierkegaard, CUP, 209. 
179 Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relation s to Hegel Reconsidered, 352. 
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the claim was made but mainly the presupposition of what, in our minds, constitutes 
the concept of God, as infinitely qualitatively distinct from human existence.  “Can 
one, then, make that which conflicts with all reason into the rational-actual?”183 In 
sum, even though God had revealed himself in Christ, he is not directly 
recognizable.184 And therefore Kierkegaard believed that the Incarnation can only be 
explained as a paradox and thus inexplicable to human reason. 
In moving forward from this discussion, I would like to make some 
concluding comments which are necessary for the following examination. First, for 
Kierkegaard, humanity is infinitely qualitatively distinct from God. This distinction 
is both conceptual and ontological. Moreover, whereas the ontological distinction 
lies in human sinfulness, the conceptual is conceived in terms of paradox resulting 
from the inherent distinctions in the concepts of God and humanity themselves. 
Furthermore, as suggested by Podmore, the IQD exists not merely in human 
sinfulness but also in the forgiveness of sin. All things considered, the IQD, 
therefore, inhibits any means on behalf of humanity to know God. With regard to the 
means whereby God has made himself known, in Christ, this too affords human 
knowledge nothing in knowing God. The reasons for this are, as noted, indicative of 
the ontologically and conceptual components of the IQD. What this means in 
reference to Christ, is that not only does human reason mock the equivocation of the 
terms God and man but, in light of this equivocation, human reason mocks “when a 
human being claims to be God.”   
In short, this section has determined that Kierkegaard’s grievance is with a 
rational theology which adheres to an unwarranted accessibility in knowing God. 
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Such an adherence, as noted, was specifically seen in Martensen’s Christological 
mediation coupled with the presumed account for humanity’s rational faculties, 
generally speaking, to know God in the first place. However, this is not the end of 
Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the speculative program.  Inasmuch as the figure of 
Christ was central to this program, in that it provided a means of integrating theology 
and Hegelian speculation, speculative philosophy’s other brother, historicism, 
maintained a formidable presence in this program. Although, Kierkegaard’s works, 
Fragments, CUP, and Training, unite in addressing the abuses of rational theology in 
its refashioning the significance of Christianity’s central tenets, it is CUP and 
Training where Kierkegaard extensively addresses these problems. Therefore, I will 
now examine Kierkegaard’s dealings with the question of the relation between 
historical knowledge and Christ as it pertains to what Kierkegaard thought was at 
stake, namely, true Christian existence. 
 
Christ and History 
Kierkegaard’s discussion of the historicity of Christianity is so highly 
dialectical that it presents, as Louis Pojman has stated, “both a necessary aspect and 
an embarrassing destruction to Christian faith.”185 In fact, as a whole, Kierkegaard 
thinks our knowledge of the past, i.e. historical knowledge, is generally clouded in 
uncertainty. At best, he contends, our knowledge of historical events is merely an 
approximation. However, with regard to our knowledge of the historicity of 
Christianity, a special case presents itself. The speciality pertaining to Christianity’s 
history is that at its centre there exists an absurdity, a paradox; in fact it is an 
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“absolute paradox”. He writes, “The absurd is that the eternal truth has come into 
existence in time, that God has come into existence, has been born, has grown up, 
etc., has come into existence exactly as an individual human being, indistinguishable 
from any other human being.”186 In short, for Kierkegaard, the absolute paradox is 
“that the Son of God became man.”187 In other words, central to the Christian faith is 
the belief that, in Christ, God has entered time therefore becoming historical.  
Now, one must be careful not to equate the absurdity of the God-man with 
Kierkegaard’s view of the historicity of Christianity as a whole. Recalling Pojman’s 
statement, for Kierkegaard, the Christian faith rests necessarily on its being 
historical. Kierkegaard does not recreate a Christianity divorced from history. Thus, 
it is central to Christian belief that one believe, as Kierkegaard states, that 
“Christianity is a historical truth; it appears at a certain time and certain place and 
consequently it is relevant to a certain time and place.”188  
According to Kierkegaard, the adherence to Christianity’s historicity is one 
which entails, not only the belief that God had become historical, but that the 
absurdity embedded in this belief does not disturb its general historical claims. The 
acceptance of the historical generalities of the life of Christ are therefore ones which 
                                                 
186 Kierkegaard, CUP, 210. 
187 Kierkegaard, JP, Vol. 4, 401. 
188 Kierkegaard, JP, Vol. 2, 232. For Kierkegaard, the question of history’s relation to 
Christianity is one as to whether historical investigation provides able enough ground upon which to 
trust in one’s salvation. And, as will be discussed below, although Kierkegaard believes the answer to 
this question is “no”, this does not deny the generally historical aspect of the Christian narrative. 
Kierkegaard writes, “First of all comes, quite properly, Lessing’s doubt that one cannot base an eternal 
happiness upon something historical. But there is [existerer] something historical, the story of Jesus 
Christ. But is it historically entirely certain? The answer to this must be that even if it were the surest 
thing in all history, this does not help; no direct transition from the historical can be made as the basis 
for an eternal happiness.” The relation between the historicity of Christian, specifically the 
Incarnation, and belief, if for Kierkegaard, guaranteed by the “if” of history, of the past. Thus, 
Kierkegaard’s reply to this relationship is: “Then I say to myself: I choose; the historical here means 
so much to me that I resolve to venture my whole life on this if…This is called venturing, and without 
venturing faith is impossible…Thus the historical is the occasion and still also the object of faith.”  
Kierkegaard’s whole address to the problem of the relationship between faith and history is in short a 
problem of the limits of knowledge. See, Kierkegaard, JP, Volume 1, 27-28. 
70 
 
Kierkegaard places within the confines of history, generally speaking, and therefore 
are open to historical investigation. For as he states, “historically, there are no 
objections to make, but the difficulty lies elsewhere.”189 However, what distinguishes 
the necessary aspect of Christianity’s general historicity from that of its most 
necessary aspect of the Incarnation is that the latter has the ability to enable its own 
“destruction”.   
Aware of the inherent difficulties related to the historicity of the Incarnation, 
Stewart notes, “History or speculative philosophy can discover many outward facts 
about Christianity and its development but nothing about its subjective 
significance.”190 What Stewart perceives is that Kierkegaard not only had 
reservations about historical knowledge in general but specifically with regard to the 
Incarnation. Kierkegaard continually beckons his readers back to the point that Christ 
had offered himself as “the object of faith” and not of knowledge. Noting that 
Kierkegaard’s use of the term “knowledge” is not directed to the natural historical 
claim of Christianity but rather to its supernatural ones, as examined earlier in the 
section “Christ as knowledge of God”, the Incarnation presents a barrier to human 
reason.  
                                                 
189 Kierkegaard, CUP, 576.  As it pertains to the objective/historical nature of Christianity, it 
is clear that Kierkegaard did believe that such historicity exists.  Thus, for those who seek to deny 
Kierkegaard this fact, they miss the point that Kierkegaard’s concern is not to deny Christianity its 
historical foundations but to stress in a time that had confused objective adherence with the central 
issue of Christianity  which is subjective appropriation, meaning, what it means to be a Christian.  He 
says, in CUP on page 578, “Objectively, it is not at all more difficult to find out what Christianity is 
than to find out what Mohammedanism and anything else historical are, except insofar as Christianity 
is not something merely historical; but the difficulty is to become Christian, because Christian is 
Christian only by being nailed to the paradox of having based his eternal happiness on the relation to 
something historical.” Furthermore, on the same page, he adds “the historicity of Christianity is true” 
concerning its historical origins, persons, and events, even though he believed the supernatural claims 
in Scripture to be true as well. 
190 Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, 468. 
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If reason has no categories at its disposal in order to overcome the logical 
contradictions emerging from uniting the terms God and man, historical investigation 
appears futile in making it sensible.191  That God had entered history in Christ 
“conflicts with all (human) reason.”192  Therefore, Kierkegaard asks, “Can it be 
demonstrated from history that Christ was God?”193 Insofar as historical knowledge 
can only provide an approximation, to those who would seek to prove the logic of the 
Incarnation by historical means, Kierkegaard thinks, at best, history can offer that 
Christ “was a great man, perhaps the greatest of all.”194 And yet, Kierkegaard is 
appalled that “history is the very thing that people have wanted to use to demonstrate 
that Christ was God.”195 “If the paradox [Christ] is explained objectively by 
speculative philosophy, then it ceases to be an object of faith and becomes the object 
of scientific knowledge.”196  
Aside from the arrogant presupposition apparent in historicism’s attempt to 
grasp something beyond its reach, Kierkegaard maintains that such attempts 
ultimately deem faith superfluous and thus destructive to the very centre of 
Christianity. Therefore, Kierkegaard’s discussion of history and Christ highlights two 
barriers which challenge the success of historical investigation. The first is the 
inability of reason to unite two opposing concepts, God and man. The second, being 
indicative of the first, is that given all the historical evidence for the deity of Christ, 
                                                 
191 Kirmmse notes, “Reason can come to the understanding that all these attempts to 
understand the key to divinity as being lodged in history, etc. are unreasonable and wrong, while faith, 
on the other hand, can see that these efforts to limit God’s absolute transcendence by assimilating him 
to human categories of understanding are mockery of God, blasphemy.” See 384-389 for further 
discussion. 
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this evidence would not be able to transcend the rational barrier given to reason and 
thus given to historical investigation.  
Even more, Kierkegaard thinks the very attempts of historical investigation to 
prove the Incarnation ends up working against itself. Pondering the idea of God’s 
coming into existence Johannes Climacus, in Fragments, asks, “How is that changed 
which comes into existence or what is the change of coming into existence?”197  The 
question concerns the certitude of historical knowledge and asks whether it is indeed 
as certain as we suppose, since, by the term “history” we communicate that it exists 
as something past, something that has happened. And yet, we find ourselves 
continuing more assuredly in our apprehending of what actually happened in days 
gone by. Since history is something past, its form of existence seems to relate 
something intrinsically necessary about those events from our present perspective.   
When something comes into existence a change is presupposed, namely, from 
non-existence to existence.  If a certain object has come into being then we assume, 
by this coming into being, that it did not previously exist and, as such, is thus not 
necessary.  As an example Kierkegaard states, “If, in coming into existence, a plan is 
intrinsically changed, then it is not this plan that comes into existence; but if it comes 
into existence unchanged, what, then, is the change of coming into existence? This 
change, then, is not in essence but in being and is from not existing to existing.”198 
That something has come into existence is, for Kierkegaard, a movement 
from possibility to actuality.199 It demonstrates that it has moved from possibility to 
actuality. But then Kierkegaard asks, “Can the necessary come into existence?”200  
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When we refer to something as necessary we are making a claim about the form of 
existence that something necessary possesses, namely, that it is.  Anything that can 
come into existence has demonstrated that it is by definition not necessary and is 
therefore only possible. “For the only thing that cannot come into existence is the 
necessary, because the necessary is.”201   
What Kierkegaard has in mind in regard to this discussion, beyond the 
remoteness of historical events in general, is the very central Christian claim of the 
Incarnation that the eternal, i.e., the necessary, has come into existence.  If God, as 
necessary, comes into existence, does this not prove that he is indeed not necessary 
since his coming into existence would prove that he did not exist? Kierkegaard finds 
this troubling and yet nothing escapes his critique.  In that an event is past and as 
such historical, it is an event which has come into existence as not necessary but as 
only possible.  And herein is the ambiguity of historical knowledge in general, as 
apprehension of the past. 
Something that is dialectical with respect to time has an intrinsic duplexity, so that after 
having been present it can endure as a past. The distinctively historical is perpetually the 
past (it is gone; whether it was years or days ago makes no difference), and as something 
bygone it has actuality, for it is certain and trustworthy that it occurred. But that it 
occurred is, in turn, precisely its uncertainty, which will perpetually prevent the 




Since historical events are simultaneously certain and uncertain, it follows that our 
conclusions about specific historical events will always be to a certain degree 
inconclusive.  
Again, Kierkegaard is not saying that history is unknowable, only that it 
possesses a past reality which is not fully accessible to the present.  If this is the case, 
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then history can always be rewritten when presented with more evidence. As such, 
history poses a problem for the believer.  
Consider the believer who is at the mercy of historical evidence (supposing it possible), 
who bases his confidence in Christianity on certain sources which today seem more or 
less established.  So he decides to believe the Gospel; but tomorrow the evidence takes on 
a new dimension and he is forced to withdraw his confidence in that evidence and change 
his commitment, suspending his faith.  Can one really subject faith and commitment to 




Concerning the historicity of Christianity, Kierkegaard directs his attention to the 
speculative thinker who views Christianity as something merely historical.  Such a 
thinker “approaches Christianity from a historical and conceptual perspective”204 and 
thus is indifferent to the central issue of Christianity which is subjectivity, personal 
living and devotion.  Of course, Kierkegaard, as we have stated, is not against 
historical criticism or speculative philosophy per se. Both “can discover many 
outward facts about Christianity and its development but nothing about its subjective 
significance.”205 
In the end, Kierkegaard believes, “with regard to the historical the greatest 
certainty is only an approximation.”206  But where one’s eternal fate is concerned, an 
approximation is not good enough. Hence, those who seek to be fully assured of the 
truth of Christianity by means of historical evidence will be greatly disappointed.  It 
cannot be otherwise, for history has to do with the past.  Those who live in the 
present can never know for sure the actual events of the past.  Add to this 
Christianity’s claim that the eternal came into existence at a past moment in time, 
and the situation becomes utterly untenable.   
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The implications of Kierkegaard’s conception of historical knowledge are 
indeed significant for Christianity. If the nature of historical knowledge exists as 
something past, something which we can only ascertain approximately, then what 
about those events within the Christian narrative which exist not only as something 
past, but as something supernatural?207  The methods of historical criticism find 
themselves hard pressed in unearthing a particular event which has no natural ground 
from which it came into existence.  Naturally, although we shall discuss the concept 
in more detail later, Kierkegaard’s use of the concept “Absolute Paradox” to describe 
the Incarnation presents an impossible feat for historicism to overcome. The eye of 
reason looks upon this lowly servant and is offended that he claims to be God.  It 
would never occur to man’s reason that God in all his majesty would reveal himself 
in this paradoxical form.  Fallen reason looks upon this man Jesus, and finds 
“nothing to be seen except a lowly human being who by signs and wonders and by 
claiming to be God continually constituted the possibility of offence.”208  That one 
claimed to be God, in history, raises the question as to what historical investigation 
may offer such a claim.  With historical investigation at a standstill, it is here we find 
the significance of the objective/subjective response in relation to the nature of 
Christianity.   
                                                 
207 It must be noted that Kierkegaard’s examination of the modal categories may at first seem 
to be a direct reference to Hegel’s own conception of the categories universality, particularity, and 
individuality which exist as the three moments of the Concept.  However, as Stewart once again 
elucidates, Kierkegaard’s attacks on the necessity of history make no sense if directly aimed at Hegel 
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truly understood only when it is grasped as a necessary culmination of the conceptual development” 
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the Incarnation is itself an historical event.   
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Since the central claims of Christianity transcend human reason, and thereby 
the use of historical critical methods of investigation, Kierkegaard believes that one 
of two decisions can be taken. Either, one takes the “leap of faith” which is the 
subjective response, or one takes the objective response and continues in the process 
of speculative deliberation on the matter, although the matter at hand, Christianity, is 
beyond objectification in this sense of the word.  “Christianity is spirit; spirit is 
inwardness; inwardness is subjectivity,”209 according to Kierkegaard.  “When the 
matter is treated objectively, the subject cannot impassionedly relate himself to the 
decision, can least of all be impassionedly, infinitely interested.”210   
It is obvious, given the epistemological and historical illusiveness of the past, 
that the objective position in relation to Christianity ends in failure since it could 
never muster up the kind of reliability it demands in order to rest assured. And even 
if it did, Kierkegaard believes that such objective cognition is always accepted as 
immediate and thus without interest. He says: 
The objective view… continues from generation to generation precisely because the 
individuals (the observers) become more and more objective, less and less infinitely 
passionately interested. On the assumption that one would in this way continue to 
demonstrate and seek a demonstration of the truth of Christianity, something remarkable 
would finally emerge, that just as one was finished with the demonstration of its truth, it 
would cease to exist as something present: it would have become something historical to 
such a degree that it would be something past, whose truth, that is, whose historical truth, 




Kierkegaard’s point is that there is no amount of demonstration or evidence able to 
provide objective certainty for Christian truths which belong to the realm of faith.  
When one continues in the search for certainty, faith, or subjectivity, is delayed.  
Delaying subjective decisions thus results from assenting to an objective fact which 
is casually accepted as history, with little or no significance for one’s life.   
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For with regard to historical issues it is of course impossible to reach an objective 
decision of such a nature that no doubt would be able to insinuate itself.  This also 
indicates that the issue is to be formulated subjectively, and that it is indeed a 
misunderstanding to want to assure oneself objectively and thereby avoid the risk in 




But does not scholarship, in relation to the historical text of Scripture, afford a bit 
more objectivity than Kierkegaard will permit?   
In reference to the “research scholar” Kierkegaard claims that since their 
objective is to secure the greatest amount of objectivity, thus reliability, in regards to 
Holy Scripture, the most that they can reach is also an approximation.213  This is not 
to belittle or diminish the role scholarship contributes to the field of biblical 
interpretation.  Kierkegaard says that “philological scholarship is wholly 
legitimate,”214 and that he “has respect…for that which scholarship consecrates.”215  
However, these efforts are somewhat exaggerated in regards to what they hope to 
achieve.  It appears that scholarship acts in such a way that its endeavours will result 
in faith.216  But when all is said and done, the fact remains that reliability is never 
reached. And thus, the question yet remains as to whether such pursuits are enough 
on which to base one’s eternal happiness.   
Since scholarship continually seeks to establish the reliability of Scripture, 
the quest continues from one generation to the next as new problems arise which 
demand attention.  But where does one rest content?  Kierkegaard wonders at what 
point the ground is secure enough wherefrom we halt deliberation and begin with 
faith.  Within such a process, the inevitable outcome is that, “The subject’s personal, 
infinite, impassioned interestedness (which is the possibility of faith and then faith, 
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the form of eternal happiness and then eternal happiness) fades away more and more 
because the decision is postponed as a direct result of the results of the learned 
research scholars.”217 
Kierkegaard argues that although scholarship has much to offer in regards to 
various historical, linguistic, and textual problems, such difficulties will always exist.  
Furthermore, solving problems inevitably leads to more problems.  So, Kierkegaard 
asks, when does one finally decide to rest secure in regards to the amount of 
epistemological warrant whereby a decision for faith can be made?  The answer 
seems obvious.  If one rests their eternal happiness on the amount of objectivity one 
can obtain, then one will never come to a decision for faith since there will always be 
either more or less knowledge to come. Faith, for Kierkegaard, is not just mere 
intellectual assent, as is the case when one is persuaded by evidence to admit the 
thing or event once in question.   
In such a case, what is the relation between the object which has been verified 
empirically, and the subject to which the object is presented?  If “everything is 
assumed to be in order with regard to the Holy Scriptures—what then? Has the 
person who did not believe come a single step closer to faith?”218  Kierkegaard’s 
reply to these questions is an emphatic “No, not a single step.”219  The basis for why 
Kierkegaard finds the cause so inadequate to the effect results from his conception of 
faith.  Although we shall examine this concept in depth later on, it will suffice for 
now to say that Kierkegaard believes that “faith does not result from straightforward 
scholarly deliberation.”220   
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Reflecting on what has been said concerning Kierkegaard’s view of historical 
knowledge (that it exists as past, and as such, exists dialectically as something certain 
yet uncertain) the implications resulting from his understanding for Scripture, as a 
historical text, are also quite obvious.  He says, “The New Testament is something of 
the past and is thus historical in a stricter sense.”221  And, as past, Scripture, although 
an objective/historical text which claims a significant amount of historicity does, in 
and of itself, retain that certain amount of uncertainty, especially in relation to the 
supernatural, which is to be approached only in the act of faith which provides the 
certainty needed.  And herein lays the significance of the Church in Kierkegaard’s 
estimation.  According to Kierkegaard, the Church, as an entity which exists at 
present, “eliminates all the proving and demonstrating that was required in 
connection with the Bible, since that is something past, whereas the Church is 
something present.”222  But here again, Kierkegaard eliminates the tendency to seek 
any form of objectivity whereby the subjective significance of Christianity may be 
placed in jeopardy.   
Although existing always in the present, the Church is an entity which is not 
grounded in the present but rather rests upon the apostolic Church.  It too possesses a 
form of historicity and thus exists as something past.223 Although Kierkegaard may 
be correct in his criticisms against the misappropriation of historical knowledge in 
seeking the surest sense of Christian objectivity, again the question can be raised 
whether or not the credibility of those biblical writers, as mediate witnesses to the 
events, might warrant a bit more objectivity than Kierkegaard allows.  Said 
differently, some forms of recorded history seem more reliable in that they were 
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written by those who were contemporaries to the events themselves.  Kierkegaard 
considers this possibility within his work, PF and presents the problem as follows. 
 Whereas Kierkegaard had shown the inability of historical investigation to 
produce subjectivity, it is the “paradox” which Kierkegaard believes offers historical 
investigation its greatest limitation.  Kierkegaard notes that many were 
contemporaries with Christ.  These people were witnesses to his miracles and 
teachings. However, Kierkegaard reminds us that even though many witnessed the 
events of Christ’s life, they still did not believe.  To clarify his point, Kierkegaard 
gives an example of possible ways that a contemporary might react to Christ. 
 The first contemporary is one who spends all of his time following Christ, 
accumulating as many facts as is historically possible.  The second contemporary is 
the most attentive student, always listening to every word the teacher says.224 
However, does this behaviour make either contemporary a true follower of Christ? 
For Kierkegaard, neither of these contemporaries possesses real faith.  The reason is, 
“for the first contemporary, that life would have been merely a historical event; for 
the second one, that teacher would have been the occasion for understanding 
himself.”225   
The true contemporary of Christ is one who possesses both objective 
knowledge and subjective appropriation.  Therefore, “as long as the eternal and the 
historical remain apart from each other, the historical is only an occasion.”226 By the 
word “occasion,” Kierkegaard is signifying the role that actual historical events play 
in relation to faith. He says: 
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The contemporary follower, too, obtains a historical point of departure for his eternal 
consciousness, for he is indeed contemporary with the historical event that does intend to 
be a moment of occasion, and this historical event intends to interest him otherwise than 




To obtain faith, the contemporary’s interest must exceed the desire to procure mere 
historical events or objective knowledge. This is to say that his happiness lies in the 
subjective appropriation of the historical which is the qualification of a true 
contemporary.  Still, the act of faith does not eliminate the historical aspect, since the 
latter is the occasion for the contemporary’s eternal happiness. 
  With this in mind, Kierkegaard reveals the limitations presented to the 
historical contemporary.  He says, “A contemporary can be a noncontemporary: the 
genuine contemporary is the genuine contemporary not by virtue of immediate 
comtemporaneity”228 (By “immediate,” Kierkegaard means “historically present”, for 
example, the apostles).  Kierkegaard reminds us that being a mere witness to 
historical events, as shown by the first contemporary, does not make one a true 
contemporary.  It is evident that Kierkegaard understands the word “contemporary” 
as signifying the true follower of Christ as distinct from a mere historical eyewitness.  
But can one who was not an eyewitness be considered a true contemporary? 
Kierkegaard’s reply is that one becomes a contemporary in the same way as the 
immediate contemporary, by virtue of faith.   
For Kierkegaard, the historical events, though providing the occasion, do not 
provide the saving condition.  Therefore, “if one who comes later receives the 
condition from God himself, then he is a contemporary, a genuine contemporary.”229  
A “contemporary such as this is not an eyewitness (in the sense of immediacy), but 
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as a believer he is a contemporary in the autopsy of faith.  But in this autopsy every 
non-contemporary (in the sense of immediacy) is in turn a contemporary.”230  Thus, 
the non-contemporary can be either one who was a historical contemporary (in the 
sense of immediacy) or also one not related in immediacy (historically) who does not 
possess subjective appropriation.  Only faith is the condition of a true contemporary, 
not historical investigation or observation.  “Faith can only be based on a personal 
encounter with Christ, and that historical revelation merely provides the existing 
individual an occasion for such an encounter.”231 Therefore, we can conclude that 
true contemporaneity is subjective appropriation, not objective adherence resulting 
from mere historical knowledge.  If historical events, in general, are at its maximum 
an approximation,232 then the task of the historian to achieve the surest amount of 
certainty in regards to a historical event, like the Incarnation, is an endless task of 
deliberation.   
As such, the historian exists in an objective relation to the task before him.  
He cares little, if at all, whether or not the event demands more than the mere 
exactness of its nature.  Christianity, on the other hand, asks more from its observers 
than mere knowledge of its origins, significant people, and events.  But, this 
subjective demand is of no concern for the historian. Historical evidence may always 
be waiting to be discovered, waiting to be counted among the rest of the evidence in 
providing history greater clarity.  Thus, the historian belongs to the generations of 
historians who endeavour “from generation to generation”233 seeking to come “as 
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close to certainty as possible.”234  But, as we have stated, the events of Christianity 
can be elucidated only up to a certain point.  Its truths evade such historical methods 
because no such methods could ever relate the happenings of those events which 
transcend their use.   
Rationally, Christ is a contradiction. And thus, no amount of historical 
evidence can lessen the tension that, in Christ, God is both hidden and revealed.  
Therefore, for Kierkegaard, Christianity demands that humanity relate to that which, 
although historical, by our reasoning cannot become historical.235  It is to forget that 
Kierkegaard’s concern with “what it means to be a Christian” was one to which he 
already presupposed a definition, namely, to believe with the passion of the infinite. 
In order to offer “true Christianity” Kierkegaard first had to address the use of 
historicism and speculative philosophy which threatened to transform how one is to 
appropriate the Christian message. Thus, his efforts sought to indicate that what 
Christianity demands is the utmost subjective passion of the individual, namely faith.  
In light of Kierkegaard’s efforts to re-establish how one approaches Christ, it 
appears that his portrayal of Christ as the absolute paradox was appropriate. With the 
Incarnation “the understanding must come to a standstill”,236 Kierkegaard thought 
that all human efforts, whether by historical investigation or speculation, must be 
reconsidered in light of this “standstill”.  Therefore, for Kierkegaard, faith is the only 
response to the paradoxes of the Christian faith and to, specifically, Christ himself. 
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Faith or Offence 
In Practice in Christianity Kierkegaard takes up the issue of the relationship 
between faith and offence.237 It is here that Kierkegaard seeks to articulate the notion 
that if the Incarnation poses a barrier unable to be breached by human enquiry, be it 
speculation or historical investigation, the individual’s relation to the God-man must 
reside in another mode of access. In imposing a barrier to human reason by means of 
the paradox of revelation, for Kierkegaard, the possibility of offence, “is the guardian 
or defensive weapon of faith...in such a way that all human understanding must come 
to a halt in one way or another, must take umbrage—in order then either to be 
offended or to believe.”238 
Therefore, only faith, whereby the individual enters into the God-relation, is 
able to come terms with the hidden God in Christ. As Kierkegaard states, “He 
[Christ] is the paradox, the object of faith, exists only for faith.”239  
Without it, one can only be offended at Christ’s claim to be God. As 
Kierkegaard states, “Essentially offence is related to the composite of God and man, 
or to the God-man.”240  More importantly, for Kierkegaard, offence to the God-man 
is not something to be bypassed. Rather, offence precludes faith insofar as one must 
first be confronted with the offence in order to then obtain faith. On this Kierkegaard 
writes, “From the possibility of offence, one turns either to offence or to faith, but 
one never comes to faith except from the possibility of offence.”241  
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In other words, offence brings the individual either to remain offended or to 
take up the offence in the utmost passion of existence which is what it means to have 
faith. Therefore, “the possibility of offence is not to be avoided.”242  This is why, for 
Kierkegaard, faith is subjectivity in its highest form.  
Human reason must first be offended, must first be left to despair its own 
inability in order that faith becomes the only means in overcoming the paradox.  
Kierkegaard thus considers despair “as the negative sign of faith.”243 But in light of 
the distinction between God and humanity, the believer, by virtue of faith, “is 
nevertheless not offended – he expresses just the opposite of offence”244 – namely 
belief. Kierkegaard sums up the relation between faith in the absurd from offence 
due to the absurd stating:   
The absurd is a category, the negative criterion, of the divine or of the relationship to the 
divine. When the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd – faith transforms it, but 
in every weak moment it is again more or less absurd to him. The passion of faith is the 
only thing which masters the absurd – if not, then faith is not faith in the strictest sense, 
but a kind of knowledge…The absurd and faith are inseparables, which is necessary if 
there is to be friendship and if this friendship is to be maintained between two qualities so 
unlike as God and man.”245   
 
Kierkegaard’s statement here is of extreme importance in making sense of the 
different ways in which he uses the terms “absurd” and “paradox” throughout his 
writings. Indeed, sometimes, such terms appear synonymous, conflated when used in 
relation to the categories of faith and offence. However, Kierkegaard does, himself, 
offer us what differences in connation might exist at times when using such terms. 
For example, he states: “That there is a difference between the absurd in Fear and 
                                                                                                                                          
believe.” Furthermore, Kierkegaard states on page 143, “So inseparable is the possibility of offence 
from faith that if the God-man were not the possibility of offence he could not be the object of faith, 
either. Thus the possibility of offence is taken up into faith, is the negative mark of the God-man. For 
if there were no possibility of offence, there would be direct recognizability, and then the God-man 
would be an idol; then direct recognizability is paganism.” See Barth Romans II, 38. 
242 Ibid., 98. 
243 Kierkegaard, JP, Vol. 1, 6. 
244 Ibid., 6. 
245 Ibid., 7. 
86 
 
Trembling and the paradox in Concluding Unscientific Postscript is quite correct. 
The first is the purely personal definition of existential faith – the other is faith in 
relation to a doctrine…Finally, it is one thing to believe by virtue of the absurd (the 
formula only of the passion of faith) and to believe the absurd. The first expression is 
used by Johannes de Silentio and the second by Johannes Climacus.”246  
Here, Kierkegaard explains his use of Paradox in CUP by contrasting it to 
Fear and Trembling. The argument Kierkegaard seeks to make in CUP is that 
reason, by way of speculative philosophy, seeks to make sense of what is beyond 
sense, is absurd. Therefore, the only way in which to believe the absurd is only by 
virtue of it which is to have faith. In faith, then, the absurd is not absurd. However, 
divorced from faith, human reason can and should only conclude, from a rational, 
speculative vantage point, that the doctrines of Christianity are prima facia, absurd, 
beyond the boundaries of human comprehension, a “riddle” as Kierkegaard himself 
states. But, when the absurd is taken up in faith, by the absurd, then there is no longer 
a tension like that of human reason in relation to the absurd.  
All in all, the self cannot evade the absurd. It either, “conceitedly” concludes 
“the paradox is nonsense” and rests thus offended, or else, in faith, it overcomes the 
absurdity in such a way that there exists a certain rational relation to the self. All 
such categories are for Kierkegaard necessary descriptions of human reason in 
relation to the divine. Without faith, reason evades the paradox by concluding that it 
is nonsense, that it is absurd. This is a form of despair since the self continues 
without knowledge of its own situation as distinct from God. In fact, herein lays 
Kierkegaard’s critique of the audacity of speculative philosophical attempts in 
                                                 
246 Ibid., 8. 
87 
 
apprehending and making sense of what is out of bounds, namely, God. However, in 
light of the knowledge from God that there exists an infinite abyss separating God 
and humanity, the self is also in despair in that it is aware of its powerlessness in 
overcoming the abyss. From here one can either stand offended or in faith believe 
that the absolute paradox, Christ himself, had overcome the distance separating God 
and humanity.  
And herein, with faith as the only means of coming to terms with the absolute 
paradox, is the significance of Kierkegaard’s critique of rational theology. 
Kierkegaard notes,  
For if what is commonly called faith-believing that there is a God, a providence, etc. 
(which is nothing other than knowing, or a spontaneity which can indeed be clarified by 
thought but is not tested by spiritual trials, does not anguish to the point of the absurd)—
if this is what it is to believe, then Christ’s words become an anticlimax and Christ comes 




Rational theology appeared to want to make sense of the Incarnation by means of 
both Hegelian mediation and/or historicism. But for Kierkegaard, these approaches, 
as examined, sought to assimilate intellectually that which can only be subjectively 
appropriated.  As Kierkegaard states, 
In Christ God volunteered his willingness to become involved with the human race.  But 
what has the human race done? Instead of becoming involved with God, it has changed 
this into history about: how God in Christ has involved himself with the apostles, or 
history about how God in Christ has involved himself with man. In short, instead of 
becoming involved with God, they have made this into something historical which they 




Intellectual assimilation of Christ can only result in either a mere objective adherence 
or the translating of Christ in terms of the ideal moral archetype. Either approach 
betrays the fact that the category of offence had not arisen, for offence would not 
have allowed for either approach to arise. Offence indicates that the individual has 
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understood that which cannot be understood, i.e. that God had appeared in human 
flesh. But faith, for Kierkegaard, allows for the “triumphant breakthrough” whereby 
the offence is overcome.249 “Without faith one remains in the offence.”250 
It is necessary to note an important qualification with regard to that which 
appears as Kierkegaard’s impenetrable barrier between God and the individual. 
Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the individual’s relation to the Incarnation, and hence to 
God, is presented by Kierkegaard in the most negative of terms. However, keeping in 
mind the context of his day, Kierkegaard believed the times demanded the need to 
first hear the “no” to their abuses in order, subsequently, to hear the “yes” of grace. 
Kierkegaard states as much:  
But if the essentially Christian is something so terrifying and appalling, how in the world 
can anyone think of accepting Christianity? Very simply and, if you wish that also, very 
Lutheranly: only the consciousness of sin can force one, if I dare to put it that way (from 
the other side grace is the force), into this horror. And that at the very same moment the 
essentially Christian transforms itself into and is sheer leniency, grace, love, mercy.
251
   
 
Kierkegaard believed that in a time when Christianity was presented in terms of its 
accessibility, Christianity needed once again to be as it is expressed in the older 
theology, as difficult for human understanding to comprehend. Aiming his criticisms 
at Lutheran Denmark, his mentioning of Lutheranism can only be understood as the 
call for a return to Luther himself. The false assumption that Kierkegaard lacked a 
concept of grace derives from an inability to understand his objective within the 
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The issue facing Kierkegaard regarded what means human reason has at its 
disposal in knowing God. But even more the issue, for Kierkegaard, was the 
sublation, the eradication of the distance between God and humanity.  Kierkegaard’s 
task in emphasizing this distance was to demonstrate that human reason is, in and of 
itself, absent of grace. Thus, what Kierkegaard considered the epitome of the error of 
the times was the notion of subjectivity, namely that the human being is the sole 
criterion for its own existence coupled with reason being a power which 
encompasses all reality, even God. Kierkegaard writes, “It is absolutely true, isolated 
subjectivity as the age understands it is evil, but restoration to health by means of 
‘objectivity’ is not a hair better.”252 In fact, Kierkegaard believes that an 
individualistic conception of the human is one that represents “subjectivity in its 
untruth” and as such must be passed “all the way through ‘to the single individual’—
face to face with God.253  
Therefore, against the placement of reason at the pinnacle of human 
existence, for Kierkegaard, faith is that pinnacle in relation to knowing God in 
Christ. Faith is the means by which one halts on the deluded path of the powers of 
human reason in relation to God. Faith is God’s chosen mode of access for humanity 
from which they relate to him; it is the creation of a new epistemology. Kierkegaard 
writes:  
In the presentation of supernaturalism there is a difficulty, for what Kant has pointed out 
is probably true, that if there is no theoretical knowledge, then this obviously means that 
the entire sphere of the an sich is excluded from human consciousness and therefore 
never comes to man through consciousness either, and I therefore readily concede to 
Goschel that nonknowledge consistently ends in nonfaith – but therefore the 
supernaturalist maintains also that there must be a complete change in consciousness, that 
a development must begin from the very beginning and [be] just as eternal in idea as the 
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first. It is therefore probably a mistake for the supernaturalist to link his faith to the 
nonknowledge of Kant, because as stated, from nonknowledge of Kant must come 




For Kierkegaard, faith is the only way from which the indirect communication of 
God in Christ is made known. Revelation is thus dialectical insofar as it is indirect to 
the ordinary mode of human knowledge but direct to faith. Furthermore, revelation is 
for Kierkegaard centred in the historical person of Jesus Christ whereby God became 
an object for human knowing. Kierkegaard states, 
One can discern that faith is a more concrete qualification than immediacy, because from 
a purely human point of view the secret of all knowledge is to concentrate upon what is 
given in immediacy; in faith we assume something which is not given and can never be 
deduced from the preceding consciousness – that is, the consciousness of sin and the 
assurance of the forgiveness of sins….The consciousness of the forgiveness of sins is 
linked to an external event, the appearance of Christ in his fullness, which is, indeed, not 
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The aim of this Chapter is to explore Barth’s use of the IQD, History, 
Paradox, and Faith in relation to revelation as found in Romans II, in order to discern 
to what extent Barth parallels Kierkegaard’s own use of these concepts. This 
investigation shall proceed in three steps. First, beyond the generalities of the 
problematic Kierkegaard/Barth relationship outlined in the Introduction, attention 
will be given specifically to the question of Kierkegaard’s presence in Romans II.  
Second, the similarities of the theological/historical backdrop between Kierkegaard’s 
day and Barth’s shall be discussed in that providing the context wherein these 
concepts appear will aid in explicating how they are used. Third, I will briefly 
discuss what works of Kierkegaard’s were available at the time of Barth’s re-writing 
of the Epistle to the Romans in order to offer the possibility that Barth was more 
familiar with Kierkegaard’s work than what is usually allowed.256 
Finally, by means of examining Barth’s own use of the conceptual material 
listed above, it will be demonstrated that a strong affinity exists between these two 
thinkers. The outcome will be to establish that this affinity exists not only in their 
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employment and conception of a negative dialectic of diastasis between God and 
humanity, but also in the positive overcoming of this diastasis by revelation.257   
 
Kierkegaard in Romans II: Problems 
Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard within Romans II is interesting and yet 
perplexing for several reasons. First, as is well known, Barth affirms that the method 
of Romans II can be “limited to a recognition” of the Kierkegaardian concept of the 
infinite qualitative distinction between God and humanity.258  Yet, aside from this 
affirmation, Barth’s method develops in “recognition” of many other influences.259  
Given the breadth of influence on Barth at the time of the shift from Romans I to II 
the Kierkegaardian presence within Romans II is both clear and obscure; clear due to 
Barth’s own admission of Kierkegaard’s presence, coupled with the presence of 
Kierkegaardian concepts, obscure, as to whether or not Barth’s use of these concepts 
stay faithful to Kierkegaard.  Second, this relation admits further obscurity if 
McCormack is right when he identifies that “the order in which Barth presented these 
influences was not accidental; the ordering was intended to attribute a priority of 
importance…”260 If this is indeed the case then the influence of others such as Plato, 
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Kant and Overbeck retain primacy over that of Kierkegaard.  For example, in his, 
Barth and Dostoevsky: A Study of the Influences of the Russian Writer Fyoder 
Mikhailovich Dostoevsky on the Development of the Swiss Theologian Karl Barth, 
1915-1922, P.H. Brazier argues for Dostoevsky’s role in Romans II in a way which 
seeks to marginalize Kierkegaard’s role.261  
  Although this work must be credited for its efforts in extracting the 
influence Dostoevsky had on Romans II, its minimization of Kierkegaard’s presence 
is unwarranted in that it reflects no knowledge of Kierkegaard. Furthermore, Brazier 
seeks to credit Dostoevsky for those traces of the IQD in Barth’s thought as early as 
1915 before his encounter with Kierkegaard. Arguing for Dostoevsky as the force 
behind Barth’s development of this concept Brazier’s posits, “But when Barth 
discovers Kierkegaard (in 1919) he finds a Christian philosopher who expresses 
succinctly and with brevity in only three words, infinite qualitative distinction, what 
Dostoevsky does using over one million words in his novels.”262  Brazier omits the 
point that Kierkegaard’s writings articulate the distinction between God and 
humanity in more words than Dostoevsky. What is more, it is Kierkegaard, not 
Dostoevsky, who Barth credits as having provided him with this concept. Brazier 
also neglects to mention that the most probable source for Barth’s use of this concept 
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prior to 1915 may well have been the Lutheran influence he received in Wilhelm 
Herrmann rather than Dostoevsky.  
 Continuing, Brazier seeks to establish his case by appealing to other sources 
which actually work against his thesis rather than for it. For example, consider his 
use of Karl Adams. Quoting Adams, he states: 
In the close connection with Kierkegaard, that of dialectics corroding, probing the endless 
qualitative difference between God and humanity, creator and cosmos, eternity and time 
is always newly striking out at rudiments but does not lay bare…there were touches also, 
of the hunger for eternity of Dostoevsky.263   
 
Adams’ statement affirms an awareness of the thoroughness of Kierkegaard’s 
development of this concept inasmuch as he describes it as “that of dialectics 
corroding, probing the endless qualitative difference between God and humanity.”264  
By contrast Adams states that there were only “touches” of Dostoevsky’s influence 
in a notion of a hunger for eternity. It appears, then, that Adams supports, rather than 
undermines Kierkegaard’s role in Barth’s use of the IQD. 
 Brazier exhibits a deficiency in his understanding of Kierkegaard’s 
development of this concept in relation to Dostoevsky’s lack thereof. Had Brazier 
been aware of Kierkegaard’s own use of this concept, he would have steered clear of 
his repeated generalizations, which he hoped would warrant his position — 
generalizations such as “The influence/effect of Kierkegaard is well researched by 
Barthian scholars.”265  In short, Barth himself points to the help Dostoevsky’s 
“characters” provided him in Romans II, but that is all.266  
Advancing the obscurity which envelops Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard is 
McCormack’s work. Although it is generally accepted that Barth had employed the 
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Kierkegaardian concept of the IQD in order “to attack all speculation which wiped 
out the infinite qualitative difference between God and man,” this employment 
becomes suspect inasmuch as McCormack argues that Barth already had a form of 
dialectic long before his encounter with Kierkegaard.267  Referencing the work of 
Michael Beintker, McCormack concludes “that most of the conceptual building 
blocks needed to produce the characteristic shape of dialectic in Romans II were 
already in place before the encounter with Kierkegaard through Barth’s reception of 
his brother Heinrich’s Ursprungsphilosophie.”268  However, as we shall see, there is 
more to be said about the “characteristic shape” of dialectic in Romans II in relation 
to Kierkegaard,  than about Heinrich’s Ursprungsphilosophie, which calls into 
question the accuracy of McCormack’s, via Beintker’s, analysis.  
In conclusion, in light of what has been stated above, it appears that Barth’s 
relation to Kierkegaard in Romans II is both highly enigmatic, as well as deemed 
(possibly as a result of the elusiveness of Kierkegaard in Barth’s works) generally 
insignificant by Barth scholarship.269   
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The Infinite Qualitative Distinction and Dialectical Theology 
The Historical Context of the significance of the IQD  
In a time not very different from Kierkegaard’s own, wherein the subversion 
of central Christian tenets at the hands of speculative idealism ran rampant/unbridled, 
the era in which Romans II was produced was one in which “Christianity became, as 
a result of the humanistic and rationalistic presuppositions … representative of 
nineteenth-century thought, ‘spiritualistic anthropomorphism’.”270 Thus, the medium 
for human knowing of God resided in feeling (Gefühl) and/or ethics grounded in the 
historical person of Christ.271  The presumptuous use of historical-critical 
methodology in Kierkegaard’s day reached its apex in the era preceding WWI in the 
historical theology of figures such as Ritschl, Harnack, and Troeltsch. Barth, 
therefore, had faced the ultimate evaporation of the “older dogmatics” in a way that 
even went beyond Kierkegaard’s context. Nevertheless, there is no subtraction from 
the common bond they shared in addressing a problem inherited from the 
Enlightenment –namely, the turn to the subject where everything had been placed at 
the altar of rationalism.   
Contending that Kant had foreclosed the possibility of knowing God by the 
faculty of pure reason,272 Barth’s earliest theology shows its debt to theologians such 
as Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Harnack, Troeltsch, and Herrmann, for whom historical 
criticism or human experience enabled theology to find its way forward. However, as 
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Barth later became aware, avenues such as these would fare no better than the 
eighteenth-century in that both ended with the same starting point and end – namely, 
the primacy of the subject. Against this backdrop, Barth’s later theology of 1919, and 
more importantly 1921, reflects an aversion to his earlier development whereby the 
application of historical-critical methodology to Christianity betrays its allegiance to 
a rational theology.   
For Barth, the culmination of a theological agenda, which had placed the 
human subject at the heart of theological inquiry, manifested itself in the reduction of 
Christian dogmatics and ethics to rationalism and war ideology; the irresistible result 
of which was the widespread theological support of Kaiser Wilhelm’s declaration of 
war.273  For Barth, the use of theology to support WWI expressed the evident 
disintegration of the infinite qualitative distinction between God and humanity 
insofar as theology had been translated into purely moralistic terms with its ultimate 
goal being that of ushering in the “Kingdom of God.”  Although, historically, the 
primacy of the subject had manifested itself somewhat differently in their respective 
times, both Kierkegaard and Barth are equally suspicious of an ungrounded optimism 
regarding humanity’s own moral existence. For both thinkers, whenever the Church 
shares this optimism, Christianity has assumed “an ineffective peace-pact or 
compromise,”274 negatively defined as “Christendom.”   
In sum, Barth’s diagnosis of the Christianity of his day as a false Christianity, 
inasmuch as it has assumed a theological position contrary to that of the Gospel, 
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follows Kierkegaard’s own assessment of Christianity in his time.  In light of this 
affinity, it is not coincidental that Barth found Kierkegaard’s negative assessment of 
Christendom useful, for, as he states, “We have heard what Kierkegaard said about it 
all, and we agree with him.”275   
 
Barth’s possible familiarity with Kierkegaard’s thought: The Kierkegaard 
Renaissance 
During those months when Barth began his revisions of Romans I, later to 
become Romans II, much of Kierkegaard’s work had already been translated and was 
therefore at his disposal.276  Hans Peter Barfod’s earliest edition of Kierkegaard’s 
journals, commissioned by Kierkegaard’s eldest brother, Bishop Peter Christian 
Kierkegaard, in 1865, was published in several instalments. The first came in 1869, 
entitled Af Søren Kierkegaards efterladte papirer, 1833-43 [From Søren 
Kierkegaard’s Posthumous Papers, 1833-43].277 Volume two (comprising the years 
1844-46) appeared in 1872, volume three (1847) in 1877, volumes four (1848), five 
(1849), and six (1850) in 1880, and the last two volumes – seven (1851-53) and eight 
(1854-55) – appeared in 1881.278 Even before Kierkegaard’s journals appeared in 
Danish, however, his published works were being translated into German.  
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The earliest, full-length translation appeared in 1861, titled “A Work.”  It 
consisted of the first nine Øjeblikket articles.279 A second edition appeared in 1864, 
unchanged except for the title: Christentum und Kirche. “Die Gegenwart”.  Ein ernst 
Wort an unsere Zeit, insbesondere an die evangelische Geistlichkeit [Christianity and 
Church. “The Present” An Earnest Word to Our Time, Especially to the Evangelical 
Clergy].280  At about the same time, in 1862, Christian Hansen published a translation 
of Kierkegaard’s For Self Examination. Recommended to the Present Age under the 
German title, Zur Selbstprüfung, der Gegenwart empfohlen. These earliest 
translations were eagerly received by the Tübingen theologian and professor, Johann 
Tobias Beck (1804-1878). It is this same Beck whom Barth mentions in a letter to 
Thurneysen on July 27, 1916, when he wrote, “Discovery of a goldmine: J. T. Beck!! 
... I came on the track of him through my work on Romans and will make use of him 
there.”281  And make use of him he did.  “More than I myself realized, it was strongly 
influenced by the ideals of Bengel, Otinger, Beck, and (by way of Kutter) 
Schelling,”282 Barth says.  Of course the date 1916 reveals that Barth is discussing the 
first edition of Romans, published in 1919.   
Beck’s presence in Romans II is formidable in that Barth commends his 
desire to execute a “genuine understanding and interpretation” of Paul’s Epistle, 
aligning him with the likes of Luther and Calvin.283 More importantly, Beck’s 
theology was so influenced by Kierkegaard that he employed Kierkegaard’s attack 
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upon Christendom in his own confrontation with various church officials of his 
time.284  Frederick C. Petersen, a professor of theology at the University of 
Christiania, once spoke of Beck as the only theologian of his time “who wishes to 
adhere to the faith as Kierkegaard knows it.”285  More importantly, Beck’s love for 
Kierkegaard was so contagious that it led to the translation and publication of 
selections from Practice in Christianity by one of his students, Albert Barthold in 
1872.286  
The previously mentioned works of Kierkegaard that were first translated into 
German were only the beginning. Thereafter a flood of works came to press. The 
Point of View and An Open Letter both appeared in 1873, followed by selections 
from Fear and Trembling (1874), Judge For Yourself (1876), some of the Discourses 
(1876), all of Practice in Christianity (1878), The Sickness Unto Death (1881), a full 
translation of Fear and Trembling (1882), both volumes of Either/Or (1885), The 
Lilies of the Field (also 1885), and Stages on Life’s Way (1886). All were translated 
and published by Albert Barthold.  In 1890 yet another student of Beck’s, Christoph 
Schrempf (1860-1944), provided his first translation of the Concept of Anxiety and 
Philosophical Fragments, together titled Zur Psychologie der Sunde, der Bekehrung 
und des Glaubens [On the Psychology of Sin, Conversion, and Faith].287 Works of 
Love, translated by Albert Dorner, appeared that same year. In 1896 he and Schrempf 
collaborated on Sören Kierkegaards agitatorische Schriften und Aufsätze. 1851-
1855, also published under the title, Søren Kierkegaards Angriff an die 
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These early efforts led to the first critical edition of the collected works, the 
Jena edition, edited by Schrempf and Hermann Gottschied (also a student of Beck), 
which appeared between 1909 and 1922. Furthermore, that Barth’s era was one 
highly occupied with the Dane’s writings is evident in at least two of his 
contemporaries specifically.  Karl Holl (1866-1926), a student of Harnack and 
inaugurator of the twentieth-century Luther renaissance, expressly avowed his debt 
to Kierkegaard. And his student, Emanuel Hirsch (1888-1972) – an exact 
contemporary of Barth’s – became one of the leading Kierkegaard scholars of the 
twentieth-century.  
Despite the wealth of Kierkegaard’s works available long before Barth’s 
Romans II,289 McCormack nevertheless states:   
What can be known with certainty is that he [Barth] read an abridged edition of 
Kierkegaard’s Journals, Training in Christianity, and the Moment…Beyond that, the 
concepts and phrases he derived from Kierkegaard can all be accounted for on the basis 
of the books which can be confirmed. There is no good reason to think he read the 
Philosophical Fragments or Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments.290   
 
However, it seems unquestionable that Barth had also read Kierkegaard’s Works of 
Love by the time he had written Romans II. Although Kierkegaard’s Works of Love is 
scattered throughout the sections, the presupposition, Positive Possibilities, and Love 
in Romans II, the clearest evidence is found on page 442, where Barth quotes 
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Kierkegaard writing, “But the neighbor is—‘every man. A man is not thy neighbor 
because he differs from others, or because in his difference he in some way 
resembles thee. A neighbor is that man who is like unto thee before God. And this 
likeness belongs to all men unconditionally’.”291   
In addition, as will be demonstrated in our examination of Barth’s conception 
of faith, his notion of faith, as the Moment, strongly suggests that he had read 
Kierkegaard’s PF as well. Barth scholarship recognises that his use of the moment is 
Kierkegaardian.  In light of this term, the assumption, it seems, is that he had taken 
this concept from Kierkegaard’s work, The Moment. But this is not the case. Barth 
tells us that the first of Kierkegaard’s works he had purchased was The Moment in 
1909. He writes, “The first book by this man which I bought—it was in 1909—was 
the Moment...But it cannot have made a very profound impression on me.”292 
However, Kierkegaard’s use of the moment in The Moment is not the moment 
of faith whereby the eternal becomes known to the individual in time. Rather, in that 
this work exists as part of his attack on Christendom, Kierkegaard uses the moment 
in reference to significance of time for such an attack. He writes, “The moment is 
when the man is there, the right man, the man of the moment.”293 Faith is yet related 
to Kierkegaard’s understanding here but only in the sense that it serves in relating 
“itself as possibility to the moment.”294 In other words, faith gives the moment the 
possibility to become significant when the individual acts in faith to do what seems 
impossible, i.e. attack Christendom. On the other hand, in PF, Kierkegaard writes, 
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“In the moment, he [the individual] becomes aware of the rebirth, for his previous 
state was indeed one of ‘not to be’.”295  
McCormack’s assertion becomes even more questionable given that the 
numerous concepts in Romans II, which bear a Kierkegaardian hallmark, indicate 
that Barth had knowledge of more than PC and PF.  According to T. F. Torrance, 
Barth’s conception of sin, as developed in chapters five and eight of Romans II, is so 
evidently reflective of Kierkegaard that he is convinced that Barth had read The 
Sickness unto Death, The Concept of Dread, and Fear and Trembling.296  Even 
though Torrance does not fully substantiate his inclination, Heiko Schulz claims that 
Barth had “read Kierkegaard’s journals (Gottsched’s selected edition from 1905) 
plus the Fragments…”297 Whether or not there is enough evidence to substantiate 
Barth’s acquaintance with Kierkegaard’s work beyond PC is of minor importance. 
What is important is that Barth was familiar with the dawning of the Kierkegaard 
renaissance and that he had considered himself a participant in it.298 
Given Barth’s frustration with the nature of theology, by 1916 he and others 
sought “to introduce, with hesitating steps, a better theology than that of the 
nineteenth century and of the turn of the century.”299  With the pinnacle of the 
Kierkegaard renaissance ready to be realized, Barth found in Kierkegaard the means 
by which to introduce a “better” theology. 
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The Function of the IQD in Romans II 
In order to evoke an awareness of the danger inherent in a theological 
discourse, which persisted in its affirmation of the uninhibited unity between God 
and humanity, Barth employed a theological methodology of diastasis which sought 
to enunciate God’s “Wholly otherness” from humanity. More specifically, its 
purpose was to draw a sharp demarcation between God’s thoughts and man’s 
thoughts, between genuine Christianity and cultural Christianity. Barth states, “The 
Gospel proclaims a God utterly distinct from men. Salvation comes to them from 
Him, because they are, as men, incapable of knowing Him, and because they have no 
right to claim anything from Him.”300  In enunciating this diastasis, Barth’s Romans 
II upholds an IQD between God and humanity which ensures a dialectical relation 
between time and eternity – a dialectic which seeks to remind humanity that “the line 
which separates here from there cannot be crossed.”301   
Therefore, in the hands of Barth, the IQD expresses a highly negative 
function inasmuch as eternity stands in infinite contrast to time and thus is beyond 
human apprehension and comprehension. The negativity of this distinction is in its 
dissolution of all and every religious experience and endeavour. While the barrier 
from here to there is, for Barth, unable to be breached there is yet a relationship 
between time and eternity. For, although eternity cannot become time, it can “break 
into time.”302    
However, the relationship between time and eternity is not only one of 
infinite repulsion, but also of an infinite negation of that repulsion – namely, 
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interrelation. Thus there exist two worlds: the “world of the Father, of Primal 
Creation” and the world of man.303  In Christ, as with no one else or with nothing 
else, do these “two worlds meet and go apart, two planes intersect, the one known 
and the other unknown.”304  In that the “distance between time and eternity, which is 
safeguarded by the time-eternity dialectic, is not spatially conceived, in the revelation 
event, eternity becomes “present” not intuitably but “between the times.”305  It is the 
dialectical notion of the interaction between time and eternity which Kierkegaard and 
Barth call the “Moment”.   
Unlike the Hegelian dialectic, whereby the tension given in two opposing 
members allow for the positing of another category by means of some sort of 
necessity or synthesis, the time and eternity dialectic of Romans II is said to express 
a complementary dialectic “in which two members stand over against one another in 
a relation of contradiction or antithesis.”306  “The dialectic does not provide a 
synthesis…it cannot be involved in a Hegelian synthesis, which overcomes the 
tension.”307 
If human reason is, in-and-of-itself, limited by means of its own categories, 
and if sin is a factor which intensifies this limitation, then human experience and 
endeavour must also be rendered futile in knowing God. And yet, in light of the IQD, 
Barth perceived that the theological discourse of his day rendered the IQD as 
inconsequential. Barth succinctly describes the error in humanity’s advancement 
when he writes, “We allow ourselves an ordinary communication with Him [God], 
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we permit ourselves to reckon with Him as though this were not extraordinary 
behaviour on our part. We dare to deck ourselves out as His companions, patrons, 
advisers, and commissioners. We confound time with eternity.”308   
In light of this confusion, then, as McCormack argues, the central problem 
which Romans II addresses is that of “the knowledge of God.”309  In order to avoid 
the “subjectivism” of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Barth’s Romans II 
sought to provide the means whereby it can be said that knowledge of God “occurs 
within the realm of theoretical knowing.”310 Long before he had considered the 
nature of this knowing, Barth had first advanced a barrier between God and humanity 
unseen even in Kant. Unlike Kant, Barth’s use of the IQD is one which would not 
only bar theoretical knowledge of God, but also any form of human capacity in and 
of itself which claimed access to God.311  In making even more problematic the 
problem Kant left theology, Barth employed a system of infinite human inadequacy 
inhibiting even Kant’s use of practical reason to supplement the restrictions of 
theoretical reason.   
 Faced with the reality of the IQD whereby God is wholly unknowable in his 
ultimate transcendence, humanity is made aware that their ethical and religious 
endeavours are but an illusion. Aware of the futility of their endeavours, humanity 
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exists in a state of krisis.312  For Barth, krisis is telling of humanity’s coming to terms 
with the chasm between themselves and God. Moreover, krisis also betrays that our 
relation to God is one of unrighteousness.313   
Barth’s condemnation of human effort, especially religion, was intended to 
awaken his contemporaries to the political and theological crisis of his time.  Just as 
Kierkegaard had stated, “In order that the ‘No,’ which in a way wants to grapple with 
God, can be heard, a person must get as far away from God as possible”,314 Barth 
employed the concept of the IQD in order that humanity first hear the “no” of God to 
their endeavours wherefrom they could perceive their efforts as under divine 
judgement. Such is the situation of humanity; such was the situation of German 
theology.  
Barth’s description of our relation to God as one of krisis undoubtedly 
emanates negativity with regard to the human predicament. Therefore, many have 
concluded that the central theme of Romans II is that of krisis. For Barth, the IQD 
serves in announcing the “no” of God in order that his “yes” may be then heard.315  
The IQD, then, first seeks to place all that is human under judgement so that grace 
may come to the forefront. But due to the theological climate of the day, Barth 
thought it necessary that humanity acknowledge its relation to God as one of 
opposition.  
  In sum, the IQD, expressed in the time/eternity dialectic, is one which is 
“used by Barth to hold apart two things which ought never to be confused, God and 
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humanity. It is intended to prevent any illegitimate synthesis from the side of 
humankind. Here is a dialectic of the strictly to-be-maintained opposition, a static 
dialectic.”316   
 Thus far, both the historical basis as to why Kierkegaard and Barth thought it 
necessary to employ a system of diastasis given in the IQD, as well as the function of 
this concept, specifically, within Romans II, has been stated. What has not been 
addressed, however, is in what sense Barth’s use of this concept is justified. In other 
words, wherein lies this limitation in regard to humanity? Is it merely an 
epistemological limitation as found in Kant’s theoretical critique? Or is there a more 
plausible explanation that has yet to be articulated for understanding Barth’s 
conception of this limitation given his preoccupation with certain theologians when 
rewriting the Romans commentary?   
The Grounding of the IQD  
As demonstrated in Chapter One’s discussion of Kierkegaard, God is 
unknowable by virtue of reason alone; with this Barth agrees. In his attempt to make 
knowledge of God knowable (intuitable) in a way unlike his predecessors, Barth 
understood that such an attempt must yet maintain the ultimate unknowability of 
God—namely that God must become an object for knowledge in a way unlike other 
objects given to theoretical reason. As McCormack notes, what Barth wanted to put 
forth was a “‘special’ kind of knowing (distinguished from all other acts of 
theoretical knowing) … because it has its source in an act of God by means of which 
the human knowing apparatus described by Kant is ‘commandeered’ (laid hold of, 
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grasped) by God from without and made to conform to God as its object.”317 
McCormack’s allusion to Kant with regard to Barth’s epistemology is not fortuitous. 
It has been argued by McCormack that Barth’s “theological epistemology in 
Romans II stands everywhere in the long shadow cast by Immanuel Kant.”318  This 
observation seems irrefutable in that already in 1908, having only begun his 
university education in 1904, Barth states he had read Kant, “almost with a 
toothcomb.”319 Kant’s theoretical system demanded that all that is knowable for 
theoretical reason is that which is intuitable, i.e. empirical or an object of intuition.  
Like Kant, Barth’s epistemology in Romans II evinces that “human knowing is the 
consequence of the synthesizing activities of the mind (the combination of intuited 
sense data with the categories of the understanding).”320 For example, in Romans II 
he states, “There is no object apart from our thinking of it.”321  
And yet to read Barth’s epistemology as being solely Kantian suggests an 
extreme devaluing of the role that revelation serves in Romans II in overcoming 
those epistemological strictures Kant himself had placed in knowing God. Without 
doubt, Barth agrees with Kant in rejecting a specific way of knowing—the 
extrapolating from observed phenomena the existence of a first cause or a First 
Principle, i.e. God. Barth evidences his agreement with Kant on this point, stating, 
“In speaking of God, human logic characteristically ignores both His nature and the 
fact that, when the reference is to Him, the argument from operation to cause is 
                                                 
317 McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the theology of Karl Barth, 28. 
318 Ibid., 245. For further discussions on Barth’s relationship to Kant see; Eberhard Busch, 
Karl Barth and the Pietists: The Young Karl Barth’s Critique of Pietism and its Response, trans. 
Daniel W. Bloesch (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2004), Neil B. MacDonald, Karl 
Barth and the Strange New World within the Bible: Barth, Wittengenstein, and the Metadilemmas of 
the Enlightenment (Paternoster Press, 2000). 
319 Busch, Karl Barth: His Life From Letters and Autobiographical Texts, 45. 
320 McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the theology of Karl Barth, 12. 
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inapplicable, since He is not a known thing in a series of things…”322  In fact, it is 
this rejection whereby Barth’s epistemology has been deemed “anti-
metaphysical.”323   
All things considered, the crux of the matter is that reading Barth’s 
epistemological limitations as being solely Kantian neglects Barth’s account of our 
limitations in knowing God as one grounded in sin, something Kant would never 
admit, at least not in strict theological terms.324  
For Barth, the cause of humanity’s inability to know God is not, at root, an 
epistemological issue but rather it is a relational issue rooted in the human 
disposition toward God being one of defiance, i.e. human sinfulness.  And although 
Barth does not provide a clear conception of sin in Romans II, yet, in the absence of a 
well defined hamartiology, several points can be made about Barth’s understanding 
of sin in Romans II. First, we are all sinners and as such stand before the judgment of 
God. Barth states, “Sin is that by which man as we know him is defined, for we 
know nothing of sinless men...”325 Second, in light of the chasm between us and God, 
sustained by sin, Romans II posits God as one “who is distinguished qualitatively 
from men and from everything human, and must never be identified with anything 
which we name, or experience, or conceive, or worship, as God; God, who confronts 
                                                 
322 Ibid., 82. 
323 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936, 245. It must be noted that the context of this reference offered by 
McCormack concerns only Barth. Also, it must be noted, as McCormack points out, to call Barth 
“anti-metaphysical” is not to imply that, even though he does reflect a Kantian epistemology which 
disallows metaphysical knowledge- a priori, such knowledge cannot be provided elsewhere such as in 
the Incarnation, see 246. 
324 Although Kant affirms that man has a "propensity" towards evil, this evil does not reside 
within his reason or even in his natural inclinations.  Instead, evil is manifested in the will’s ability 
either to choose or reject the law.  For more on Kant’s account of evil in relation to knowledge of 
God, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (Chicago: 
William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica Inc, 1952), 344. 
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all human disturbance with an unconditional command, ‘halt.’”326 Due to sin, Barth 
upholds an infinite barrier between God and humanity which humanity is utterly 
unable to penetrate. Thirdly, sin is described in terms of human arrogance or pride.327 
And finally, sin serves Barth in explicating our situation as one in need of grace.328   
For Barth, the solution to the problem of the IQD between God and humanity 
is one dependent on our understanding of this problem. Given the pervasiveness of 
the time and eternity dialectic in Romans II, which places an infinite barrier between 
us and God, Barth believes our relation to God is one which exhibits an unwarranted 
blurring of this distinction. Humanity demonstrates this in its numerous endeavors to 
relegate God to human ways of thinking, historicism, ethics etc. Such endeavors 
appear to ignore the reason why they exist in the first place, namely, knowledge of 
God is beyond theoretical reason. In seeking to circumvent our theoretical limitations 
by pragmatic or practical means, Barth thinks two things manifest. First, if 
knowledge is truly theoretical, then humanity reveals its ignorance in seeking to 
obtain and thereby claim knowledge of God to which they have no access. Barth 
states, “We know that God is He whom we do not know, and that our ignorance is 
precisely the problem and the source of our knowledge.”329 If this is the case, that 
humanity knows that its endeavors or claims in knowing God speak to its awareness 
that it is destitute of this knowledge, then why yet do such endeavors persist?  
Second, therefore, and in light of this ignorance Barth thinks something else 
becomes manifest, namely, that humanity persists in their ignorance due to their 
arrogance. He writes, “Our arrogance demands that, in addition to everything else, 
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some super-world should also be known and accessible to us.”330 In claiming an 
unbridled access to God in their numerous undertakings, humanity reveals that the 
distance which separates them from God is not due to the limits of human categories 
but rather, as Barth states, “To a fundamentally wrong attitude to life.”331  What is 
fundamentally wrong is “the vanity and utter questionableness of all that is and of 
what we are.”332  Barth thinks that our unrighteousness evidences our failure to 
acknowledge God as wholly other and that as men we have no claim to him. It is the 
unrighteousness of arrogance from which, as Barth states:  
We press ourselves into proximity with Him: and so, all unthinking, we make Him nigh 
unto ourselves. We allow ourselves an ordinary communication with Him, we permit 
ourselves to reckon with Him as though this were not extraordinary behavior on our 
part…This is the ungodliness of our relation to God. And our relation to God is 
unrighteous…We are not concerned with God, but with our own requirements, to which 
God must adjust Himself.333 
 
In failing to acknowledge our distance from God, we perpetuate the 
misrelation between us and Him which inevitably results in idolatry, the setting of 
ourselves “upon the throne of the world.”334 Therefore, God is not understood as one 
infinitely distinct from us. Rather, as Barth writes, “We make of the eternal and 
ultimate presupposition of the Creator a ‘thing in itself’ above and in the midst of 
other things…an endlessly uncertain object of our experiences.”335 He adds, 
“Whenever the qualitative distinction between men and the final Omega is 
overlooked or misunderstood, that fetishism is bound to appear in which God is 
experienced in birds and four footed things, and finally, or primarily, in the likeness 
of corruptible man.”336  In short, there is a forgetting of the abyss which separates us 
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from God. Barth states, “The more the individual “marches along his road secure of 
himself”337 it becomes evident that there is “a forgetting of the abyss.”338  By virtue 
of humanity’s neglecting of the IQD, God’s judgment against our arrogance and 
ignorance maintains what we are unwilling to accept.  Barth states, “He [God] 
acknowledges Himself to be our God by creating and maintaining the distance by 
which we are separated from Him.”339  In sum, from what is detectable in Romans II, 
Barth affirms that the IQD between us and God exists due to the arrogance of human 
thought and endeavor through which, in betraying our consistent defiance of the 
IQD, we “confound time with eternity. That is our unrighteousness.”340 But distance 
between God and humanity is not the last word of Romans II. 
Earlier, it was mentioned that Barth employed the concept of krisis in order to 
express human existence apart from God. But this expression is merely a preliminary 
foundation in order to make room for grace. In other words, what Barth advances in 
his use of the IQD is, in fact, the dialectic of judgment and grace wherein one must 
first acknowledge the innate distance between us and God and only then recognize 
their reconciliation despite the difference.   
In affirming the IQD between us and God, we affirm the “no” of God against 
us. Barth writes, “The wrath of God is the judgment under which we stand in so far 
as we do not love the judge; it is the ‘No’ which meets us when we do not affirm 
it.”341 Yet, in affirming the IQD between us and God it becomes apparent that such 
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 Ibid., 44. Walter Lowrie posits that Barth’s use of sin in relation to the IQD is one not 
only conditioned by the distance between creature and Creator, qualitatively, but also one resulting 
from the failure of the creature to respect this difference.  “It consists rather in the fact that he ignores 
this distance with the guilty ambition to be like God.” For more on this see, Walter Lowrie, Our 
Concern with the Theology of Crisis (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1932), 187. 
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an affirmation is necessary in order to receive the grace of God. Barth describes 
human awareness of this positive dimension within the concept of krisis as a 
“wholesome krisis.” Of the necessity of our affirming of the IQD for reconciliation, 
Barth writes,  
If mankind be itself God, the appearance of the idol is then inevitable. And whenever the 
idol is honored, it is inevitable that men, feeling themselves to be the true God, should 
also feel that they have themselves fashioned the idol. This is the rebellion which makes 
it impossible for us to see the new dimensional plane which is the boundary of our world 
and the meaning of our salvation.342 
 
In sum, acknowledging the krisis of our existence admits “the boundary 
which bars us in.”343 And yet, seen in light of the dialectic of grace and judgment, 
this boundary “nevertheless points beyond itself.”344 Barth affirms that even in the 
midst of human krisis, “the speech of God [is] heard out of the whirlwind.”345 In 
affirming the boundary between time and eternity, humanity perceives God not only 
as the one who maintains our limitation but also as the one who becomes “the 
dissolution of our limitation.”346  However, unless we affirm our difference from 
God, whereby we acknowledge that only he is righteous, then the barrier remains but 
a barrier, a negation, an abyss.347  It is the reality of our equating or reckoning 
ourselves with God about which Barth writes, “Men fall a prey first to themselves 
and then to the ‘No-God’. First is heard the promise – ye shall be as God!—and then 
men lose the sense for eternity. First mankind is exalted, and then men obscure the 
distance between God and man.”348 In sum, the IQD is grounded in our failure to 
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affirm it whereby we perpetuate the distance between God and ourselves in our 
exalting of ourselves rather than God. 
In light of our present discussion, it is worth returning, for a moment, to our 
discussion of Barth’s epistemology in relation to Kant. In contrast to Kant’s 
adherence to noetic limitations in knowing God, it has been shown how Barth’s 
account of human limitation first exhibits the knowledge of God presupposed by 
humanity who then fails to acknowledge what is known, i.e., that God is infinitely 
different. However, for Kant, what theoretical reason could not accomplish, practical 
reason could. By its means the “knowledge” of God (his existence and moral nature) 
was vouchsafed.349 Therefore, what Barth maintains as crucial for knowledge of God 
(acknowledging first the IQD and then the impossibility of overcoming it), namely, 
human limitation, Kant overcomes by means of equating our moral capacity with the 
divine command and thus postulating the necessity of the divine Being.350 Barth 
reveals his indebtedness to a Kantian epistemology but only insofar as the limits of 
reason relate to the world of the empirical and not to the ground of this limit.351  
Thus far, a few parallels are detectable between Kierkegaard and Barth with 
regard to the IQD. First, both thinkers maintain that God is infinitely qualitatively 
                                                 
349 According to Kant, practical reason postulates God's existence as necessary if man is to 
attain to his telos, that moral perfection which makes him worthy of the summum bonum, or supreme 
good.  Furthermore, since man is finite, and the task of achieving moral perfection is an arduous 
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See, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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use Luther’s terminology, Coram Deo.” See, T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early 
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distinct from humanity, both ontologically as well as relationally, given the effects of 
sin. Second, in light of the various means of knowing God representative among 
rational theology since Kant, both Kierkegaard and Barth concerned themselves with 
the rearticulation of the IQD. This concern was one which ultimately sought to 
reorient theological discussion to a reconsideration of the significance of faith. Barth 
himself attests to this concern, stating:  “The judgment under which we stand is a 
fact, quite apart from our attitude to it. Indeed, it is the fact most characteristic of our 
life. Whether it enters within the light of salvation and of the coming world depends 
upon the answer we give to the problem of faith.”352 Third, bearing in mind our 
examination of Kierkegaard in Chapter One, both thinkers affirm a dialectic of 
judgment and grace given in the IQD. This means that although both thinkers 
emphasize the concept of diastasis, the emphasis is necessary in order to open the 
way for grace. Furthermore, it is this two dimensional notion of the dialectic of 
judgment and grace from which Kierkegaard is said to differ from Barth.353  
Usually, it is maintained that Barth’s dialectic of sin and grace, especially 
with regard to his dialectic of Adam and Christ within Romans II, reflects something 
of a Hegelian dialectic whereby the tension between thesis and antithesis is 
overcome in a synthesis.354 In this light, it is maintained, Barth’s dialectic of 
judgment and grace stands in stark contrast to Kierkegaard’s one-sided dialectic of 
sheer negativity.355  Although performing, initially a negative function, Barth’s static 
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dialectic of time and eternity is overshadowed by the overwhelming reality of God’s 
breaking into time, of the reality of grace realized in the new man.  The two classes 
wherein Barth’s four types of dialectic (Adam and Christ dialectic; time and eternity 
dialectic; dialectic of life; and the dialectic of veiling and unveiling) are classified are 
that of either a supplementary dialectic or a complementary dialectic. The former can 
be understood where “one member of a pair predominates in value and potency over 
                                                                                                                                          
Realistic Dialectical Theology, 268. But, although the supplementary function is clearly visible here 
in Barth’s discussion of the old and new man, this overcoming of the tension does not pertain to the 
dialectic of Adam and Christ alone. In fact, what McCormack seeks to elucidate relates to a 
misreading of Barth’s intention in Romans II as one who maintains merely a static notion of dialectic, 
i.e. a Kierkegaardian notion. In short, McCormack argues that the overcoming of the tension in 
Barth’s dialectics expresses that Barth’s theology in Romans II is not one of Krisis but of grace. It is 
here that McCormack gains notoriety in arguing against this misreading of Romans II.  However, the 
notion of Krisis, resulting from the static dialectic of time and eternity, is functionary in Romans II but 
only insofar as it understood from humanity’s perspective and not God’s. Only when we consider the 
dialectic of Adam and Christ in relation to time, does, as McCormack argues, “a new dialectic 
surfaces—a dialectic of the Kierkegaardian type”. 269. Yet, McCormack’s placing Barth’s dialectic 
against Kierkegaard’s fails to acknowledge a point of parallel between Barth and Kierkegaard, 
namely, that the overcoming of the tension is merely one which is understood by faith on this side of 
eternity. Therefore, both Barth and Kierkegaard give nothing to human ability in being able to 
perceive the existence of the new man in place of the old.  In short, what humanity sees as impossible 
and as a barrier between them and God, God sees the possible and overcomes the barrier in grace.  As 
Terry Cross points out, it is God who performs “the synthesis within the realm of eternity.” (92)  Even 
Eberhard Busch, in his Barth and the Pietists, makes this distinction wherein he states: “Indeed, there 
is an ‘identity between him and me,’ a paradoxical yet unified identity which is the person ‘who I am’ 
encounters at his end.” (125) And yet, Busch agrees with McCormack in stating that “This is an 
identity whose paradoxical nature seems to be more like Hegel’s, in which two contradictory members 
are joined together into one identity and whose paradoxical nature seems to be less than the paradox 
Kierkegaard affirms, for whom this paradox takes the place of the synthesis.” (125)  In short, the 
problem facing us is one which is tied to a view that due to Kierkegaard’s desire to emphasis the 
infinite barrier between time and eternity he was then left to ponder mainly on the side of the subject 
the inevitable results of this distinction. Therefore, as McCormack states concerning Kierkegaard’s 
theological motif, “Kierkegaard’s central aim was to safeguard the reality of the thinking individual 
human being who exists in time against the absorption into the Hegelian Absolute.” (237) 
Furthermore, McCormack argues that Barth’s separation from the other dialecticians of his day, 
specifically Bultmann, was due to a controversy over Kierkegaardian methodology. Quoting Jungel, 
McCormack states, “It is Kierkegaard’s Existenzdialektik which provided a kind of inheritance in the 
face of which all the dialectical theologians had to take a position. Does one interpret the divine-
human relation from the side of humanity and therefore, with Kierkegaard, on the basis of the dialectic 
of finite and infinite which Kierkegaard saw as constituting the structure of human existence?( See, 
Bruce McCormack’s, A Scholastic of a Higher Order: The Development of Karl Barth’s Theology, 
1921-31( Ann Arbor, MI: U.M.I, 1989), 125. It was to this question that Barth had thus moved away 
from Kierkegaard’s overly anthropomorphic staring point to the divine-human problem. However, as 
we have seen in our discussion of Kierkegaard, an interpretation of Kierkegaard that sees him working 
in categories of the human divorced from the divine is one which is wholly without ground. 
Kierkegaard was not interested in the absorption of the human subject in the Hegelian absolute in and 
of itself. Rather, it was the absorption of all that is central to Christianity into the Hegelian absolute 
which was Kierkegaard’s concern. To this problem, Kierkegaard addressed, in affinity to Barth, the 
problem of knowledge of God etc.  
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the other. As a consequence of this ‘imbalance’ the predominate member takes up 
the weaker into itself with the result that the weaker member is either cancelled out 
altogether or is perhaps taken up into the other in a higher synthesis.”356 The latter 
expresses a static dialectic wherein the two members stand in opposition without 
hope of reconciliation.  
It is well known, especially due to McCormack’s work, that the role of grace 
in Barth’s Romans II is indeed an active component. For Barth, grace overcomes the 
abyss separating God and humanity. As demonstrated in his dialectic of the old and 
new man, Barth held that Adam as the “old man,” the “old subject,” represents the 
sinful state of humanity.  As such, humanity is under the wrath and judgment of God. 
Barth writes: 
This then is our past – Adam and all of us, Adam in his relationship to us, we in our 
relationship to Adam.  This is the history of man and of humanity outside Christ: the sin 
and death of a single man, of Adam, the man who in his own person is and represents the 
whole of humanity, the man in whose decision and destiny the decisions and destines, the 
sins and the death of all the other men who come after him, are anticipated.357 
 
 Cut off from God’s world, the old man is under the krisis of God.  As fallen, 
his efforts are useless.  Thus he is left to himself without any means whereby he may 
know God or gain His favour. However, in the “God-given occurrence” of faith, 
humanity becomes aware that they stand under judgement, that their existence is one 
of krisis. But krisis is not the last word concerning our existence.  
Over against the old man stands the new man, represented by Christ, “the 
‘new’ subject, the Ego of the coming world.”358  Krisis invites the possibility of 
God’s grace by which our existence as the old man is “dissolved in order that they 
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may be established” as the new man.359  Barth writes, “Those who take upon them 
the divine ‘No’ shall themselves be borne by the greater divine ‘Yes’.”360  
Acknowledging our inability to procure God’s favour reveals that grace “pertains to 
the will of God, and His will alone.”361  Grace is God’s “divine prerogative” which 
affirms humanity’s inability to procure it.362  The presentation of grace has nothing to 
do with humanity and everything to do with God. It is “the promise of the new man, 
of a new nature.”363 This new nature, of course, is for Barth something 
“unobservable to human perception and thus is in this world negative, invisible, and 
hidden.”364  Only in faith is the distinction between the old and new man 
“immediately dissolved in the oneness of the new man.”365   
Barth’s affirmation of the new man, in light of the dissolution of the old, is 
thus representative of the supplementary dialectic insofar as it is an eschatological 
reality maintained by faith and not insofar as it is one open to human observation.  
However, returning to the claim that Barth’s dialectic is more representative of Hegel 
than Kierkegaard’s, the question is, in what sense this might be the case. Stated 
differently, if, for Barth, the overcoming of the tension is procured by grace, in what 
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360 Ibid., 41. To better clarify the role of grace in relation to the overcoming of the chasm 
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sense is this dialectic representative of a Hegelian dialectic? Perhaps Barth’s dialectic 
of the old and new man bears some resemblance to Hegel’s dialectical movement of 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis insofar as something of a synthesis is perceivable. But 
a reading of Barth’s dialectic as Hegelian is nevertheless an oversimplification of 
Hegel’s meaning in that there is no evidence Barth had read Hegel at the time of his 
writing Romans II nor is his synthesis truly Hegelian.366  
Moreover, while Barth’s view that the overcoming of the tension owes itself 
to God, Hegel’s logical movement of concepts in overcoming the tension owes itself 
to reason within the context of historical processes. Regardless of the parallels 
between Barth’s dialectic and Hegel’s, all such parallels are relativized, not only in 
respect of the means whereby the tension is overcome but also with regard to the 
locus of the tension itself. Hegel’s dialectic is a logical/conceptual movement. By 
contrast, Barth’s is existential. 
Additionally, Hegel’s dialectic opens up to a new knowledge within the 
phenomenal world, while Barth’s offers a new knowledge of which transcends the 
phenomenal, i.e., the new man. Therefore, the end result of Hegel’s notion of 
synthesis is inapplicable to Barth’s conception of the old and new man, as, for Barth, 
there is not an obvious overcoming of the former by the latter, at least not one 
                                                 
366 See footnote 355 of this manuscript. Against the common conception that Barth’s 
dialectic of the old and new man reflects Hegel’s dialectic of synthesis, i.e. an overcoming of the 
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not from Hegel, but from Kierkegaard – who believed in his turn that he had learned it from Socrates.” 
Lowrie continues, “Many people are not capable of believing that the paradox is all he ventures to 
offer them, that instead of going on triumphantly to resolve by a synthesis the paradoxical thesis and 
antithesis.” For further discussion see Walter Lowrie, Our Concern with the Theology of Crisis 
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evident to reason or logic. Barth states, “Sin is that by which man as we know him is 
defined, for we know nothing of sinless men.”367  He adds, “As the old man, he is 
what he ‘is’, the man ‘we’ know, who is under the wrath of God: as the new man, he 
is what he is not, the man ‘we’ do not know, who is righteous before God.”368  
Thus, whilst Barth’s statement offers the appearance of some sort of synthesis 
a tension is yet present. For Barth, our existence, as the new man, must not “be 
confounded with those eschatological illusions in which the union of ‘here’ and 
‘there’ is anticipated in our imagination.”369 Rather our new existence in Christ is 
one which exists at present. The paradoxical essence of Barth’s dialectic allows the 
tension between the old and new man to be overcome in the “moment” of faith while 
upholding the tension in order to keep the overcoming evident only to faith and not 
to reason. And to this point he adds: 
But only in the light of the critical ‘Moment’, when mankind and its world are passing as 
one whole, from the old to the new, from ‘here’ to ‘there’, from the present to the coming 
age, does the distinction between the two become apparent. The distinction exists 
therefore only when this world is dissolved by the dissolution whereby it is 
established.370  
 
Moving on to the other form of dialectic evident in Romans II, both the dialectic of 
time and eternity and that of veiling and unveiling are said to be complementary in 
that “two members stand over against one another in a relation of contradiction or 
antithesis. No reconciliation or synthesis between the two is admitted.”371   
It is this form of dialectic which is said to be more Kierkegaardian. On the 
other hand, as noted by McCormack, this form is said to move beyond Kierkegaard 
with regard to Barth’s use of it, in that grace again overcomes the tension, as we shall 
                                                 
367 Ibid., 105. 
368 Ibid.,165. 
369 Ibid., 163. 
370 Ibid., 165. 
371 Ibid., 237 
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soon see with Barth. Furthermore, since grace is seen as overcoming all opposition 
from humanity’s vantage point, Barth thus parallels Kierkegaard in maintaining a 
dialectic of overcoming and tension regarding time and eternity and thereby 
revelation. In other words, from our investigation in Chapter, Kierkegaard too 
actually reflects a supplementary action with regard to his dialectic, both thinkers 
agree in posing the impossibility of human knowledge of God only for humanity 
with regard to its capacity and endeavor outside of grace. The problem in seeing 
Kierkegaard’s dialectic as static is therefore further evidence for Barth’s overall 
misreading of him, as noted in the Introduction and throughout this thesis. As 
discussed in Chapter One, Kierkegaard’s dialectic of time and eternity is not merely 
negative in function. And so Barth and Kierkegaard can be seen as possessing a 
shared affinity for the positive overcoming of the IQD through the grace of God’s 
redemptive self-revelation. And yet, although Barth parallels Kierkegaard in this 
respect, a difference can be detected in that it can be said that Kierkegaard’s limits 
are not as pervasive as Barth’s.  
For Kierkegaard, all human existence can be said to possess an awareness 
that God exists, in what he describes as a “human presupposition.”  He states, 
“Therefore there has never been a man who has not believed it [God’s existence] but 
there certainly have been many who have been unwilling to let the truth conquer 
their souls.”372  Although Romans II might suggest a similar conclusion to that of 
Kierkegaard, in the end, such a conclusion would be highly premature.373   
                                                 
372 Kierkegaard, PF, 192. 
373 In his Orthodox and Modern, McCormack addresses the inadequacies of those readings of 
Barth which seek to allow more than Barth would himself—in this case, Walter Lowe’s reading of 
Barth which argues for natural theology in Romans II. But as McCormack rightly notes such readings 




In conclusion of our discussion of the ground of the IQD, the task has been to 
demonstrate that amidst the misunderstanding that Kierkegaard’s use of the IQD 
operates with a one-sided negativity, Barth comes to believe that he has revised 
Kierkegaard’s position in his understanding of the IQD. In the Introduction to this 
thesis it was posited that the problem with Barth’s later assessment of Kierkegaard’s 
thought related to the IQD. This problem is one which yet plagues Kierkegaard 
research and Barth research alike – namely, the idea that Kierkegaard’s thought is, 
despite his best efforts, a form of theological anthropomorphism brought on by the 
abyss humanity encounters in the IQD.374   
In seeking to place such an extreme barrier between God and humanity, it is 
held, then, that Kierkegaard’s extreme preoccupation with the human subject was 
inevitable – a  preoccupation which allows many Barth scholars to view 
Kierkegaard’s dialectic as being not only static in nature but also as such leaving the 
human subject in despair. As was noted, this position is one which finds its basis in a 
specific misinterpretation of Kierkegaard’s dialectic as being mainly negative in 
function. Podmore diagnoses the situation as follows: “This trajectory [the negative 
dimension of the IQD alone] would further corroborate the suspicion, shared by 
many philosophers and theologians, that Kierkegaard provides a detailed cartography 
of the abyss without showing any exit from the interior labyrinth of despair.”375  
                                                 
374 Against the position that Kierkegaard’s work is a form of anthropomorphism, there are 
resources which place Kierkegaard’s work within a historical and accurate theological context in an 
undisputed fashion whereby Barth’s accusations of Kierkegaard stand corrected.  See, Simon D. 
Podmore, Kierkegaard & the Self Before God: Anatomy of the Abyss (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2011); Kristen K. Deede, “The Infinite Qualitative Difference: Sin, the Self, 
and Revelation in the thought of Soren Kierkegaard” in the International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 53:1(February 2003), 25-48. 
375 Podmore, Kierkegaard & the Self Before God: Anatomy of the Abyss, 3. 
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Interestingly, it seems that Barth did not think, at the time of Romans II, that 
Kierkegaard was guilty of such a charge. At the meeting of the “Friends of the 
Christian World” in Elgersberg in October, 1922, Barth stated: 
Those who accept the thought I have brought forward as germane to the essential facts 
thereby acknowledge themselves descendents of an ancestral line which runs back 
through Kierkegaard to Luther and Calvin, and so to Paul and Jeremiah…The very names 
Kierkegaard, Luther, Calvin, Paul and Jeremiah suggest what Schleiermacher never 
possessed, a clear and direct apprehension of the truth that man is made to serve God and 
not God to serve man.376 
 
Here, Barth aligns Kierkegaard to those thinkers (in contrast to Schleiermacher) 
whose theology clearly expresses a preoccupation of the divine-human relationship 
from the side of the divine. In light of the statement above, Barth’s later 
apprehensiveness toward Kierkegaard seems to reflect a gradual transition away 
from Kierkegaard throughout his theological development. The question is why?  
What I shall attempt to do next is to address the discrepancy between the 
early Barth and the later Barth in regard to his understanding of Kierkegaard’s IQD. 
Our objective is therefore to find out if, in fact, it is correct to understand Barth’s 
dialectics in Romans II, which clearly present the tension between time and eternity, 
and between sin and grace, as being overcome by grace, as being in contrast to 
Kierkegaard’s presumed highly negative function of the IQD in which revelation and 
grace are trampled underfoot by the ruination of sin and despair. In light of what we 
have seen of Barth’s use of the IQD, coupled with our investigation of Kierkegaard’s 
use of the IQD in Chapter One, I would like to draw these two studies together thus 
bringing this particular discussion to a close. 
 
 
                                                 
376 Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man. Translated by Douglas Horton 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1928), pp. 195-6. 
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Barth’s misapprehension of Kierkegaard’s dialectic: Positive dimensions of the IQD 
Preceding our investigation into Barth’s misreading of Kierkegaard, T.F. 
Torrance, in his Karl Barth: an Introduction to his Early Theology 1910-1931, states 
most curiously: “There is no doubt that Kierkegaard’s break-through from ethics to 
grace, that is to forgiveness and Christianity, and his analysis of man’s sin as the 
dead wound in his existence which he cannot heal, but which is both revealed and 
healed by grace, lies behind much of Barth’s thinking.”377 
Torrance’s declaration of Barth’s indebtedness to Kierkegaard’s “break-
through from ethics to grace” may suggest that the Barth of Romans II did in fact 
understand Kierkegaard correctly even if he was later convinced that he had not. 
However, Barth later believed that his earlier use of Kierkegaard was naïve, if not 
premature. There are several factors which may have contributed to Barth’s moving 
away from Kierkegaard. First, at the turn of the twentieth-century, and even up until 
Barth’s rewriting of the Romans commentary, Kierkegaard’s works, PF and CUP, 
had predominated in familiarity. Second, Barth had in his possession the translation 
of Kierkegaard’s works offered by Christoph Schrempf and Gottsched.   
As Heiko Schulz argues, Schrempf’s “translations soon became the authority 
for many German scholars.”378 Therefore, the Kierkegaard received in the twentieth 
century was the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, the sceptic and critic of Christianity. 
From Climacus one would have received a harsh lesson into the problems facing 
Christianity as well as the critique of theological endeavour, especially in relation to 
                                                 
377 Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology 1910-1931, 65. 
378 Schulz, “Germany and Austria: A Modest Head Start: The German Reception of 
Kierkegaaard” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception Tome I: Northern and Western Europe, 307-
387. See this essay for further insight to Kierkegaard’s reception by German theologians in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century as well as Barth’s relation to that reception.  
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verification of Christian truths by means of historical investigation and speculative 
idealism.  
Third, as a result of Barth’s interaction with thinkers such as Gogarten and 
Bultmann, he had come to think of Kierkegaard as one who was more concerned 
with existential motifs of individuality, subjectivity, and existence rather than the 
Kierkegaard of his early days who was a proponent of Luther’s theology of the cross. 
During his stay at Göttingen, Barth began to question the Kierkegaard he had 
received from Training in Christianity in light of the Kierkegaard taken up by 
Bultmann, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre.379 Fourthly, we might question the 
possible influence that Barth’s beloved teacher Wilhelm Herrmann may have had on 
his understanding of Kierkegaard.  
“Both Albrecht Ritschl and Wilhelm Herrmann claim that it [Kierkegaard’s 
work] is anthropology, more specifically, the believer’s first-person perspective 
which functions as the sole ground, starting point and necessary condition of 
theology.”380  Amidst the speculation as to Barth’s partial reading of Kierkegaard, of 
concern is whether or not Kierkegaard warrants Barth’s criticism. Something worth 
considering is that perhaps a misreading of Kierkegaard’s IQD as wholly negative 
resulted, and continues today, from an over emphasis on Barth’s positive component 
within his methodology of diastasis in Romans II. 
One must not be too hasty in emphasizing the aspect of grace whereby the 
predominating negative force of judgement in Romans II is compromised. This does 
                                                 
379 See Karl Barth, “Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille.’ Canadian Journal of 
Theology 11:1, 1965, pp. 6.  
380 Schulz, “Germany and Austria: A Modest Head Start: The German Reception of 
Kierkegaaard” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception Tome I: Northern and Western Europe, 320. 
Also, Schulz references Barthold’s comments on both Ritschl and Herrmann in Zur theologischen 
Bedeutung pp. 21, 53, 56, 58-9, as well as Ruttenbeck’s Kierkegaard pp. 278-81. 
127 
 
not, of course, allow for a minimization of the role of grace in Romans II either. 
Rather, the overwhelming negativity of the IQD should be seen as a necessary step in 
paving the road to a discussion of grace. As Torrance states concerning Romans II, 
“The emphasis was quite definitely upon what became known as diastasis, the 
distance, the separation, between God’s way and man’s ways, God’s thoughts and 
man’s thoughts, between Christianity and culture.”381  Indeed, Torrance admits that 
“the great positive theme of the Romans is the saving grace and compassion of 
God.”382 Still, although grace is present in Romans II, it should not be seen as 
overshadowing the overwhelming presence of diastasis which Barth thought 
necessary in order to clear the way for grace.  
In recalling that there appears to be a neglect of grace in Kierkegaard’s IQD, 
what he seeks to establish is a genuine description of the human response, unaided by 
grace, to the grace of God, rather than eliminating grace altogether. In other words, 
like Barth, Kierkegaard sought to emphasize the effect of sin on our knowing God, in 
order to give God primacy in rectifying this deficiency. Kierkegaard writes, 
“Ultimately it is here the yawning chasm lies: Christianity stipulates the 
defectiveness of human cognition due to sin, which is then rectified in Christianity. 
The philosopher tries qua man to account for matters of God and the world.”383 
Therefore, Kierkegaard’s expression of the IQD is, as he states, “An expression of 
being extremely close to consummation, this feeling for the last time of the chasmic 
depth of separation between being man and being with God; therefore, it is the final 
                                                 
381 Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931(Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1962), 49.  
382 Ibid., 50. 
383 Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, Volume 1, Journals AA-DD, edited by Niels 
Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa 
Rumble, and K. Brian Söderquist (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 26. 
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expression for what comes next – being blessedly with God.”384 In the end, aided by 
Schrempf’s translations, the rise of the existential Kierkegaard, Barth, as least in 
1963, thought Kierkegaard’s IQD in wholly negative terms. Barth writes, concerning 
Kierkegaard’s IQD, “I simply could not hold to the theoretical and practical diastasis 
between God and man on which I insisted at the time of Romans.”385 
In conclusion, Kierkegaard’s development of a theology which both 
expresses and dissolves the IQD between God and humanity lays the foundation for 
Barth’s own theological direction in Romans II, even if Barth himself only 
discovered the negative dimension of Kierkegaard’s dialectic thereby missing the full 
dialectical force of Kierkegaard’s intention. At least, in the negative force of barring 
all human points of access to God, by means of maintaining the IQD, Barth believed 
he had remained faithful to Kierkegaard throughout his theological development.386  
Once Barth came upon the IQD he states “to go back to Hegel or even Bishop 
Mynster has been out of the question ever since.”387 Though Barth thinks (at least by 
1963) Kierkegaard lacks a theology of grace by which to resolve the IQD, we have 
seen that Kierkegaard’s upholding of the ‘no’ acts as a dialectical presupposition of 
the ‘yes’. Therein, Barth actually remains a far more faithful reader of Kierkegaard’s 
dialectics than even he realised.  
Insofar as we have first discussed the powerless nature of human 
understanding in relation to knowing God outside of revelation, we are now able to 
advance our discussion of Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard concerning reason’s 
                                                 
384 Kierkegaard, JP, Volume 1, 136, 
385 Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts,173. 
386 Evidence of Barth continual adherence to an infinite qualitative difference between God 
and humanity can be seen in his “The Rationality of Discipleship”, in Karl Barth, Fragments Grave 
and Gay, ed. By Martin Rumscheidt, trans. By Eric Mosbacher (London: Collins, 1971), 43, which is 
a 1963 reply to Professor Max Bense’s article Atheism, For and Against. 
387 Barth, “Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille.’ Canadian Journal of Theology 
11:1, 1965, 5.   
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relation to revelation, specifically as it is given in the Incarnation. Before proceeding 
to this comparison, we will first examine to what extent Barth’s view of history’s 
relation to Christian truths parallels Kierkegaard’s. From this, we shall then address 
what knowledge of God is perceivable in the person of Christ which will bring us to 
a comparison of Barth’s use of “Paradox” in relation to Kierkegaard’s own use 
discussed in earlier.  
 
History and Christian Truth 
The Barth of Romans II had often been charged with being “anti-historical” 
as a result of his highly dialectical notion of time and eternity. Barth, however, 
defended himself against this charge stating “nor am I a ‘bitter enemy of historical 
criticism.’”388 Rather, Barth believed the pursuits of historical criticism well justified 
and adds, “I have nothing whatever to say against historical criticism. I recognize it, 
and once more state quite definitely that it is both necessary and justified.”389  
As noted in Chapter One, Kierkegaard too is often seen as being “anti-
historical” to such an extent that he is seen as the ideal proponent of the most 
extreme form of fideism which needs nothing of historical or objective grounds in 
being epistemologically justified.  This accusation, hopefully, has been shown to be 
wholly unwarranted.  The charge of “anti-historicism” levelled against both 
Kierkegaard and Barth is one which confuses their resistance to the all-encompassing 
validity of historical investigation of Christianity as espousing a non-historical 
Christianity.   
What might appear as an over-exaggerated reaction to historicism was in fact 
                                                 
388 Barth, Epistle to the Romans, 9. 
389 Ibid., 6. 
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the result of a problem that Kierkegaard and Barth both shared.  This problem existed 
in “seeking to find a way to speak of revelation in history, but not of history.”390  
Both thinkers had witnessed, within their respective times, that the obsession with 
historicism and speculative thought had become so profound that, in an all 
encompassing swoop, the emergence of Christianity had been subsumed and 
addressed as another mere historical happening amongst others.  Therefore, what is 
central for both thinkers is that the truths of Christianity be understood as historical 
but not in the normal sense of the word.   
In Barth’s day, specifically, the abuses of historicism and psychologism, as 
seen in the proponents of Ritschlianism, compromised the true essence of 
Christianity.391  Due to these abuses, it comes as no surprise that Barth relied upon 
Kierkegaard’s earlier attack on Christendom, not to mention the writings of Franz 
Overbeck,392 in aiding his own attack.  
                                                 
390 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936, 233. For further reading see this same work, 262-66. 
391  Interpreting Kant as an anti-metaphysical moralist, Ritschl took to task the presumptuous 
metaphysical claims of speculative rationalism.  For him, morality needed no metaphysical 
foundation.  Indeed, metaphysics was deemed an impossible endeavor because all putative knowledge 
claims must, in principle, be verified by historical/empirical investigation.  Lacking such warrants, a 
retreat to metaphysical grounds must be considered superfluous and ethically useless.  In sum, since 
knowledge can only be obtained empirically, the only basis for any knowledge of God and His will is 
to be found in the historical person of Jesus Christ, as one who fully represents God by exemplifying 
the ideal, ethical human being.  Similarly, Ritschl rejects the subjectivism of Schleiermacher’s 
knowledge of God as residing in “God-consciousness.”  Ritschl’s theology begins with the gospel as 
historically given in Jesus Christ.  For more on the effects of theology after Kant, specifically with 
regard to Barth’s influences see Gary Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology (Louisville, 
Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000); Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically 
Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995); Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. Brian Cozens (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1959); and Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology: Schleiermacher 
to Barth (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936). 
392 The tension within scholarship concerning Barth’s use of Overbeck over that of 
Kierkegaard has not gone unnoticed.  However, since the objective here is not to try and ascertain the 
primacy of influence on Barth’s conception of history, a few brief observations will suffice in regard 
to this debate. First, the evidence is overwhelming that Barth had indeed employed Overbeck’s 
concept of Urgeschichte used to signify the unobservable origins or conditions of external history thus 
representing “Primal History.”  Furthermore, this is supported by Thurneysen who credits Overbeck in 
providing Barth with this concept which served as a central motif in the second edition, see 
(Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth—Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925, trans. 
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In issuing his warning to Christendom in chapter eleven of Romans II, Barth 
appeals directly to Kierkegaard when he states: “We have heard what Kierkegaard 
said about it all, and we agree with him.”393  A page later he says, “When a 
Kierkegaard or a Kutter, measuring the Church by an absolute standard, proceeds to 
utter his complaint against it, we are bound to uphold his criticism, indeed we must 
underline it and endorse it.”394  Given the aforementioned comments by Barth in his 
1963 Sonning Prize address about Kierkegaard’s criticism of a “too pretentious and 
at the same time too cheap christianism and churchiness of prevalent theology”395 it 
is clear that Kierkegaard’s thought on the relation of historical knowledge and 
Christianity had informed much of Barth’s own thoughts on the matter in regard to 
not only diagnosing the problem of this relation but in offering a solution as well.  
Both the diagnosis and the remedy are posed in the IQD whereby time and eternity 
relate one to another without being sublated. 
Therefore the relation of the IQD in the time and eternity dialectic to Barth’s 
concept of history is an inseparable one.  McCormack notes that for Barth “eternity 
                                                                                                                                          
James D. Smart (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1964), 21.  However, in light of Barth’s own 
words in Romans II, which point to Kierkegaard’s harsh dialectic in separating time and eternity, 
coupled with Barth’s mentioning of Kierkegaard’s criticisms to cultural Christianity, to maintain a 
one-sided position which credits Overbeck with the distinction between history and sacred history, 
Christianity and Culture, is ambitious. Indeed, in arguing for the primacy of Overbeck over that of 
Kierkegaard with regard to influencing Barth’s Romans II, Busch argues that what Barth had 
discovered in Kierkegaard was reaffirmed in what he had already encountered in Overbeck, see 
Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth and the Pietists: The Young Karl Barth’s Critique of Pietism and Its 
Response. Translated by Daniel W. Bloesch (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 73.  
However, if the argument is a matter of who Barth encountered first, Barth discovered Kierkegaard in 
1909, long before his 1916 encounter with Overbeck. But the issue is what Barth himself evidences 
with regard to the distinction between Christianity and Culture, history and sacred history, and the 
evidence suggests that both Overbeck and Kierkegaard help Barth in this regard. For Barth’s use of 
Kierkegaard in this regard, see Barth, Romans II, 279and 395. 
393 Barth, Epistle to the Romans, 392. 
394 Ibid., 395. 
395 Barth, “Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille,’ 1965, 5.   
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cannot become time without ceasing to be eternity.”396  The difficulty that the time 
and eternity dialectic poses for our discussion of revelation and history exists in the 
apparent inability of revelation to be historical given the restrictions of the IQD, as 
McCormack points out.397  Demanding attention now, is Barth’s position on the 
inability of eternity to become time which is reminiscent of the same problem that 
concerned Kierkegaard.   
Kierkegaard’s purpose in relating the extenuating problem of the elusive 
nature of the concept of “becoming” was to raise the barriers for historical 
investigation in seeking to make sense of revelation. Furthermore, their 
admonishment was to the contradiction ensuing when, given the restrictions of 
human knowledge, historical criticism laid claim to what was inaccessible, i.e., 
sacred history. Revelation is “historical”, but only faith can affirm it.  Kierkegaard 
writes, “‘History,’ says faith, ‘has nothing at all to do with Jesus Christ; with regard 
to him we have only sacred history (which is qualitatively different from history in 
general.”398  Yet, in that the concept of revelation denotes God’s entrance into human 
history, these events, it would seem, invite such investigation. But this is not case for 
either thinker. 
Barth expresses the relation of time and eternity as consisting of two planes 
which are distinct one from another: one being the world of the Father which is 
unknown and the world of humanity which is known.399  The crisis which this 
                                                 
396 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936, 263. Even though eternity cannot become time without ceasing to exist as 
eternity, it can, as McCormack states, “encounter time.” 
397 Ibid., 264. 
398 Kierkegaard, PC, 30. 
399 Barth, Epistle to the Romans, 30. In seeking to articulate the relation of eternity to time, or 
in this case, scared history to history, Barth describes the relation as one wherein eternity touches the 
earth “as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it.” Interestingly, inasmuch as 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of the relation between time and eternity parallels Barth’s own 
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qualitative distinction causes for human history is one whereby it is cut off from the 
primal history of God.  “History bears inevitable witness to its non-historical 
beginning and its non-historical end”400 by means of its efforts to establish ethical 
society and in the existence of religion and religious institutions.  The key for 
understanding Barth’s use of the “infinite qualitative distinction” rests in grasping the 
disjunction that the related “time/eternity dialectic” creates for our understanding of 
history-viz., that of secular history (Geschichte) vs. primal history (Urgeschichte).  
For Barth this understanding rests in our 
Apprehension that the world and human history are moving in a secular and relative 
context, which is in itself ultimately meaningless; but it involves also the apprehension 
that they have meaning as a parable of a wholly other world; that they bear witness to a 
wholly other history; that they are reminiscent of a wholly other mankind; that they are, 
in fact, a parable, a witness, and a reminiscence, of God.401   
 
Insofar as humanity seeks to grasp the divine in concrete manner, it betrays its 
dependence and acknowledgement of this unobservable, ahistorical unknown origin 
history of the world and humanity402 which Barth terms Urgeschichte.   
When one seeks to understand Christianity’s historicity divorced from its 
source (eternity), then it exists in stark contradiction to what it was originally meant 
to be.  In that Christianity presents a history unlike ordinary history, its historical 
claims are untouchable by ordinary historical investigation. Barth writes, “No road to 
the eternal meaning of the created world has ever existed, save the road of negation. 
                                                                                                                                          
understanding, it would come of no surprise that the way in which they perceive this relation also 
parallels. Keeping in mind Barth’s words just mentioned, Kierkegaard, describing the relation 
between time and eternity by means of the Incarnation, states, “Christ veritably relates tangentially to 
the earth (the divine cannot relate in any other way): He had no place where he could lay his head. A 
tangent is a straight line which touches the circle at only one single point.” See Kierkegaard, Journals 
and Papers, Vol. 1, A-E, 138, and Barth, Epistle to the Romans, 30. 
400 Barth, Epistle to the Romans, 147. 
401 Ibid., 107. 
402 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 




This is the lesson of history.”403 
The existence of the IQD prohibits the equating of time and eternity 
wherefrom humanity lays hold of God thus reducing him to a creation of human 
thought, religious experience, or ethics.  Barth writes: 
If it were possible for a man to penetrate with his understanding the non-historical in 
which every great episode in history had its origin, he might, by raising himself beyond 
the sphere of history, attain to that knowledge which would absolve him from the 
necessity of taking serious account of the actual facts of history.404 
                         
Barth reflects Kierkegaard’s separation between human history and sacred history in 
order to safeguard the divine.  Quoting Kierkegaard he states, “The moment I make 
of my words an existential thing – that is to say, when I make of Christianity a thing 
in this world - at that moment I explode existence and have perpetuated the 
scandal.”405  However, Barth’s relation to Kierkegaard extends well beyond the 
implication of the IQD for the historicity of the Christian faith.  With Kierkegaard, 
Barth maintains an epistemological reservation as to the surety and meaningfulness 
of historical knowledge, generally speaking, which suggests another similarity 
between them.  
Reminiscent of Kierkegaard’s notion of historical knowledge as 
approximation, Barth maintains that although we can learn from the past, this 
knowledge is limited.  In the relation between the past and the present, “time is at 
once dissolved and fulfilled.”406   
For Barth, as well as Kierkegaard, exact historical certainty does not exist. If 
historical knowledge in general remains ultimately uncertain what can be known 
historically of those events which claim to have their cause in that which is 
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135 
 
unhistorical. In other words, if reason and its endeavours, i.e. historical criticism, are 
not granted certainty, what resources does humanity have at its disposal in perceiving 
the divine in history?  
 Barth offers that faith which, resting in “the non-historical, the invisible, and 
… the incomprehensible”407 permits our acceptance of the divine element within 
human history. Without the “non-historical” whereby “history reveals its 
importance,” the past can say nothing to us.408  Addressing the significance and 
limitations of this dialogue, or “intercourse,” Barth reflects not only a Kierkegaardian 
scepticism towards historical knowledge but also the notion of Kierkegaard’s 
concept of contemporaneity whereby, in the act of faith, knowledge of the past 
becomes a real and meaningful reality for the present. He states: “However 
accessible the authorities and sources for the writing of history may be, the keenest 
historical acumen can discover nothing, if contemporary intercourse be not mingled 
with it.”409   
The concept of contemporaneity is indeed important for both Kierkegaard 
and Barth for several reasons. First, without it, the person and work of Christ would 
exist isolated to its historical context with little or no relevance for the present.  
Second, the notion of contemporaneity, lends itself to an understanding of how we 
are to relate to the historical/rational uncertainties of Christianity.  Insofar as 
Christianity was a movement relegated to a specific time and place, with specific 
individuals, it is historical in the normative sense. However, although Christianity is 
a historical event, its origin is not in the sense of other events in history which are 
historical condition or dependent on events within time for its existence. Instead, 






Christianity has its beginnings, its source in a cause outside time, namely, God.  In 
this view, Christianity is and is not historical.  
Therefore, Christianity welcomes the human subject a relation to it different 
from that of normal history, namely, the relating of subjective appropriation. 
Subjective appropriation overcomes both the remoteness of the past as well as that 
“history” which is said cannot become historical. Historical investigation’s wanting 
to unearth Christianity’s ambiguities thus fails to perceive that Christianity does not 
concern itself with exact historical knowledge because its history is a history beyond 
the scopes of investigation.  Barth states: “Be the material never so carefully and 
critically brought together; be the devotion in delving into the past never so great, 
and the accuracy of the scholarship never so precise … yet this, for all its 
competence, is not history.”410 If historical knowledge demands nothing but our mere 
acknowledgement of its objective certainty, then, with Kierkegaard, its knowledge is 
of little consequence insofar as it demands nothing for our present existence. Barth 
too, then, faced a similar task to that of Kierkegaard’s in seeking to resurrect the 
essence of Christianity as that which demands faith, not historical/rational certainty 
or justification.   
Barth’s affinity with Kierkegaard, in regard to the relation between history 
and Christian truths, is one which he seems to have carried with him throughout his 
theological maturation. In his 1963 reply to Professor Max Bense’s article Atheism, 
For and Against Barth expresses this ongoing “faithfulness to Kierkegaard’s reveille 
in his words 
The atheism that is the real enemy is the ‘Christianity’ that professes faith in God very 
much as a matter of course, perhaps with great emphasis, and perhaps with righteous 
indignation at atheism wild or mild, while in its practical thinking and behaviour it carries 
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on exactly as if there were no God. It professes its belief in him, lauds and praises him, 
while in practice he is the last of the things it thinks about, takes seriously, fears or 
loves.411 
 
Examining the relation of Barth’s conception of history to Kierkegaard’s lends to a 
consideration of what is central for both thinkers criticism of history, namely, the 
efforts of historical criticism in seeking to make sense of the Incarnation. 
 
Paradox: The Incarnation and History 
It is generally recognized that Barth relied heavily on Kierkegaard’s concept 
of Paradox in order to describe how human understanding relates to the truths of 
Christianity.412 Initially with our comparative analysis of shared concepts between 
Kierkegaard and Barth, it was mentioned that Barth’s use of the IQD served as the 
ground wherefrom his time-eternity dialectic lent itself to the formation and 
uncovering of his other dialectics as seen in the dialectic of judgement and grace 
(Adam and Christ), as well as the distinction between Primal History and History.  
This conceptual relationship has not gone unnoticed in the work of others, like 
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McCormack and MacDonald.413  For example, MacDonald writes, “Barth took the 
view that his various dialectical ‘meanderings’ were merely ways of expressing ‘God 
is God’.”414  Therefore, in that our attention now turns to Barth’s conception of the 
relation between historical/speculative knowledge and the Incarnation, the question 
is raised as to what role the IQD serves, if any, in explicating this relation. 
To bring us back to our earlier discussion of the difficulty the time-eternity 
dialectic extends to revelation within history, it was stated that “the solution to this 
problem is given in the problem itself.” And although discussing the limits which the 
time-eternity dialectic imposes on the ability of historical-critical methods to 
investigate revelation in history, we left the problem unsolved, this we will now 
address.   
Thus far, it cannot go unnoticed that Barth’s use of the time and eternity 
dialectic has secured a limitation in our relation to God. In light of the negativity 
resulting from this dialectic regarding to Christian knowledge, McCormack asks, 
“Given the misunderstanding to which the time-eternity dialectic so easily gave rise, 
why did Barth use it?”415 Aside from the negative aspect this dialectic extends in 
rendering all human possibilities impossible, McCormack answers: 
It was useful for bearing witness to a theological state of affairs. Eternity cannot become 
time without ceasing to be eternity, but eternity can encounter time. So too, in the case of 
revelation, God (as the content of revelation) cannot become the medium in which He 
veils Himself without ceasing to be God…So it was the structural similarity between the 
time-eternity dialectic and the dialectic of veiling and unveiling which made the former a 
useful tool for bearing witness to the latter. [But] unlike eternity, which can only limit or 
bound time, God can realize new possibilities in time.416 
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McCormack posits that the time and eternity dialectic functions first, in negating all 
human attempts to relegate the historicity of revelation to the mere historical 
wherefrom it becomes accessible to historical-critical methods. Second, showing the 
questionability of its presupposition, historical-critical methodology is supplanted for 
that of God’s bringing in the “new possibility” of accessibility of revelation. To this 
dialectical relation of a “new” history within “human” history, Barth writes, “The 
years A.D. 1-30 are the era of revelation and disclosure.”417  And so, as we shall see, 
the time-eternity dialectic remains intact even when overcome by God’s revelation. 
This means, that the IQD between God and humanity remains in full force by means 
of revelation as being both the veiling and unveiling of God in Christ. This is to say 
that in the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth, God’s revelation creates both a 
surmountable and yet insurmountable problem for human understanding; this is how. 
The paradoxical nature of revelation in Christ offered Barth the means for a 
better understanding of the relation between time and eternity.  According to Barth, 
in Christ, time and eternity “meet and go apart, two planes intersect, the one known 
and the other unknown.”418 First, where these two worlds meet is observable in the 
historical person Jesus of Nazareth.419 Barth states, “The name Jesus defines an 
historical occurrence and marks the point where the unknown world cuts the known 
world.”420 However, although affirming an objective point of reference lest humanity 
look to themselves in grounding knowledge of God, Barth does not permit an 
equating of history and revelation whereby revelation becomes another historical 
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event open to human scrutiny. Instead, the dialectic of time and eternity is further 
strengthened even in God’s revelation insofar as God remains hidden in Christ.  
Although, in Christ, the world of the Father touches the known world of 
humanity, this world is not permitted direct observation by virtue of revelation itself. 
For Barth, God’s revelation in Christ is dialectical with regard to human affirmation 
of it. In the historical person of Jesus, humanity begins with something concrete with 
regard to knowledge of God, in contrast to their own subjective projections and 
creations. However, the concreteness of this knowledge is one which does not exist 
in the historical person of Christ in and of himself. In fact, Barth’s use of the word 
“concrete” does not denote a lack of concreteness in revelation but rather denotes the 
inability of our human capabilities to perceive revelation.  He states, “We who stand 
in this concrete world know nothing, and are incapable of knowing anything of that 
other world.”421 In light of this limitation then, Barth demands an honest admittance 
on our behalf as to what is meant when one affirms that “the years A.D. 1-30 are the 
era of revelation and disclosure.”422 In other words, when one affirms that in the 
historical person of Christ there God has made himself known, on what grounds 
exists this affirmation. From sheer historical observation, aided by the eyes of reason, 
Barth believes that all we see is Jesus of Nazareth, not the Christ of faith. Barth 
writes, 
Jesus stands among sinners as a sinner; He sets Himself wholly under the judgment under 
which the world is set; He takes His place where God can be present only in questioning 
about Him; He takes the form of a slave; He moves to the cross and to death; His greatest 
achievement is a negative achievement. He is not a genius, endowed with manifest or 
even with occult powers; He is not a hero or leader of men; He is neither poet nor 
thinker.423 
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In the historical person of Jesus, we perceive a human being unlike any other. 
In ourselves, we have not the means to look past the empirical, temporal, historical 
person of Jesus and affirm that God stands before us. Rather, by virtue of our 
epistemological limitations, the Incarnation does not issue an obvious 
acknowledgment on our part. Quite the contrary, human reason denies such a notion 
of God becoming incarnate. As such, the revelation of God in Christ is a scandal to 
human understanding and therefore “criss-crosses every form of rationalism.”424 
Therefore, Barth affirms that Christ, “can be comprehended only as Paradox 
(Kierkegaard).”425 He adds, “As Christ, Jesus is the plane which lies beyond our 
comprehension.”426 When confronted with the veiling and unveiling God, Barth 
thinks that reason faces a paradox in its contemplating of two opposing concepts, i.e., 
God and man. Like Kierkegaard, the paradoxical nature of the Incarnation affords 
Barth the means whereby to fundamentally question the endeavours of historical 
criticism and rational speculation. Both these enterprises are however not 
questionable in themselves but only when they seek to transcend their inherent 
limitations 
In sum, God has unveiled himself in Christ, in history, by means of human 
flesh. However, it is the means itself which perpetuates the dialectic of revelation. In 
other words, God has unveiled himself in a way which leaves him indistinguishable 
from any other human being. Therefore, God’s unveiling of himself as a human 
being in history simultaneously veils himself from mere human perception and 
historical investigation.  Barth writes: 
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In Jesus revelation is a paradox, however objective and universal it may be. That the 
promises of the faithfulness of God have been fulfilled in Jesus the Christ is not, and 
never will be, a self-evident truth, since in Him it appears in its final hiddenness and its 
most profound secrecy. The truth, in fact, can never be self-evident, because it is a matter 
neither of historical nor of psychological experience, and because it is neither a cosmic 
happening within the natural order, nor even the most supreme event of our imaginings. 
Therefore it is not accessible to our perception.427 
 
Even though it will not be until the Göttingen Dogmatics where Barth will fully 
articulate the significance of human flesh in guarding the divine Subjectivity of God, 
this notion is yet present at this time in Barth’s thought. It is because God is 
righteous and wholly other that “in Jesus God becomes veritably a secret.”428 
Because God is infinitely qualitatively distinct from humanity, the Incarnation exists 
as “the most complete veiling of His incomprehensibility.”429  
For Barth, given that “there is no object apart from our thinking of it…if God 
were…an object among other objects, if He were Himself subject to the Krisis, He 
would then obviously not be God.”430 It is within the context of the notion of 
revelation as both the veiling and unveiling of God from which Barth’s harsh attack 
on historicism is to be understood. Recall, that Barth had earlier in the preface to the 
Romans II, addressed those who had unjustly labelled him as being “a bitter enemy 
of historical criticism.”431 In view of human reason’s inability to perceive in Christ 
nothing but a paradox, the endeavours of historical criticism to make sense of the 
divine in Christ become utterly futile. For Barth, the paradoxes of Christianity 
existed in order to protect the efficacy of its power in both judging and saving 
humanity. Quoting Kierkegaard, Barth writes,  
Remove from the Christian Religion, as Christendom has done, its ability to shock, and 
Christianity, by becoming a direct communication, is altogether destroyed. It then 
becomes a tiny superficial thing, capable neither of inflicting deep wounds nor of healing 
                                                 
427 Ibid., 98. 
428 Ibid., 98. 
429 Ibid., 98. 
430 Ibid., 82. 
431 Ibid., 9. 
143 
 
them; by discovering an unreal and merely human compassion, it forgets the infinite 
qualitative distinction between man and God.432 
 
Due to the infinite chasm which separates time and eternity, God and 
humanity, coupled with the impenetrable revelation of God in Christ, Barth 
maintains that “there are no human avenues” of approaching the knowledge of God 
in Christ. Even more, if “the wrath of God is the judgment under which we stand,”433 
then the “judgment of history is that those devoted to its investigation are driven to a 
final deprivation: they become dumb before God.”434 In short, the words such as 
“history”, “historical criticism”, and “humanity” are synonymous with time, and time 
denotes limitation and corruption.435 In short, Barth’s criticisms of historicism are 
directed to its presumptuous attempt to treat the Incarnation as another mere 
historical event. In light of the limitations given to our knowledge, and our 
endeavours, Barth maintains therefore that “within history, Jesus as the Christ can be 
understood only as Problem or Myth.”436 In the end, Barth adherence to the IQD, 
given in the dialectic of time and eternity, “the difference between that which lies 
beyond the judgment and that which lies on this side of it is not relative but absolute: 
the two are separated absolutely.”437 
At most, history can only provide insight to the historical Jesus, not the Christ 
of faith. God’s revelation in the historical person of Jesus “can never be self-evident, 
because it is a matter neither of historical nor of psychological experience.”438 
Furthermore, “it can neither be taught nor handed down by tradition, nor is it a 
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subject of research…Therefore it is not accessible to our perception.”439  Therefore, 
quoting Kierkegaard again, Barth writes, “Now, Spirit is the denial of direct 
immediacy. If Christ be very God, He must be unknown, for to be known directly is 
the characteristic mark of an idol.”440 
 As we observed earlier in Kierkegaard, the Incarnation reveals an ontological 
impossibility, in that, since God exists necessarily, it would therefore be impossible 
for him to come-into-being in that this transition is one from possibility to actuality 
and therefore would suggest that the Incarnation is like that of other temporal events.  
Since God exists necessarily he is unable to come-into-being as historical. Thus, the 
Incarnation, as Barth says, presents “the paradox that eternity becomes time.”441  If 
the human categories of the understanding exist only in relation to the empirical, then 
revelation necessarily transcends what can be known.   
Appropriately, Barth echoes Kierkegaard in issuing a warning to “be on our 
guard against that ‘fibrous, undialectical, blatant, clerical appeal that Christ was 
God…”442  Whence comes the seriousness of Barth’s warning? Quoting Kierkegaard, 
Barth states that “he [Christ] was beyond our comprehension.”443  Barth’s 
development here appears to parallel Kierkegaard’s own discussion in PC on all 
sides. Barth continues stating: 
He [the observer] may pronounce Him to be divine because of His peculiar awareness of 
God or because of His religious- ethical heroism- to this Kierkegaard referred when he 
spoke of the ‘clerical appeal’ to the visible Jesus. Or he may pronounce the visible figure 
of Jesus to something well known to the student of ancient mythology, or may dismiss 
Him as a madman.444 
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In sum, Barth’s use of paradox is descriptive of revelation in relation to reason. 
However, this too has been put into question. It is stated that: 
[Barth] must be viewed as incautious and inconsistent in his use of terminology like 
‘dialectic’ and ‘paradox.’  He does not work with a single definition of either concept, 
nor does he attempt to coordinate his various usages in order to show their 
interrelation.445    
 
This assessment follows from a specific reading of Kierkegaard’s thought which can 
be interpreted in either of two ways. The concept can be used either in a “logical 
sense of a non-synthesizable opposition between two statements,”446 or it can be used 
to denote “anything which goes against appearance or expectations.”447   
McCormack believes that Kierkegaard’s use of paradox should be understood 
in the first sense (to which here he stands closer to Barth) and that Barth’s use of the 
term paradox is predominately presented in the second sense, as relating to what is 
contradictory to appearance.  However, as we have observed, Kierkegaard’s use of 
this term is predominantly expressed in the second sense, although incorporating the 
first. Kierkegaard writes: “The thesis that God has existed in human form, was born, 
grew up, etc is certainly the paradox sensu strictissimo, the absolute paradox.”448  
That this man, Jesus of Nazareth, should declare that he was God, “come into 
existence exactly as an individual human being, indistinguishable from any other 
human being,”449 not only contradicts what is given to our senses, but also our 
reason, which brings us to another important clarification.    
The basis of the paradoxical appearance of the Incarnation is one grounded in 
reason’s inability to come to terms with what is contradictory to the senses. 
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Kierkegaard himself says that “the understanding declares that the paradox is the 
absurd.”450  Barth reflects Kierkegaard’s use exactly when he states, “The 
assumption that Jesus is the Christ is, in the strictest sense of the word, an 
assumption, void of any content that can be comprehended by us.”451  A further 
example of Barth’s agreement with Kierkegaard’s use of this concept can be seen in 
Barth’s statement, “We - God’s Children! Consider and bear in mind the vast 
unobservability, impossibility, and paradox of these words.”452   
It seems clear that Barth’s use of the term “paradox”, like Kierkegaard’s, 
consists of both an empirical nature and also a categorical nature in that the two are 
needed in order to produce knowledge. Inasmuch as both Barth and Kierkegaard 
were indebted to Kant’s epistemology a definition of a paradox which reflects both 
an empirical and conceptual contradiction seems valid.  Indeed, both Barth and 
Kierkegaard extend their use of the term paradox beyond the nature of the 
Incarnation to that of Christianity. But this extension does not create an inconsistency 
as McCormack suggests. 
 Due to the employment of the IQD, whereby humanity possesses no 
categories to know that which extends beyond the phenomenal, all that pertains to 
God and his relation to time is also unobservable and thus paradoxical. For, “we 
must abide humbly by the recognition that His [God] procedure is altogether beyond 
our powers of observation.”453  The rational/empirical use of paradox is, as we 
observed earlier, also evident in Barth’s dialectic of the old and new man as well as 
in his assessment of the Church of Jacob which, as “observable, knowable and 
                                                 
450 Kierkegaard, PF, 52. 
451 Barth, Epistle to the Roman, 36. 
452 Ibid., 299. 
453 Ibid., 351. 
147 
 
possible” exists as the Church of Esau.454 For Barth and Kierkegaard alike, God’s 
revelation in Christ is a scandal to reason since it contradicts its preconceived idea of 
the nature of God.  When reason reflects on God, it thinks of an omnipotent ruler 
clothed in honor and majesty.  That this majestic God of creation should reveal 
himself in the form of a lowly servant is utterly preposterous: 
He was a lowly human being, a lowly man who did not set himself off from the human 
throng either by soft raiment or by any other earthly advantage and was not 
distinguishable to other human beings, not even to the countless legions of angels he left 
behind when he humbled himself.455 
 
In light of the hiddenness of God’s revelation in Christ, how, then, is one able to 
overcome the logical-empirical contradiction given in revelation whereby God, 
hidden in the medium of human flesh becomes an object for human knowledge 
despite the contradiction? This question inevitably leads us to the role of faith in 
relation to the truths of Christianity and, specifically, the Incarnation.  
Faith and Offence 
When discussing Barth’s notion of faith, his concept of the Moment assumes 
prominence. According to Barth faith, he states, “Is the ‘Moment’ when men are 
moved by God, by the true God, the Creator and Redeemer of men and of all human 
things...The ‘Moment’ of the movement of men by God is beyond men.”456 In 
relegating human capability for faith beyond human attainability, Barth maintains 
that our possession of faith is not dependent on our own righteousness.457 Rather, 
being beyond human merit, faith is a “decision which lies only in God’s hands.”458 In 
light of the IQD between God and humanity, Barth therefore understands the moment 
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of faith as a moment “which is beyond all time.”459  Furthermore, for Barth, the 
reality of the moment of faith is eschatological insofar as it is a reality which, 
although relating to time, shall be affirmed “only in the context of the negation of the 
Last Trump.”460 In Barth’s estimation, faith, like all the truths of Christianity, can 
only be realized in the end when time in consumed by eternity. Therefore, within 
time, faith can only appear as paradox. Humanity is only able to, “in fear and 
trembling, assert the possibility of its occurrence”461 and not “that we have attained 
this possibility.”462  
In short, for Barth, in that the reality of faith is the moment when eternity 
encounters time, this encounter denies observation in time. But more importantly, for 
Barth, the moment of faith itself assumes predominance with regard to its function. 
Faith is the means wherefrom humanity receives the ability to know God. Therefore, 
Barth’s notion of faith, although pertaining to the Gospel as a whole,463 aims 
specifically to the question of humanity’s knowledge of God. Therefore, inasmuch as 
in Christ God has made himself known, the category of faith denotes the mean in 
which this knowledge is attained. 
However, insofar as knowledge of God in Christ presents reason with a 
paradox, this knowledge, Barth maintains, “is a matter for faith only.”464 In other 
words, in that God’s revelation in Christ is indirect rather than, like human 
knowledge, direct, His revelation “is intelligible only by faith.”465 For Barth, faith is 
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“the ‘Moment’ when men are moved by God, by the true God”466 in order that what 
is unattainable by reason becomes attainable by God’s grace.467 Therefore, as a gift 
of God’s grace, faith is a miracle which reveals the utter impossibility of human 
effort in making known what only God can make known.468  
By the miracle of faith, humanity comes to perceive not only God hidden in 
Christ, but perceives the possible impossibility of being reconciled to God. However, 
as Barth states, “This miracle of reckoning of the divine righteousness, this non-
reckoning of human unrighteousness...is the paradox of faith.”469 The paradox of 
faith points to the fact that all human reason and endeavour exists wholly futile in 
both understanding and attaining this knowledge of revelation and its work on our 
behalf. “Men come to faith, only from and through faith.”470 By faith, humanity 
comes to understand the sheer “otherness” of God. Faith denotes that humanity is 
aware of their inability to overcome the chasm of the IQD which separates them 
from God. It, as Barth states, “renders inevitable a qualitative distinction between 
God and man.”471 But faith, insofar as it operates against the power of reason, is a 
serious matter.  
For Barth, the seriousness of matter rests in the problem given to reason in its 
encounter with the Incarnation. Here, reason is faced with a choice to either believe 
or to be offended.472 Barth writes, “To him that is not sufficiently mature to accept a 
contradiction and to rest in it, it becomes a scandal – to him that is unable to escape 
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the necessity of contradiction, it becomes a matter for faith.”473 Therefore, with the 
words of Kierkegaard, Barth issues a warning to the temptation of lessening the 
paradox which necessarily exists in order to allow faith, He writes,  
We must therefore be on our guard against that ‘fibrous, undialectical, blatant, clerical 
appeal that Christ was God, since He was so visibly and directly’! May we be preserved 
from the blasphemy of men who ‘without being terrified and afraid in the presence of 
God, without the agony of death which is the birth-pang of faith, without fear and 
trembling which is the first requirement of adoration, without the panic of the possibility 
of scandal, hope to have direct knowledge of that which cannot be directly known…and 
do not rather say that He was truly and verily God, because, because He was beyond our 
comprehension.’474 
 
To the necessity of the paradox for faith, arising from God’s taking on of human 
flesh, Barth adds, 
In order that the condemnation might be perfected, this KENOSIS of the Son of God, this 
form of a servant, this impenetrable incognito, is not accidental but essential. It is 
imperative that the incognito of the Son of God should increase and gain the upper hand, 
that it should move on to final self-surrender and self-abandonment; imperative that we, 
from the human point of view, should be scandalized; imperative that we should that not 
flesh and blood but only the Father in heaven can reveal that there is more to be found 
here than flesh and blood.475 
 
By virtue of the uncertainty which accompanies the God-man, Barth believes “All 
faith is both simple and difficult for all alike it is a scandal, a hazard, a 
‘Nevertheless’; to all it presents the same embarrassment and the same promise; for 
all it is a leap into the void.”476  
Barth’s describing faith in terms of “scandal” and “hazard” betrays another 
interesting aspect of faith.  
According to Barth, faith’s inherent risk of a leap procures its significance as 
active. For Barth, faith is “living.”477  Many times throughout Romans II, Barth uses 
words such as individual, action, obedience, decision and existential which underline 
his conviction that, as he states, “The Gospel demands participation, comprehension, 
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co-operation.”478 Given his understanding that only faith allows for the individual’s 
relation to God, this implies that faith works in those it has been given.  
As a whole, these terms relate that, in short, faith is “the demand for 
obedience.”479 This demand is, as Barth states, “a call which enlightens and rouses to 
action.”480 Therefore, Barth’s description of faith insinuates a subjective dynamic 
insofar as it relates to the human response to God’s revelation. Moreover, Barth 
distinguishes time and eternity in terms of the objective and subjective. This 
distinction serves Barth in underscoring what he thinks indicative of humanity’s 
relation to truth. The truth, i.e. what pertains to God, is a reality to which humanity 
must be given access. In this sense, the individual’s relation to the truth is 
synonymous for the individual of faith. Barth writes, “There is no objective 
observation of the Truth; for its objectivity is that by which we are observed before 
ever we have observed anything at all. Truth is that primal objectivity by which the 
observing subject is itself constituted. Truth…cannot be subjectivized.”481 Thus, 
when viewed in terms of objectivity and subjectivity, objectivity correlates to the 
reality of the invisible, new world’s relation to the “human, historical, subjective 
side” of time.482  
Of course, Barth’s distinguishing the human and divine in these terms 
prohibits relegating the source of truth to humanity. Rather, as Barth’s words attest, 
                                                 
478 Ibid., 28. For more on the way in which Barth uses the concept of the individual in this 
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subjectivity, passion, i.e. faith; see, CUP, 129-251. 
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subjectivity conveys the individual’s relation to God in terms of obedience and 
faith.483 In fact, faith’s manifestation in obedience is described by Barth in 
Kierkegaard’s own words as the “passionate motions of eternity.”484 The notion that 
faith is subjective seems appropriate in light of Barth’s adamant rejection of any sort 
of objectifying of eternity’s presence in time.485  This notion finds further support in 
Barth’s description of faith as a risk or hazard for the one who exercises it. He writes, 
“If there be no gamble of faith, if faith be forgotten or for one moment suspended, or 
if it be thought of as anything but a hazard, this identity [between the new and the old 
man] is no more than an entirely trivial enterprise of religious or speculative 
arrogance.”486  
The risk innate within faith obviously relates to the hidden ground from 
which humanity acts and thinks in contrast to the empirical or objective. In other 
words, to the eye of reason, faith appears ridiculous and ungrounded insofar as it has 
no empirical referent to which it relates. Therefore, to the one who acts against what 
constitutes “rationality” faith is a risk insofar as it contradicts our ways of knowing. 
This is why, for Barth, faith is understood in terms of “fear and trembling”.  In short, 
if knowledge of God is unattainable theoretically, then faith must denote a mode of 
epistemological apprehension whereby the individual exists in the most passionate, 
existential relation to God insofar as the risk of faith necessitates such a relation. 
Barth writes, “And to call upon the Lord means existential knowledge and faith and 
fear and love.”487 And, again, it is appropriate to mention that Kierkegaard himself 
ascribes to this very notion of faith. He writes, “The essential thing about subjectivity 
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is that in resolution and the decision of choice one runs the risk. This is the absolute 
decision.”488 Aligning Barth to a Kierkegaardian notion of truth presents, as noted in 
the Introduction, a very uncomfortable parallel for some. 
As noted in Chapter One of our study of Kierkegaard, his task of explicating 
the nature of Christianity as being subjective has most often led to an abuse of his 
intention.  He has usually been understood as endorsing an extreme view of 
subjectivity wherein Christianity has been presented as being void of objective truth 
and thus sheer delusion.  However, if one does not understand Kierkegaard’s use of 
faith, subjectivity and truth, as seen in Chapter One, in relation to the Incarnation 
then one will inevitably interpret his notion of subjectivity incorrectly.489 An 
example of this is evident in McCormack’s assertion that: 
The basic problem confronting Kierkegaard was that of guarding the subjectivity of the 
human individual against its absorption by the Hegelian dialectic of absolute spirit…This 
is not Barth’s problem at all.  His problem is that of guarding the divine subjectivity, not 
human subjectivity.490 
 
Furthermore, McCormack argues that given Kierkegaard’s concern with the human 
subject himself, Kierkegaard, unlike Barth, sought to interpret “the divine-human 
relation from the side of humanity.”491  
Again, as we noted in Chapter One, Kierkegaard’s concern cannot be as 
McCormack asserts. Kierkegaard’s notion of subjectivity denotes a specific approach 
to the objective uncertainties of the Christian faith, namely, the approach of faith. 
Kierkegaard is radically opposed to any human means in apprehending God outside 
of God’s own initiation in making himself known. The problem with Kierkegaard is 
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that, in light of his harsh attacks on the attempt of rational theology to make 
Christianity so accessible, as mere matters of fact, readers of Kierkegaard assume his 
notion of subjectivity naturally replaces an objective epistemology for a subjective 
one. But this is not Kierkegaard’s position. Rather, as he states, “It is absolutely true, 
isolated subjectivity as the age understands it is evil, but restoration to health by 
means of ‘objectivity’ is not a hair better.”492 In fact, as examined in Chapter One, 
Kierkegaard believes that an individualistic conception of the human is one that 
represents “subjectivity in its untruth” and as such must be passed “all the way 
through ‘to the single individual’—face to face with God.”493 Even more against 
interpreting Kierkegaard as one who advocates the subject as the loci of truth in 
contrast to the truth in God, Kierkegaard writes, “The maieutic cannot be the final 
form, because, Christianly understood, the truth does not lie in the subject (as 
Socrates understood it), but in a revelation which must be proclaimed.”494 
Furthermore, the Kierkegaardian approach to the divine-human relation, 
which is rooted in Kierkegaard’s dialectic of the finite and infinite as the structure of 
what constitutes human existence, is thought to be an expression of Barth’s earliest 
theological Liberalism which he abandoned for that of interpreting the divine-human 
relation from the side of God.495  Unfortunately, of these possible approaches, which 
is said to have arisen out of a controversy among the dialectical theologians 
concerning the correct understanding of Kierkegaard, it seems the view of Gogarten, 
Brunner, and Bultmann has prevailed.  
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Barth’s discussion of faith here reflects, if you recall, Kierkegaard’s own 
discussion of faith on several points. First, for Barth, faith is “the free initiative of the 
absolute ‘Moment’ of the righteousness of God.”496 Kierkegaard too maintains that 
the re-birthing of faith is “the moment.”497 It is a moment of decisive significance in 
that, as a moment “filled with the eternal,”498 it is “the fullness of time.”499 
Furthermore, the “moment” signifies the point of contact between time and eternity 
whereby the individual receives the condition for conversion, namely the condition 
of faith.500   Kierkegaard writes, “In the moment, he becomes aware of the rebirth, 
for his previous state was indeed one of ‘not to be’.”501 Interestingly, throughout 
Barth scholarship, it has been stated that Barth took his notion of the moment from 
Kierkegaard. To this, it is assumed that the work from which Barth found this 
concept was Kierkegaard’s The Moment, or The Instant. However, in this work, this 
concept bears no resemblance to Barth’s use as found in Romans II.  Rather, where 
Barth’s reflects Kierkegaard with regard to the moment is in Kierkegaard’s 
Philosophical Fragments.  
Second, for Kierkegaard too, faith is a miracle and hence by the grace of 
God.502  Third, Faith, because it is God’s doing, overcomes human impossibility in 
achieving it.  Kierkegaard writes: 
Faith should make striving possible, because the very fact that I am saved by faith and 
that nothing at all is demanded from me should in itself make it possible that I begin to 
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strive, that I do not collapse under impossibility but am encouraged and refreshed, 
because it has been decided I am saved, I am God’s child by virtue of faith.503 
 
Fourth, Kierkegaard too held that the paradoxical revelation of God in Christ was 
necessary in order that humanity respond in faith. Kierkegaard states, “But one 
cannot become a believer except by coming to him [Christ] in his state of abasement, 
to him, the sign of offence and the object of faith.”504 He adds, “The possibility of 
offence is not to be avoided. You must go through it; you can be saved from it in 
only one way: by believing. Therefore Christ says: Blessed is he who is not offended 
at me.”505 Barth echoes Kierkegaard here almost exactly stating, “In Him God 
reveals Himself inexorably as the hidden God who can be apprehended only 
indirectly. In Him He conceals Himself utterly, in order that He may manifest 
Himself to faith only.”506  
Fifth, in light of the paradox, human reason, as we observed, is placed with a 
decision to either believe or be offended. To this Kierkegaard writes, “Faith is a 
choice, certainly not direct reception—and the recipient is the one who is disclosed, 
whether he will believe or be offended.”507 Barth again echoes these words stating, 
“This discovery [In the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation] is...a free choice 
between scandal and faith.”508 Sixth, with Barth, due to the risk present with the 
decision of faith, Kierkegaard holds that Faith is a leap into the void.509 
Finally, given Barth’s latter problem with Kierkegaard’s supposed negative 
dialectic of the IQD, both thinkers agree that faith affirms both the maintaining of the 
IQD as well as its being overcome by revelation. Kierkegaard writes, “The 
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possibility of offence [which is intrinsically linked to faith], as we have tried to 
show, is present at every moment, confirming at every moment the chasmic abyss 
between the single individual and the God-man over which faith and faith alone 
reaches.”510    
  In conclusion of this examination of the affinity between Barth’s thought in 
Romans II and Kierkegaard’s, I think it is permissible to state, in speaking of 
Kierkegaard, Barth’s general tone is overtly positive. Barth expresses his 
appreciation for Kierkegaard’s thought by virtue of the numerous concepts and 
themes he borrows from him. In light of the theological situation to which Romans II 
addressed, Kierkegaard’s heavy use of diastasis served Barth in expressing the 
problem of this situation as one which has blurred the IQD between God and 
humanity. Barth notes both the Kierkegaardian criticism he had learned from as well 
as an admonishment to the reader to listen to “the dialectical audacity of 
Kierkegaard,”511 stating, “When a Kierkegaard or a Kutter, measuring the Church by 
an absolute standard, proceeds to utter his complaint against it, we are bound to 
uphold his criticism, indeed we must underline it and endorse it.”512  Throughout this 
examination of Romans II, I have endeavoured to trace Barth’s development of the 
IQD in relation to revelation, specifically with reference to the Incarnation and to 
historical criticism’s unwarranted investigation of revelation. Thus Barth, as 
Kierkegaard before him, relentlessly maintained the IQD against the never ending 
approximations of historicism in seeking to make “sense” of the Incarnation. Thus it 
was argued that in view of the IQD, for both thinkers, the revelation of God in Christ 
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presents a paradox to reason which stands offended. Moreover, the offence issued by 
the Incarnation is only overcome by God’s grace in the renewal of faith.  
Barth’s Romans II serves as a strong indictment of the inflated attempts of 
reason to usurp the divine prerogative, and a stern warning that all human 
endeavours stand under the judgment of the transcendent God.  But as we 
discovered, Barth’s purpose in employing the IQD was to open the door for grace. 
Thus, in light of our discussions of Kierkegaard and Barth, their conception of IQD 
is one comprised of both a negative and positive dimension. Furthermore, the 
misunderstanding prevailing among readers of Barth concerning Kierkegaard’s use 
of subjectivity has also been addressed in ways which reveals some affinity to 
Barth’s own use whereby the IQD safe-guards the divine Subjectivity.  
Now, at this point in my endeavour, in moving beyond Romans II to the 
Göttingen Dogmatics, I am entering, seemingly at face value, a less secure footing 
related to any fruitful discussion of Barth and Kierkegaard. However, if a choice 
between Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics were required regarding which of 
the two is more Kierkegaardian in tone, it would have to be the Göttingen 
Dogmatics. This is why: within these lectures we discover that Barth is doing 
something quite different, in fact new, in contrast to Romans II. Delaying, for now, 
what is new here, Barth carries out his new task by means of employing concepts 
very similar to Kierkegaard’s whereby the parallels are far more striking than those 
discussed in Romans II.  
To start, Barth, in a richer sense, betrays a new understanding of the human 
subject, in and of itself, in relation to God’s revelation. Intrinsically related to this 
relation, Barth also offers a more developed understanding of revelation, specifically 
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in the Incarnation which also bears a strong likeness to Kierkegaard’s own 
conception of the Incarnation. In short, I am suggesting that, contrary to the 
overwhelming position that after Romans II Barth has left Kierkegaard behind, in 
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KIERKEGAARD AND THE GÖTTINGEN DOGMATICS 
 
Introduction: Procedure and Problems 
The objective of this present chapter is to accomplish the following. First, I 
will offer a discussion of Barth’s more refined anthropology in order to show how 
closely it approximates Kierkegaard’s own notion as found in his SUD and his 
Journals. The result of this examination will be to demonstrate that Barth has now 
moved beyond Romans II to articulate the effects of sin in relation to the self, in and 
of itself, and the self in relation to God. Addressing this point will allow me to bring 
to a conclusion, by way of evidence, the discussion which commenced in Romans II 
concerning Barth’s growing suspicion that Kierkegaard’s IQD was one which leaves 
the subject in despair, destitute of grace. From this, I will offer some parallels 
between these two thinkers in relation to this discussion. Second, in light of the more 
expansive discussion of Kierkegaard in Chapter One, I will endeavour to unveil 
Barth’s more developed articulation of revelation as being composed of both an 
objective and subjective component. A discussion of the objective component will 
consist in specifically evaluating the way in which this component is related to 
Barth’s Christology, a relation which is said to mark “a real watershed in Barth’s 
development.”514 In light of this point of departure in Barth’s thinking, I will address 
the way in which he now seeks to articulate revelation in history from which this 
articulation comes to parallel Kierkegaard’s conception of revelation even more. In 
                                                 




view of this new articulation what also emerges is the way in which Barth comes 
closer to Kierkegaard in expressing not only the reality of revelation in history but 
also the limitations which history offers humanity in knowing revelation.  
Finally, I shall discuss the subjective component of revelation in Barth’s own 
terms of human response, namely, faith and obedience. This too shall, by way of 
reminder, be contrasted with Kierkegaard’s own use of subjectivity.  It must be 
briefly noted that all such parallels cannot hide some differences between these two 
thinkers.  For example, in seeking to speak of the objectivity of revelation, Barth 
relies heavily on the authority of the Church in a way which exceeds Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of ecclesial tradition in relation to its affirmation of God in history.  
However, such differences, in fact, relate more to individual objectives or pursued 
problems rather than to conceptual difference and therefore do not disrupt, 
significantly, any similarities.  
 
The Objective in the Göttingen Dogmatics 
In comparison to Romans II, the Göttingen Dogmatics, Instruction in the 
Christian Religion (offered first as lectures from the summer semester 1924 to 
summer 1925) marks the emergence of a different Barth, although not wholly 
different, in at least two ways which, however, are intrinsically linked. One 
difference is a change in direction for Barth, or rather a change of concern.  Without 
rehashing, in detail, the whole of the Göttingen Dogmatics515 let me state a very 
condensed summary of this difference.  
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As a whole, Barth’s central task in these lectures was his concern with the 
questions of the ground or possibility for Christian thinking and preaching.  Barth 
questions what talk about God can mean, specifically as it is affirmed within 
Christian preaching and teaching. In order to address this concern, Barth, by means 
of the Trinitarian development at Nicea as well as the Christological resolution 
reached at Chalcedon, takes up the way in which revelation is related to scripture and 
then to preaching. He states:  
The Word of God on which dogmatics reflects – I need only refer to the common formula 
to show the point at issue – is one in three and three in one: revelation, scripture, and 
preaching – the Word of God as revelation, the Word of God as scripture, and the Word 
of God as preaching, neither to be confused nor separated…yet not three Words of 
God…Scripture is not revelation, but from revelation. Preaching is not revelation or 
scripture, but from both.516   
 
Whereas the Barth of Romans II relied heavily on drawing the limits to what we can 
know and say of God, his lectures at Göttingen reveal that his endeavour is now to 
overcome these limits. Indeed, Barth’s emphasizes on grace in Romans II does offer 
the overcoming of human limitation. Yet, in light of his inarticulate notion of 
revelation, this overcoming appears weak in its objective. Thus, Barth’s desire to 
affirm human knowledge of revelation inevitably, points to a new epistemological 
development in Barth’s conception of revelation.  
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Word of God does continue.” For further discussion see, Bruce McCormack, A Scholastic of a Higher 
Order: The Development of Barth’s Theology, 1921-31, 292. 
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McCormack notes, “What is new here is the understanding of the relation of 
revelation and history – a new understanding which does not set aside the 
eschatological reservation of Romans II but succeeds in making clearer the 
significance of history in relation to revelation.”517 This new development is said to 
have resulted from Barth’s encounter with Heinrich Heppe’s discussion of 
anhypostatic – enhypostatic Christology,518 which results in the epistemological 
significance of the Incarnation as an intuitable event “in” history,519 namely, that 
God has become an intuitable object so that we may know him. In sum what we have 
here is Barth’s new reliance on the Alexandrian Christology of the Word-flesh which 
allows him to speak afresh that “revelation really does enter fully into history and 
time.”520   
In light of his use of Heppe’s discussion of the theological development of 
the Early Church and the Reformation, Barth assuredly moves well beyond 
Kierkegaard’s own concerns. As McCormack states, with the formation of the 
Göttingen lectures, “a new phase characterized by a growing predominance of 
dogmatic thinking is intitiated.”521  However, from what follows, although I cannot 
deny Barth’s indebtedness to Heppe in formulating his new Christological 
expression, nevertheless I have cause to doubt the level of this indebtedness in light 
of the striking parallels his Christology shares with Kierkegaard. Inasmuch as 
Barth’s Christology continues to acknowledge the dialectical fervor of veiling and 
unveiling, there remains a question as to what is exactly new here in comparison with 
                                                 
517 McCormack, A Scholastic of a Higher Order: The Development of Barth’s Theology, 
1921-31, 296. 
518 McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, 30. 
519 Ibid., 31. 
520 McCormack, A Scholastic of a Higher Order: The Development of Barth’s Theology, 
1921-31, 314-5. 
521 Ibid., 336. 
164 
 
Romans II. I will return to this discussion later at the conclusion of the examination 
of the objective possibility of revelation. 
In highlighting the differences in scope between the Göttingen Dogmatics 
and Romans II,  it is quite evident that Barth’s reading list in preparing his lectures at 
Göttingen differs greatly from the list of the “critics of Christianity” he employed in 
Romans II wherein Kierkegaard is included. Now, Barth’s reading list in preparation 
for his lectures on “Reformed Dogmatics” reveals the extent to which he was 
prepared to wrestle for the first time with the linage and development of Christian 
doctrine from the early Church and from there to the Reformation and beyond. 
Therefore, he had immersed himself in thinkers such as: “The Apologies of Justin 
and Aristide, the Octavian of Minucius Felix, Origen’s Contra Celsus, Tertullian’s 
Apology, Athenagorus, Gregory of Nyssa’s Logos Catechetikos and Augustine’s 
Enchiridion, Karl Heim, Thomas Aquinas, D.F. Strauss, Alexander Schweizer, 
Wilhelm Herrmann, and Fr. A.B. Nietzsche.”522 
  Although Barth’s lectures at Göttingen betray new considerations these do 
not alter the theological strictures shared with Romans II. Said differently, the Barth 
of the Göttingen Dogmatics, in continuity with Romans II, has retained certain 
qualifiers in articulating his newly formed relation between history and revelation. 
According to McCormack they are as follows. First, although Barth will evidence a 
new approach in speaking about revelation, in history, by means of a new 
understanding of the incarnation, his idea of the incarnation yet remains unable to be 
penetrated by historicism. What this means is that Barth has carried on his dialectic 
of veiling and unveiling.523 Thus, by means of upholding this dialectic, in his 
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revelation God is still the Subject who can never be equated, directly, to the medium, 
the object, Christ himself.  God yet remains hidden in a veil of human flesh such that 
all human capacity comes to a halt which only faith can penetrate.524 Secondly, 
revelation is such only insofar as it involves the God who speaks and the human 
subject who listens, namely, the divine and the human participation.525 And finally, 
in continuity with Romans II, revelation continues to be a-historical and 
eschatological.526  
But more importantly with regard to Barth’s expression of revelation in the 
Göttingen Dogmatics, whereas in Romans II where revelation is mainly discussed in 
terms of the resurrection in relation to Christ, Barth now speaks of revelation in 
terms of scripture and human proclamation. Barth’s extending his understanding of 
revelation to incorporate scripture and preaching does not however minimize the 
dialectical nature of revelation. The trinitarian formulation of revelation in Christ, 
scripture and proclamation exhibits yet the tension between time and eternity. With 
regard to scripture and proclamation, the IQD is made manifest in the paradoxical 
unity of God’s word and the human word. Both, according to Barth, are “God’s 
Word...given to us in the concealment of true and authentic human words.”527   
Although, Romans II attests a lack of Christological expression which lends itself to 
a very obscure and undeveloped notion of revelation, this deficiency, Romans II yet 
appears to offer the foundation for this new expression even if this foundation is still 
constrained by Barth’s consistent employment of terms such as paradox, incognito, 
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hiddenness in relation to God in Christ. And yet, interestingly, these terms persist in 
the Göttingen Dogmatics in Barth’s discussion of the Incarnation.  As we shall see, if 
one unites these terms of negation with an early Church Christology of 
anhypostasis—enhypostasis, something materializes which parallels Kierkegaard in 
ways not discussed in our examination of Romans II.  
Although Kierkegaard’s Christology may not bear the explicit marks of the 
Chalcedonian formula, this is no way detracts from its continuing parallel to Barth. 
Unlike Barth, Kierkegaard had not encountered the school of liberal theology 
wherein any discussion of revelation in Christ was given in terms of moral 
personality or ethical archetype. Rather, Kierkegaard worked under the 
presupposition of reformation theology from which he took direct aim at the efforts 
of speculative philosophy and historicism. Therefore, it was only within the context 
of the presupposition that God became human that Kierkegaard uses terms like 
paradox, incognito, indirect communication, and leap of faith.  
Again, admittedly there is a difference here in Barth’s Göttingen Dogmatics 
from that of Romans II, but what is the nature of this difference?  As I will discuss 
later on, if Barth, as in Romans II, still employs the dialectic of time and eternity with 
the dialectic of veiling and unveiling when describing revelation in history, then we 
must entertain that the difference relates merely to his conceptualizing the 
Incarnation in relation to the authority of the Church.528   
Evidencing a Problem with Kierkegaard 
Nonetheless, seeking parallels between Barth’s Göttingen period and 
Kierkegaard is itself a suspicious task in that it was during this time where Barth 
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betrays a growing suspicion of Kierkegaard. On February 15, 1925, while Barth was 
still proceeding with his lectures on Dogmatics (from the summer semester of 1924 
until the summer semester of 1925), he had reproached Bultmann “for thinking in 
terms which were too anthropological, too Lutheran, too reminiscent of Kierkegaard 
and Gogarten.”529 Interestingly, by way of a side note, Kierkegaard also criticizes 
Luther for being too anthropological, so it is strange that he should be placed with 
Luther in Barth’s criticism of Bultmann. Kierkegaard writes, “Luther is the very 
opposite of ‘the apostle.’ ‘The apostle’ expresses Christianity in God’s interest, 
comes with authority from God and in his interest. Luther expresses Christianity in 
man’s interest, is essentially the human reaction to Christianity in God’s interest.”530 
In light of Barth comments above, it is fair to say that his, 1963, firm 
rejection of Kierkegaard, Barth’s 1925 reservations about Kierkegaard, are rooted in 
the rise of the existentialist Kierkegaard, which Barth discusses in his 1923/24 
lectures on the theology of Schleiermacher. Barth’s emerging caution about 
Kierkegaard at this time, therefore, is one that inevitably resulted from his mulling 
over what he thinks problematic in Schleiermacher’s theology, namely, that it is too 
anthropomorphic.531 The connection Barth makes between Schleiermacher and 
Kierkegaard can be expressed as follows.  
 Inevitably, Barth’s thoughts on Schleiermacher’s theology foreshadow what 
will concern him later in his summer lectures, namely, the lack of a “subject-object” 
                                                 
529 Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, 161. Also note that 
in the introduction it was mentioned that in this same year appeared A. Messer’s book Søren 
Kierkegaard und Karl Barth. 
530 Kierkegaard, JP, Vol. 3, 104. 
531 Barth, in The Theology of Schleiermacher (lectures at Gottingen in the winter semester of 
1923/24) directly attributes the emergence of anthropological theology to the theology of 
Schleiermacher. However, Barth’s attributing here is one that is not aimed directly at Schleiermacher 
but rather to “a new form which accommodated itself to the ‘contemporary spiritual situation’.” See 
The Theology of Schleiermacher, 269.  
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schema in Schleiermacher. It was by virtue of this lack of subject-object distinction, 
Barth believed, that theology had gone wrong in seeking to ground itself in the 
extreme of either an objective or a subjective starting point. To solve this problem, 
Barth’s Göttingen Dogmatics seeks to articulate a relationship between a true object 
and a true subject within revelation. Barth’s problem with Schleiermacher’s theology 
is that it results in the primacy of the human subject.532  It is this same expression of 
theological anthropology which Barth thinks lies hidden in Kierkegaard.533 Even 
more, Barth questions why Kierkegaard, in his attack on rational theology, had not 
taken on Schleiermacher as well as Hegel. Barth states, 
And as to Kierkegaard, I must confess that the appeal of the existentialist theologians to 
him as their great and direct forerunner has made me a little reserved toward him. Why 
did he actually delimit himself – in his original manner, but yet also in conformity to the 
spirit of the middle of the nineteenth century – so sharply against Hegel, but hardly at all, 
to my knowledge, against Schleiermacher?”534 
 
Still, though Barth questions Kierkegaard, he at least admits that Kierkegaard’s 
theology “included concepts which Schleiermacher certainly would not have 
cherished – such as Word, encounter, occurrence, cross, decision, limit, judgment, 
etc.”535  
If Barth’s criticisms of Kierkegaard began as early as 1923, by 1925 Barth’s 
opinion of Kierkegaard’s thought was that it is too anthropological, something about 
which Barth would become increasingly suspicious. Furthermore, as we stated 
                                                 
532 Although Barth attributes the beginning of anthropological theology to Schleiermacher, 
Barth does not hold Schleiermacher fully responsible but rather faults the “new form which 
accommodated itself to the ‘contemporary spiritual situation’.” See, Barth: The Theology of 
Schleiermacher,269. 
533 Ibid., 271-77. 
534 Ibid., 271. 
535 Ibid. Barth continues stating, “There was of course the opposing theology in the 19th 
century which definitely did not originate with Schleiermacher and is not to be traced back to him. In 
relation to it we should have to talk about Gottfried Menken and J.T. Beck, Kierkegaard and the elder 
Blumhardt, the Lutheran Vilmar and the Reformed Kohlbrügge, Lagarde, and Overbeck, the younger 
Blumhardt and Hermann Kutter”, see, introduction to Barth’s Schleiermacher Lectures, XV. Barth’s 
words here evidence that, in 1923, althought he has come to question whether or not Kierkegaard’s 




earlier, it seems that in light of Barth’s correspondence with the likes of Gogarten, 
Bultmann, Heidegger and perhaps even Brunner, Barth could not reconcile himself 
with the predominant interpretation of Kierkegaard by Christoph Schrempf.536   
In sum, Barth fundamentally disagrees with the anthropological orientation of 
theology in accounting for knowledge of the self and God outside of revealed 
                                                 
536 As Schulz notes, due to Schrempf’s inadequate reading of Kierekgaard, many came to understand 
Kierkegaard’s writings (in particular the pseudonymous ones) as endorsing religious unbelief or 
scepticism, which ironically was “the very same unbelief or scepticism that Schrempf enthusiastically 
subscribes to and practices himself.” More importantly, for our discussion here, is the fact that 
Schrempf had arrived at his superficial reading of Kierkegaard due to his “radicalizing Kierkegaard’s 
principle of “subjectivity as truth”.”  The outcome of Schrempf’s reading of Kierkegaard was one that 
had minimized any interpretation of Kierkegaard which endorsed a subjective appropriation of what 
is objectively given. See Heiko Schulz, “Germany and Austria: A Modest Head Start: The German 
Reception of Kierkegaaard” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception Tome I: Northern and Western 
Europe. Edited by Jon Stewart (Ashgate, 2009), 307-387. What was Barth’s overall problem, 
specifically with the theological anthropology of these thinkers noted above? In answering this 
question, although this project does not consider the period of time between Barth’s Göttingen 
Dogmatics and the 1963 speech, much had happened in that time whereby in 1963 Barth exhibits an 
overt concern with Kierkegaard. Barth, unlike anywhere else, offers in his 1936 first part- volume of 
the Church Dogmatics, his concerns with the rise of the theological anthropology of Gogarten, 
Bultmann and Heidegger. Preceding Barth’s discussion of these figures in relation to the then-current 
fixation on theological anthropology, he first considers the return to Pietism in the wake of 
Enlightenment thought. According to Barth, the fact that Pietism calls for a personal striving with 
regard to conversion is indicative of its “idea that faith is to be decisively regarded as a determination 
of human reality.”(20) It is in connection with this orientation to the human being that Barth thinks, 
that “the anthropologising of theology was complete.”(20) Barth wonders “Whether the same is not to 
be said of the existential element which is demanded to-day from theological thinking and the 
utterance under the influence of Kierkegaard, but supremely if sometimes unconsciously in 
continuation of the Pietist tradition.”(20) Reflecting on the dangers of a theological consideration of 
existence, Barth thinks his colleagues, specifically here, Heidegger, reverse the grounds from where 
human existence is to be understood. For Barth, human existence is to be understood only in light of 
revelation, in light of the message of Scripture. (39) In combating the anthropological consideration 
of human existence prior to faith and revelation, Barth calls upon his brother Heinrich Barth in 
positing that, “Only in retrospect from revealed truth, i.e., by way of recapitulation and not 
anticipation, does the philosophical concept of existence seek to be an analogy to the knowledge of 
God. In no sense, therefore, can it be accepted as an instrument of the knowledge of God.”(39) Thus 
far, it can go without saying that from our examination of Kierkegaard’s conception of the self, as a 
self before God, Barth mistakenly questions Kierkegaard in relation to a human orientation of the self 
divorced from revelation. With regard to Gogarten, Barth thinks the problem is the same, namely, the 
human being as the starting place in relation to God.(128) Barth does tell us that Gogarten thinks his 
anthropology is one in which “man…cannot be thought of apart from the God who has united 
Himself with man in revelation, ‘from the man God became’.”(128) However, Barth is quick to point 
out that for Gogarten, “this does not mean from Jesus, from the one God-man, but from that other 
man who has ceased to be isolated vis-à-vis God and yet is not identical with the God-man.”(128) 
Against Gogarten’s further claim that man is known in relation only to the Gospel, Barth states, 
“Gogarten frequently speaks of the man who is to be understood in the light of the ‘Gospel’. Gospel 
here, however, is this revelation which is given with creation and which precedes the proclaimed 
revelation.”(129) For more on Barth’s discussion, as given above, see, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 
Vol. 1.1: The Doctrine of the Word of God, translated by G.W. Bromiley, edited by G.W. Bromiley 




revelation. Again, it must be stated that, in light of our examination of Kierkegaard, 
Kierkegaard denies both a natural theology as well as an understanding of human 
existence outside of the revelation of God in Christ. For Kierkegaard, Christ is the 
teacher and Savior who gives the individual the truth of the human condition as one 
separated from God and from within itself, along with the remedy for these 
separations.537  But even more, Barth’s diagnosis—that the modern age has 
reinterpreted the divine in Jesus as pertaining to the divine in all of us—is one with 
which Kierkegaard would agree. Kierkegaard writes,  
In the entire modern age, which so unmistakably bears the mark that it does not even 
know what the issue is, the confusion is something different and far more dangerous. By 
way of didacticism, the God-man has been made into that speculative unity of God and 
man sub specie aeterni [under the aspect of eternity] or made visible in that nowhere-to-
be-found medium of pure being, rather than that the God-man is the unity of being God 
and an individual human being in a historically actual situation.538 
 
Strangely enough, despite Barth’s reservations towards Kierkegaard’s work, his 
reposing of the question of the relation between God and humanity continued to echo 
Kierkegaard in a way which will be demonstrated in what follows.  
 
Man as His Question: Human Existence as Contradiction 
A more refined Anthropology 
In Romans II, Barth describes humanity in terms of being infinitely 
qualitatively different from God, infinitely separated from God due to sin. However, 
as noted earlier in our examination of Romans II, the difficulty with Barth’s 
description is its inability to articulate not so much what sin is but to what extent it 
                                                 
537 See Chapter One “The Self with/without Self-hood and God,” 46-50. 
538 Kierkegaard, PC, 123. Kierkegaard continues his criticism of the modern age’s attempt to 
sublate the divine and human, stating, “Does all the modern thought about the speculative unity of 
God and man, all this that regards Christianity only as a teaching, does this have the remotest 
resemblance to the essentially Christian? No, in the modern approach everything is made as direct as 
putting one’s foot in a sock—and the Christian approach is the sign of contradiction that discloses the 
thoughts of hearts.” (126) 
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relates to the individual in relation to God.539 Adding to the ambiguity of Barth’s 
understanding of sin in Romans II, humanity is there discussed in terms of the 
corporate dialectic of the old and new man rather than in terms of individual 
sinfulness, even if Barth thinks the category of sinfulness applies to the individual. In 
this light, Barth speaks of humanity as the “old Adam” and Christ as the “new” 
which appears to denote a generality of the whole of human existence in relation to 
Christ rather than the individual.  Thus, his concern in explicating the distinction 
between the old man and the new does not provide further clarity in regard to an 
account of individual existence in relation to sin and God. After all, given Barth’s 
use of a very pervasive and broad dialectic of time and eternity in Romans II, it 
seems as if his intention had been merely to separate categories between the divine 
and human rather than dissect them.   
But here in the Göttingen Dogmatics something different is present in Barth’s 
discussion of categories such as the human, sin, and God whereby he parallels 
Kierkegaard immensely. In short, there is a more definite understanding of the self as 
an individual in relation to God than that given in Romans II. This is evident in his 
juxtaposing of the individual and God, the preacher and the Word, the interpreter of 
scripture and others. For, example, when Barth addresses the confession that God’s 
Word, as given in scripture, is his Word to us, it is discussed in terms specifically 
related to the individual. Barth states, “This claim does not come collectively to 
humanity or even to Christendom but to the individual.”540 God’s Word to humanity 
is the call for individual responsibility, an act of freedom by the individual in relation 
                                                 
539 In our examination of Romans II, it was argued that Barth’s understanding of sin is that of 
human arrogance which ignores the IQD as well as human ignorance which continues to overcome the 
IQD with whatever means available, see pages 110-3 of this thesis. 
540 Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, 255. 
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to Him and his revelation. Barth states: “There is no possibility of regarding scripture 
as merely historical. There is no possibility of folding the arms and adopting the 
stance of onlookers or spectators. The only possibility is that of seriousness, of 
decision, of being taken captive, of faithfulness, of an act of supreme spontaneity.”541  
Each individual is now brought to the point of decision and responsibility 
with regard to the God-relation. But it is a relation of the individual to God which 
does not deny the individual’s relation to others. In other words, the individual must 
account for its existence as one not only before God but also among others who also 
bear this responsibility.  
This relation of one to another is a very important point for Barth, which 
should not be overlooked. Why? For Barth the problem of revelation (understanding 
what is meant in claiming that God has spoken and still speaks) is one which 
becomes wholly problematic if left to individual interpretation and isolation from 
others as interpreters of scripture. To this concern, Barth states: “Christian preachers 
are not just individuals, as Kierkegaard depicted them. They are that too – and woe to 
them if they are not – but they are not just that. In talking about God they place 
themselves in a series, on the ground of a certain piece of history, under an order.”542  
Before we commence with an examination of Barth’s affinity to Kierkegaard 
within the Göttingen Dogmatics, I must note that such an endeavor seeks not only to 
articulate the conceptual parallels here but also to conclude what we had touched on 
in our examination of the infinite qualitative difference in Romans II.  
To recall, briefly, the question pervading this project was whether or not 
Barth’s view of this concept, in both its positive and negative dimension, parallels 
                                                 
541 Ibid., 254. 
542 Ibid., 53. 
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that of Kierkegaard’s own use. We stated that, at least for the Barth of 1963, 
Kierkegaard’s IQD was understood as merely negative, one wherein, the individual 
“is caught in the wheels of a law which can only deaden and makes one sour, 
gloomy, and sad.”543  However, in light of our brief discussion of this concept in 
Romans II, as we begin, my hope is that Barth 1963 understanding of Kierkegaard 
now appears questionable. In order to bring this discussion full-circle, an analysis of 
both Kierkegaard’s and Barth’s understanding of humanity is needed. The necessity 
rests in understanding that inasmuch as the IQD is descriptive of humanity’s relation 
to God, this relation is one which is directed to humanity in their predicament of 
human sinfulness – a  predicament of contradiction of which we are culpable.  
Therefore, we shall proceed in discussing first the nature of humanity’s 
existence, namely, what it means to be “human” in both Kierkegaard and Barth’s 
thought. Second, we shall discuss what measures are taken up in both thinkers in 
addressing human existence in their contradiction. Finally, our aim will be to 
establish firmly that although both thinkers hold that human existence is one of 
sinfulness i.e. contradiction, this contradiction is one which is overcome in the 
subject’s relation to God in whom he or she comes to a true form of human 
existence. That God is the corrective for our contradiction necessarily points to the 
reality of grace given in God’s revelation offered us in Christ. This examination is 
important because it offers a corrective to the misperceived notion that Kierkegaard 
was only concerned with the individual isolated from God.544  
                                                 
543 Barth, “Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille” in the Canadian Journal of 
Theology 11:1, 1965, 6. 
544 McCormack argues that a crucial difference separating Kierkegaard and Barth lies in their 
differing concerns. According to McCormack, Kierkegaard’s concern is that “of guarding the 
subjectivity of the human individual against its absorption by the Hegelian dialectic of absolute 




Barth on the Self as Contradiction 
In continuity with Romans II, Barth still maintains that the human is 
separated from God and, as responsible for this separation, is therefore a “wanderer 
on the road and abroad.”545  But in more specific terms, Barth now extends the 
distance between God and humanity beyond the IQD to one existent within the 
human being itself, which is defined thereby as being in contradiction, existing as 
one with opposing forces of spirit and nature, finite and infinite, being and 
thought.546 Thus, the human subject, in Barth’s estimation, “is always the one under 
the almost crushing contradiction of the other, so that he cannot be glad about the 
one because of the other.”547  Barth stresses that both distances point to human 
culpability. 
Barth states that a man “cannot view the disorder in which he is entangled as 
his fate. He must view it as his responsible act, his fault.”548  Furthermore, the 
contradiction in which the individual exists is one unable to be overcome by its own 
powers or effort.549 Barth describes the self’s awareness of its own inability to 
overcome the “rift” within its existence as one in which the self suffers such 
                                                                                                                                          
human subjectivity.” See, McCormack, A Scholastic of a Higher Order: The Development of Karl 
Barth’s Theology, 1921-1931, 126. Although Kierkegaard’s dealing with human existence was a 
reaction to the Hegelianism of his day, which threatened the significance of the individual, in no way 
did he seek to establish a notion of the subject without relation to God. For more, See Karl Barth’s 
Church Dogmatics, 1:1, 40. Countering Barth’s view, see Kierkegaard’s JP 4:3902. However, given 
our examination of Kierkegaard in Chapter One, it can also be said as one with the divine subjectivity. 
What else could we conclude from his efforts to draw the limits of human reason in relation to 
revelation by means of his concepts of the IQD, paradox, indirect communication, sin, offence etc. as 
seen throughout our study? It is true that Kierkegaard is concerned with the human subject but not in a 
way different from Barth. The difference rests only within the scope of their respective project. But 
even this difference dissolves by virtue of the task they share, namely, explicating the individual’s 
relation to God. As we shall see, Barth is no different from Kierkegaard here. 
545 Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, 73. 
546 Ibid., 74. 
547 Ibid. 
548 Ibid., 77. 
549 Ibid., 75. Note this too is in continuity with Romans II. 
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knowledge. Barth states that “The real trouble is that there are always two. Man has 
an incurable wound…he suffers from the fact that he is something that has to be 
overcome and cannot be overcome,”550 and yet, “man has no possibilities in this 
direction.”551   
Just as the human possesses nothing in itself whereby the contradiction may 
be overcome, so too the human possesses no innate knowledge of this contradiction. 
The sheer inability of human effort reveals the ever-present force of the time and 
eternity dialectic which is born out of the human condition. Interestingly, so that one 
may take seriously the inadequacy of their powers concerning this matter, Barth 
articulates that contradiction is the human reality. Therefore it is not a logical 
contradiction that may be overcome. In light of the various attempts throughout 
history wherein many Christian concepts were subsumed under the powers of human 
logic in order to be explained, rationally, Barth stresses that, “It will not do to accept 
the contradiction and then to give the assurance that something which transcends it, a 
third and higher thing, a synthesis in which the antithesis can come to rest, presses 
upon us so ineluctably that we cannot avoid positing it as real and thereby overcome 
the contradiction.”552  
In fact, without running ahead of us in stating the exact parallels between 
Barth and Kierkegaard, it is quite apparent at this juncture that Barth has in mind 
Kierkegaard’s opposition to the use of Hegelian logic which, among Kierkegaard’s 
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contemporaries, sought to overcome the contradictions in Christianity, existence 
being one of them.553  Barth states: 
From a Christian standpoint the definition of man as a pilgrim is a definition of existence, 
not merely of thought…He may reflect upon his path, he may find pleasure in the tireless 
self-movement of the idea, he may erect a system of paradoxes, he may be very 
comfortable in his humanity. He can do these things, but he is not pilgrim man as he does 
so. We reach here a point at which Kierkegaard once thought that he should vindicate the 
interests of Christianity against Hegel. The relation of Hegel’s dialectic to the real 
dialectic seemed to him to be like that of Leporello with his record of his master Don 
Juan, who in constrast himself drinks and seduces and enjoys life, and hence himself goes 
to hell. The ‘himself’ must be asserted…Man is not the subject of mere discussion or 
clarification but the participant in a battle report who has just emerged from the fray.554 
 
However, for Barth, revelation presupposes the human condition as one separated not 
only within in itself but from God as well. He states: “God’s revealing of himself to 
man, his making himself known out of his hiddenness, presupposes that man is 
separated from God but should not be so…”555 Even more, if the human is to gain 
any knowledge whatsoever of their existence as one in contradiction, whereby the 
IQD is presupposed, it can only be made known to them in relation to revelation “as 
one who is addressed by God’s Word.”556   
In short, Barth wants to stress two aspects of the human existence as a 
contradiction. First, “God overcomes the contradiction by himself becoming man and 
by creating faith and obedience in us by his Spirit.”557  Without entering a discussion 
now of Barth’s richer understanding of revelation, we note that it is God who enters 
human history in the act of self disclosure and who overcomes the distance within 
ourselves and between us. But once again, lest humanity enter a dangerous relation to 
the redemptive work of Christ in history, Barth issues forth his dialectical fervour 
once more distinguishing the Christ of faith from the Christ of history. He states: “In 
                                                 
553 Strangely enough, Barth occasionally draws, in his dogmatics, on a figure who was 
attacked by Kierkegaard in seeking to overcome all such contradictions, namely, Martensen.  
554 Ibid., 77. 
555 Ibid., 72 
556 Ibid., 75. 
557 Ibid., 78. 
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my view…when all other lights have been put out, we try to retrieve the lost situation 
by bringing in a visible historical entity, Jesus of Nazareth, in which the 
contradiction is supposedly overcome.”558 Barth’s statement is given further 
clarification: outside the “Divine possibility” the historical person Jesus of Nazareth 
presents humanity with just another tool to use in their own endeavouring.  
 Even the Incarnation itself, divorced from humanity’s realization of the 
divine in the human becomes not a means of overcoming the human situation but 
rather another obstacle to transcending it.  Thus, when Barth states that the 
“contradiction is final” he means that “no word that man speaks as subject is the 
word of reconciliation, not even the word ‘Jesus Christ,’ which is not a magical 
formula. There is room for this word only when God as subject makes room for 
it.”559  
Second, due to human inability to understand its own condition or correct it, 
Barth points us to the centrality of revelation for our solution, concluding that, “We 
are forced to say that we may not and cannot understand him except in relation to 
God. If we strongly endorse this view of man in contradiction to the aforementioned 
Christian definition, then we endorse equally strongly the view that man stands 
before God.”560   
As a whole, Barth’s view of the individual can be summed up as follows. 
First, man is separated from God by an infinite qualitative difference due to sin, for 
which he is culpable and from which he also exists in a contradiction of the finite and 
the infinite, namely, in a conflict of opposing forces. Second, as one subsumed under 
contradiction and thus separated from God, man has no powers to reconcile these 
                                                 
558 Ibid., 79. 
559 Ibid.  
560 Ibid., 80. 
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forces. Third, man is aware of both the contradiction in himself and between him and 
God only by virtue of revelation, without which man is utterly helpless. Fourthly, 
man is only, therefore, truly defined when he or she is defined in relation to God who 
is able to reveal both his condition and the remedy for the condition. Finally, it is 
God’s revelation in Christ which is able to overcome the distance separating man and 
God as well as the contradiction in man, even if such a reconciliation is unknown to 
him except through the eyes of faith. Indeed, in relation to our discussion in Romans 
II, in both of these works Barth still maintains the overcoming of the abyss produced 
by human sin by means of grace, i.e. revelation.  
However, as we noted throughout our investigation of these two thinkers, the 
problem in aligning the two rests not with an interpretation of Barth but rather with 
Kierkegaard. Recall that even Barth himself reflects extreme hesitation concerning 
Kierkegaard’s theology. Nonetheless, if we bear in mind what was briefly touched 
upon in our examination of Romans II, that Kierkegaard’s dialectic of time and 
eternity is not one which is merely negative but possesses a positive factor as well, 
we are now prepared to expound this positive aspect more fully. Therefore, from our 
examination of Kierkegaard’s view of man in relation to our previous discussion of 
the IQD, we will now conclude with a summary of the parallels and differences 
between Barth and Kierkegaard from our study here.   
 
Kierkegaard and Barth on the Self 
Overall, Kierkegaard’s conception of the human being (the self or 
individual), is complex as well as highly controversial. As we noted in Chapter Two, 
the controversy relates to his understanding of “Subjectivity as the Truth.” It is this 
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specific notion whereby two years after his Göttingen lectures, Barth decided to 
move away from Kierkegaard. He states, “Because I cannot regard subjectivity as 
being the truth, after a brief encounter I have had to move away from Kierkegaard 
again.” 561  But as we noted, Barth’s understanding of this principle had been 
influenced by Bultmann and Gogarten’s interpretation of this Kierkegaardian motif. 
Furthermore, as also previously noted, the German reception of Kierkegaard was 
through the lens of Christoph Schrempf, a lens which saw nothing of the Christian 
Kierkegaard but of only Kierkegaard the sceptic and subjectivist.  
In light of the predominating interpretation of Kierkegaard at Barth’s time, it 
is no wonder that, as early as 1923, he began to reveal a one-sided view of 
Kierkegaard’s IQD as one solely negative in that it resulted in leaving the subject in 
the abyss of despair without God. However, given what we examined in Chapter 
One, in conjunction with the present chapter, this is not Kierkegaard’s true position. 
Indeed, Kierkegaard does endorse that subjectivity is truth, but if we recall, this 
phrase is one that expresses not the individual as the source of truth but rather how 
the individual should relate to truth. Even more, “truth”, in Kierkegaard’s use, is a 
discussion about the truth of Christianity and not some whim of creating one’s own 
truth.  
  Barth’s partial view of Kierkegaard’s individual, as one in despair as a result 
of the IQD is correct, but this is only half of Kierkegaard’s intention. In order to 
understand the whole of Kierkegaard’s meaning of the IQD, a more thorough 
discussion of his view of the human being, specifically in relation to God, is 
required. Therefore, from what has been stated above concerning Barth’s view of 
                                                 
561 Self Potrait, 161. 
180 
 
“man”, we will now briefly recap what has been said previously about Kierkegaard’s 
in order to better present the parallels between Kierkegaard and Barth concerning 
individual’s relation to itself and God.  
Thus far, from our Chapter on Kierkegaard, we noted the following. First, in 
SUD, Kierkegaard posits that the individual is a composite of the eternal and the 
temporal, and therefore created to be in relation to God. However, sin has caused a 
misrelation in the self’s relation to itself and to God.562  Second, in PF, Kierkegaard 
                                                 
562 Kierkegaard, SUD, 13. Here Kierkegaard is discussing his understanding of the self’s own 
knowledge of its existence as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal wherefrom a contradiction 
ensues from these two elements. Therefore, that Kierkegaard uses the word “synthesis” to denote the 
human existence and Barth “contradiction” is not indicative of a disagreement. It is as a result of this 
synthesis that the contradiction exists. It is worth noting, that the make-up of the human existence as 
consisting of these two elements does not imply that the contradiction exits by way of this synthesis. 
Rather, the eternal and the temporal in the human being  belongs to what constitutes his being, 
specifically as a creature in relation to the Creator. The opposition arising from this synthesis is 
therefore not in and of itself, but rather as a result of sin. The human, in Kierkegaard’s estimation, 
does seem to possess, at times, some sort awareness of its existence as one intended to be in relation to 
God by virtue of its own powers. And in fact, within his Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 
Kierkegaard presents, in the clearest of terms, human existence as being in contradiction and the 
repair of this existence by means of relation to God, for whom the individual was created. In light of 
having been created by God, the individual has some minute level of insight into his own inability to 
restore this relationship. His exposition of this discussion is found mostly in the two discourses, To 
Need God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection, and To Gain One’s Soul in Patience and is, in 
many ways a more developed if not at least direct discussion of the human condition in relation to 
God. For example, in these discourses, Kierkegaard describes the human condition as one in which 
the human soul “is the self contradiction between the external and the internal, the temporal and the 
eternal.” (To Gain One’s Soul in Patience, 166) This condition then lends itself for Kierkegaard to 
also describe the human condition as one wherein, due to the contradiction, the individual is in 
conflict, “wrestling” with itself. Furthermore, the only correction to this contradiction, to this 
overcoming of the inward tension, is one which the human himself cannot prescribe in that the highest 
that the human can achieve is that he is “fully convinced that he himself is capable of nothing, nothing 
at all.” (To Need God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection, 307)  And yet, according to 
Kierkegaard, “To comprehend this annihilation is the highest thing of which a human being is 
capable; to brood over this understanding, because it is a God-given good entrusted to him as the 
secret of truth, is the highest and the most difficult thing of which a human being is capable.” (309)  
The human, in Kierkegaard’s estimation, therefore does seem to possess, at times, some sort of 
awareness of its existence as one intended to be in relation to God by virtue of its own powers. 
However, if we take this subtle notion as Kierkegaard’s true intention, then it becomes inconsistent 
with what he states in SUD. Therefore, no matter what inclinations we may receive from Kierkegaard 
as to man’s own innate ability to understand its own condition as one of contradiction, his statements 
always leave us denying the human being any such ability. He states, “Thus man is a helpless creature, 
because all other understanding that makes him understand that he can help himself is but a 
misunderstanding.” (309) And lest one is convinced that Kierkegaard at least endorses some view in 
which the human self knowledge divorced from God’s revelation possesses some intrinsic ability to 
“look upward or inward”, Kierkegaard is quite clear that such knowledge is useless. He states: “All his 
self-knowledge was altogether vague, since it involved only the relation between a dubious self and a 
dubious something else.” (313) In short, if we can attribute to Kierkegaard the view that the human 
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argues against a Socratic notion of truth (that the individual has the truth within and 
needs only to be reminded of it by bringing it forth) for that of a Christian notion, 
namely, that the self is not in the truth. Kierkegaard calls this sin. Furthermore, “Man 
has to learn what sin is by revelation from God,”563 states Kierkegaard. This 
knowledge is one which is given by the Saviour, therefore, he is the one “who gives 
the condition and gives the truth.”564 Thirdly, in light of Kierkegaard’s denial of the 
Socratic notion of truth, our evaluation of Kierkegaard’s notion of subjectivity 
suggested that it is to be understood as relational rather than creative. In other words, 
our relation to God is one which has been initiated by God who gives both the means 
and the capacity to relate to him with the utmost interiority of our being. 
Again, in light of Barth’s reading of Kierkegaard, from what has been stated 
above, Barth’s reading is thus far justified. In other words, if Kierkegaard’s use of 
the IQD, is one wherein the individual “is caught in the wheels of a law which can 
only deaden and makes one sour, gloomy, and sad,”565  then Barth’s assessment is 
correct. But as we observed in Chapter One, this is not the case. 
                                                                                                                                          
possesses something of value in discerning the state of his existence it can be only the sheer 
inclination that something is not right within the self, that some sort of tension exists between a deeper 
self and the immediate self. This distinction does in fact seem to be the case. Kierkegaard does make a 
distinction between the “deeper self” and the “first self”, the immediate self. (314) Even more, this 
subtle distinction seems, for Kierkegaard, to provide the first and necessary step in the self coming to 
be a self. He states: “But even if the first self and the deeper self have been reconciled in this way and 
the shared mind has been diverted away from the external, this is still only the condition for coming to 
know himself.” (317) In short, by means of what powers the human being possesses, he can come to 
know that one needs God. “Through more profound self-knowledge, one learns precisely that one 
needs God,” states Kierkegaard. (317) But once again, even this knowledge, this “profound self-
knowledge”, is not due to the human’s own powers. If one thinks this, then, as Kierkegaard states it 
“would be essentially just a misunderstanding.” (318) Indeed, the opposition whereby the distinction 
may be posited by the human is one that is internal. But the internal voice which the human being 
hears is not one of human capability but one of incapability, in short, that he is conditioned by sin. 
(319) 
563 Kierkegaard, SUD, 95. 
564 Kierkegaard, PF, 15,17. 
565 Barth, “Thank –You and a Bow: Kierkegaard’s Reveille,” 6. 
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As mentioned, in SUD, Kierkegaard seeks to understand what it means to be 
an individual, a self. And what we found is that the self is a composite as well as one 
in despair because of this dual nature. But what about this dual nature causes the self 
to despair? To answer this question we must keep in mind some of his arguments in 
PF.  
Insofar as Kierkegaard maintains that the human condition is one of 
sinfulness there arises despair, and herein lies PF’s connection with SUD. 
Kierkegaard states, “Despair is the misrelation in the relation of a synthesis that 
relates itself to itself…if he [self] were not a synthesis, he could not despair.566 In 
short, “despair is a qualification of spirit and relates to the eternal in man.”567 First, 
according to Kierkegaard, “a human being is spirit” and “spirit is the self.”568 
However, most are unaware that they are spirit. Why? In order to be a self, to know 
that you are a self, you must be in relation to the power that has established you, 
namely God. Kierkegaard states, “The self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude 
and finitude that relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself, which can be 
done only through the relationship to God.”569  In that “despair in man is a 
misrelationship between the temporal and the eternal, of which his nature is 
composed,”570 this misrelation can only be corrected by the self’s coming into 
relation with God. 
Inevitably, if one is not aware that their nature is composed of a synthesis, 
then in no way can one begin to be a true self. In other words, if one understands 
themselves as merely temporal, then in no way would they look to the eternal in 
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themselves, to their need of the “God-relationship”. Note, the misrelation in the self 
as well as his or her inability to perceive it, is for Kierkegaard of the individual’s 
own doing, i.e., sin. He states: “How does this misrelationship happen, then? From 
man himself, who disturbs the relationship, which is precisely to despair.”571   
Even more, in order for the self to come to a knowledge of their existence as 
spirit, they must be given this knowledge. In this context, as a discussion of the 
human condition in relation to God, Kierkegaard’s PF is better understood. The self 
is in untruth. The truth of their existence, as sinful, as “disturbing this relationship” 
must be revealed to them by God. Pausing for a moment, given what so many 
perceive of Kierkegaard, as one who is concerned with the human subject in and of 
itself, his notions of sin and despair are so powerfully asserted against the individual 
in all its powers and efforts that all such assertions pertaining to Kierkegaard’s notion 
of the individual must take heed of his presentation of sin. He states: 
But precisely because no human being can by himself come to the idea that God loves 
him, in like manner no human being can come to know how great a sinner he is. 
Consequently, the Augsburg Confession teaches that it must be revealed to a man how 
great a sinner he is. For without the divine yard-stick, no human being is the great sinner 
(this he is – only before God).572 
 
In the absence of revelation, the self cannot become a self and thus does not know 
that it is in despair.  
 For Kierkegaard, the second sense of despair exists as a result of revelation. 
When the self comes to the knowledge that it is spirit, a synthesis, it perceives, for 
the first time, the IQD between itself and God and thus, again, despairs. As 
revelation makes known the infinite chasm which separates humanity and God, 
humanity despairs at the impossibility of overcoming this chasm. Left to itself, the 
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individual despairs in its inability “to will to be oneself.”573  In short, “what is 
intolerable to him is that he cannot get rid of himself,”574 no matter how hard he tries.  
At this point, the affinity that exists between Kierkegaard and Barth relates to 
their equal employment of diastasis. However, bearing in mind what was 
demonstrated in Chapter One concerning Kierkegaard’s overcoming of the IQD, the 
affinity between these two thinkers continues. 
 Earlier we noted that what Kierkegaard sought to establish was a genuine 
description of the human response to God’s forgiveness, which unaided by grace, is 
one of offence. He states: 
First of all, Christianity proceeds to establish sin so firmly as a position that the human 
understanding can never comprehend it [the negative dimension and its relation to the 
concept of revelation]; and then it is this same Christian teaching that again undertakes to 
eliminate this position in such a way that the human understanding can never 
comprehend it.575 
 
As a result of investigating Kierkegaard’s IQD in connection to the human and God 
relation, it seems that Barth’s misreading of Kierkegaard’s IQD as negative, 
inasmuch as it lacks grace, is without ground. Of course, Barth cannot be fully 
blamed for this misreading, many other factors, as we noted, are related. In spite of 
the problems revolving around Kierkegaard’s conception of Christianity, his 
employment of the IQD was intended to show the primacy of God’s grace by means 
of his portrayal of the seriousness of the human situation as utterly helpless and thus 
in need of God and his revelation. He states: 
There is an infinite, radical, qualitative difference between God and man. This means, or 
the expression for this is: the human person achieves absolutely nothing; it is God who 
gives everything; it is he who brings about a person’s faith, etc. This is grace, and this is 
Christianity’s major premise.576 
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In concluding our discussion here of Kierkegaard and Barth’s understanding of the 
human, I shall briefly outline the parallels and differences from my investigation. 
 First, both thinkers believe the human condition is one of sin. As a result of 
sin, humanity is separated from God as well as within themselves. Secondly, both 
thinkers endorse the view that only in the light of revelation can humanity be made 
aware of the effects of sin in them and in relation to God.  In light of revelation, both 
thinkers maintain that two forms of separation pertain to the individual. One form is 
the chasm separating them from God, namely the IQD. This first form of separation 
communicates that the intention of both thinkers was to relate the utter negativity of 
human existence caused by the IQD. The second form, which appears, for Barth, 
here in the Göttingen Dogmatics, is the contradiction innate within our existence, 
which Kierkegaard also affirmed.  
A third parallel is that revelation, while initially igniting our awareness of the 
negativity of our existence, offers also the corrective for our existence resulting in 
the self’s being reconciled to both itself and God. This reveals that both thinkers 
adhere to a theology of grace which rescues the individual from its despair brought 
on by the IQD. The significance given to revelation in the discussion of sin and grace 
in both thinkers rests in the nature of revelation as being God’s objective giving of 
himself in Christ. In short, the self’s separation from itself and God is overcome in 







The Objective Possibility of Revelation 
For Barth, the question of the possibility of revelation presents two problems. 
The first, Barth writes, is “How can God come to us without ceasing to be God?”577 
The second, he writes, is “How can we humans stand before God without ceasing to 
be human?”578  Both of these questions represent Barth’s present conviction that 
revelation comprises of both an objective and a subjective component, the former of 
which is under examination at present. With regard to Barth’s first question, his 
answer is “That the doctrine of the incarnation has given us an answer.”579 However, 
while offering knowledge of God, the Incarnation does not permit a moving beyond 
the barriers given to human reason and endeavour Barth had offered in Romans II 
given in the time and eternity dialectic. Therefore, I agree with McCormack’s 
position that “the eschatological reservation which, in the phase of Romans II, had 
been safeguarded by the time-eternity dialectic, was now built into the very structure 
of his Christology.”580 However, in what follows, I will argue that McCormack’s 
position, that Barth’s Christology in the Göttingen Dogmatics allows for a gradual 
doing away with the time-eternity dialectic “with no loss of the critical distance 
between God and humankind, is somewhat confused.581  
Earlier, in Romans II, Barth had attacked all human means which sought to 
eradicate this barrier, means which presupposed an unbridled access in relation to 
God. So relentless was his attack that the result is one which leaves the reader 
questioning what can, in fact, be affirmed about God. Therefore, by virtue of Barth’s 
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terminology in Romans II, coupled with the pervasiveness of the dialectics of time 
and eternity and of veiling and unveiling, the impression is that we cannot presume 
to have access to God and that we are left, in the end, without such knowledge. And 
even though Barth sought then to offer knowledge of God via the resurrection, such 
knowledge is merely ambiguous insofar as revelation is ascertained by the luminous 
power of the resurrection which casts a light backward to the contradiction of the 
cross. In Romans II, Barth states, “It [this Otherness of God’s speaking or our 
knowledge of him] is the meaning of all ecclesiastical and religious history, nay, of 
all history; meaning which, for this reason, cannot be identified with any period or 
epoch of history or even with any underlying experience in history.”582  
In that revelation assumes a dialectical relation to time, the temptation may 
arise to defer to some sort of mystical or transcendent experience, something the 
Barth of Romans II sought to eliminate.  It seems, given the lack of historicity 
Romans II presents in his conception of revelation, Barth has worked against himself. 
Therefore, after the writing of Romans II, coupled with his correspondence with 
Harnack in 1923,583 Barth realized he had, perhaps, undermined the very thing he 
was seeking to protect, namely, revelation. And yet Barth’s desire to supplement the 
obscure and intangible language of Romans II’s notion of revelation is one not 
without bounds. Barth was conscious that he could not go back and fully reopen, if at 
all, the doors of historicism which he had so forcefully closed earlier. Instead, he 
would still have to uphold the IQD between time and eternity but in a way which 
would allow full expression of the God revealed in time, an expression which, 
however, would still safeguard the divine subjectivity. In other words, as 
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McCormack notes, Barth must maintain that God is the Subject of revelation who 
cannot become a mere object.584 Therefore, as stated in the introduction to this 
Chapter, Barth’s conception of the Incarnation here in the Göttingen Dogmatics has 
its impetus from principles given in Romans II: First, God is infinitely qualitatively 
distinct from humanity.585  Second, God is not an object like that of ordinary human 
objects of perception, nor can he be.586   Third, as Subject God evades the ability of 
human reason and human effort to make him an object.587 In short, humanity, by 
virtue of its own efforts, is entirely helpless in knowing God.588   
 
God as Object in Jesus Christ 
No matter the extensive limits still given to human knowledge of God, Barth 
now affirms that in Christ God has made himself known, God has given himself as 
an intuitable object for human knowing. This given-ness is the means whereby God 
is revealed, namely, in the taking up of human flesh.  In assuming human flesh, God 
makes himself conformable to our human ways of knowing, i.e. enters into empirical 
reality. “He shows himself to us, to our eyes, our ears, our feelings, our 
perception.”589  
As stated in the Introduction to this Chapter, although I question to what 
extent Barth’s reading of Heppe has contributed to his “new” articulation of 
revelation in history, one thing is clear in this regard. Barth’s language in describing 
the Incarnation, takes on the Chalcedonian language of the hypostatic union when he 
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states, that “The real deity and the real humanity must be so united that neither can 
be changed into the other or mixed with it.”590 In this light, the dialectic of veiling 
and unveiling is given new significance by means of Barth’s re-thinking of the notion 
of the God’s assuming of human flesh as the “medium’ of revelation. Barth writes,  
I have not been talking hypothetically about a hypothetical entity but about the actually 
existent possibility of revelation, about Jesus Christ, about the way that God comes to us 
as it is known and confessed in the Christian church. I could not speak specifically about 
the condition without finally, as you have noted, adopting the terms of the Chalcedonian 
Definition, in which the church gave classical formulation, not to a deduction of Christ a 
priori, but to an account of the actual reality of Christ.591 
 
In light of the relation now between Barth’s understanding of the morph 
theou and the Chalcedonian formula, the dialectic of veiling and unveiling perhaps 
marks a point of departure from Romans II. In Romans II, the Incarnation is 
discussed in terms of human flesh as the medium, or organ of revelation but not in 
terms of revelation itself. Therefore, God in Christ is hidden and only revealed by the 
power of the resurrection whereby we are able to perceive more than mere humanity 
in Christ. However, although Barth in the Göttingen Dogmatics describes the relation 
of the divine and human in Christ dialectically, paradoxically, and thus in parallel 
with Romans II, he now affirms a far more dialectical conception of revelation: the 
divine and human are now wholly united, yet utterly distinct. He writes, “For if he 
were not wholly human, and only in his humanity the organ by which God makes 
himself perceptible, then he would not be the Revealer at all…God must really meet 
man, and that means that he himself must be truly and totally human and nothing 
else.”592   
By virtue of this formulation, Barth is able to speak more concretely about 
revelation in history. However, the concreteness with which Barth desires to speak of 
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revelation does not permit, as stated, a lessening of the IQD by which the divine 
Subjectivity remains guarded. Rather, this formulation allows for both a more 
concrete articulation of objective revelation as well as a more concrete resistance to 
merely human perceptibility. How? Barth writes, “The human being through whom 
God conceals himself and makes himself comprehensible must be no less fully 
human. The concealment must be complete, the divine incognito must be total.”593  
Therefore, although Barth writes, “The Incarnation means that God becomes 
objective and concrete, coming into history, into the circle of human 
comprehension,”594 the Incarnation also creates a problem in that “God’s Word 
becomes complex instead of simple.”595  
With these words, Barth hints at the complexity of the Incarnation as the 
solution to the problem: it provides objective knowledge of God while maintaining 
the impenetrability of his divine Subjectivity. Although affirming that in Christ, “the 
inalienable subjectivity of God conceals itself in the hard objectivity of revelation,” 
Barth nevertheless affirms that “No less impregnable [revelation], the divine 
subjectivity must still triumph as before in the human objectivity in which it has 
hidden itself.”596 As we shall now examine, the “triumph as before” denotes that 
Barth has continued with Romans II’s notion of the dialectic of veiling and unveiling 




                                                 
593 Ibid., 138. 
594 Ibid., 193. 
595 Ibid. 
596 Ibid., 138. 
191 
 
The Paradox of Revelation 
What is apparent in Barth’s Chalcedonian language is, again, his 
unwillingness to compromise the dialectical nature of revelation. The uniting of God 
and man, for Barth, “must be a striking dialectical union.”597 This means that “the 
relation must be an open and loose one inasmuch as the deity does not pass into the 
humanity or the humanity become identical with the deity.”598 The dialectical union 
of God and man is, for Barth, the key to maintaining the way in which God can both 
unveil himself for human knowledge all the while hiding himself in the veil of 
human flesh which provides the means for knowledge to begin with. Since God is 
not an object, he must become one in order to be knowable. And yet in becoming an 
object for human knowledge he remains hidden as the Subject. However, as Barth 
states, “God is hidden then, not because of the relativity of all human knowledge, but 
because he is the living God who reveals himself as he is, the triune God, 
inexhaustibly living, immutably the subject, from himself and not from us.”599  
Paralleling Romans II, the presentation of God’s revelation in Christ in the 
Göttingen Dogmatics is paradoxical by virtue, then, of the object in which God 
makes himself known. Our acknowledgment of this knowledge of God in Christ is 
therefore unlike our affirmation of everyday empirical reality. Given the paradox of 
the God-human, a mere objective adherence to revelation is impossible. Revelation 
in Christ is knowledge not directly given to human understanding and perception but 
rather indirectly given despite the divine incognito. Barth writes, “God’s revelation 
in any case means...the complete divine incognito, God’s dealings with us 
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exclusively by indirect communication.”600 As a result, Christ “must not make God 
so perceptible that anyone can see and perceive at once that here is God.”601  
Barth, despite his seeking to ground his understanding of eternity’s relation to 
time within the confines of Chalcedonian language, betrays his ongoing agreement 
with Kierkegaard with regard to the nature of revelation as being both inaccessible 
and accessible to humanity. This is evident in Barth’s use of indirect communication 
and paradox to describe both the dialectic of revelation as well as the dialectical 
relation with regard to human affirmation. Amidst his affirmation of the objective 
possibility of revelation, Barth asks us to consider its limits, objectively speaking. He 
writes, “Let us consider the paradox of this circumstance itself. This man, this man 
(we must emphasize both) is God himself who reveals God himself, who by God 
himself is revealed as God himself.”602 Moreover, in line with Kierkegaard, Barth’s 
use of the paradox of revelation prohibits a mere objective consideration of 
revelation. In other words, the paradox denies rational assent in order to welcome 
another avenue of human receptivity, namely faith, which I will discuss later. Barth 
writes, “This paradox, its radical outworking from every angle, its defence against 
every attempt to weaken it or dissolve it, became the theme of early Christian 
Christology.”603  
For Barth, even in revelation there is no lessening of the IQD between God 
and humanity. Barth states, “We have to understand and assert this qualitative 
distinction so radically that there can be no question of any erasure of the 
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boundary.”604 Whereas in Romans II the distance between God and humanity was 
maintained by the time-eternity dialectic, now, as McCormack has pointed out, the 
distance is maintained by revelation itself. Therefore, McCormack is correct in 
noting a shift in the means from which the distance is maintained. However, this shift 
does not assume a lessening of the time-eternity dialectic insofar as the Incarnation is 
the manifestation of time and eternity in time. As the eternal and the temporal, the 
infinite and the finite, the Incarnation presents the paradox to human reason and thus 
upholds the IQD. Thus, given Barth’s attempt to speak of revelation in history, 
although the means in keeping the IQD has shifted in location, i.e., the Incarnation, 
there is no shift with regard to what the Incarnation seeks to maintain, namely, the 
difference between time and eternity. In sum, now that revelation is in history, the 
time-eternity dialectic is relocated in history in safeguarding the eschatological 
reservation. 
Indeed, revelation is for Barth precisely the overcoming of the IQD which 
separates us from God. He writes, “But we must also remember the positive side that 
revelation means the overcoming of the antithesis between God and the world which 
through us is entangled in the contradiction with him.”605  However, according to 
Barth, although the barrier has been overcome in Christ, the barrier exists in Christ 
himself. In other words, by virtue of Barth’s attempt to speak more concretely about 
the reality of revelation in history, the result has been the expression of a more 
concrete notion of the barrier in history. Barth writes, “The limit that is thereby set 
for us has nothing whatever to do with a one-sided emphasis on God’s 
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transcendence, majesty, or negativity.”606 In other words, like Romans II, Barth 
maintains the IQD by virtue both of God’s unknowability as qualitatively and 
infinitely distinct and of the paradox that marks the incarnation of Christ. Barth’s 
obvious endeavour to speak of revelation in history brings us to question what this 
relation means for the historical investigation of God’s revelation in Christ.  
 
Christ and History: 
Before discussing Barth’s new articulation of revelation’s relation to history, 
I would first like to revisit Kierkegaard’s position of this relation. In Kierkegaard, the 
accidental and contingent aspects of revelation are suggestive of what type of 
relation the event of the Incarnation has to history and, specifically, historical 
investigation.  As I noted earlier, historical events in general are accidental insofar as 
their coming into existence reveals their contingency, their not being necessary. If 
something is said to be necessary it denotes that it exists and that it is therefore 
unable to come into existence in that it already exists.  Historical events are not 
necessary by virtue of their transition from possibility to actuality, in short, from 
their not existing to coming into existence. Therefore, a historical event is by nature 
an event which is not necessary. The apparent problem therefore, in speaking of God, 
who is necessary, as one who comes into existence is that either he is not necessary 
or he has not really come into history. There appears to be a tension in claiming that 
historicism cannot speak for an event which is described by Barth as possessing all 
the attributes of being historical, i.e. contingent, accidental, and concrete. This 
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paradoxical presentation of the historicity of revelation is indicative of the way in 
which revelation manifested itself historically, namely, as a paradox.   
Due to Barth’s desire to speak objectively about knowledge of God, about the 
fact that God has become an object in history, Barth had to reconsider the relation 
between history and revelation in a way that he had not in Romans II.  There, he had 
sought, with a voracious dialectic to remove knowledge of God beyond the reach of 
historical criticism in a way which compromised the adherence to historical 
revelation. But he now no longer endorses this extreme dichotomy. Why?  
 Barth had come to a deeper appreciation of the relation between revelation 
and history as a result of his study of what role the Church and scripture contribute to 
this relation.  But most importantly, what moved Barth beyond his harsh criticisms of 
history in Romans II was, as stated, his new affirmation of God in history. What 
aided Barth’s understanding of our relation to this abnormal historical event was his 
re-evaluation of the Church in terms of its authority in relation to the historical 
witness of scripture, such that scripture is the witness to God in history.  Barth 
writes, “The authority that the church grants to the historical datum is real, 
constraining authority. But this means that the historical datum as such can be its 
historical proclamation but not its source. This source, so to put it spatially, is to be 
sought further back, in a suprahistorical sphere, beyond the datum.”607 But note: 
Barth distinguishes the proclamations of the historical event from the source of the 
event.  
For Barth, the Church’s authority does not rest in and of itself but rather 
serves to affirm the historical datum whereby this distinction exists. It is scripture 
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that serves as the means whereby we have the proclamation of the historical datum 
but the historical datum itself has its source in relation to God who gives himself in 
revelation. However, scripture is nonetheless revelation insofar as it is the witness to 
the revelation of God in Christ by the Holy Spirit. Barth writes:  
Scripture as God’s Word, or of God as its author, is strictly a paradoxical one and must 
always remain so. Revelation gives rise to scripture and itself speaks in it. This is what 
makes scripture God’s Word without ceasing to be historically no more than the words of 
the prophets and apostles, sharing the relativity, the ambiguity, and the distance that are 
proper to everything historical: the letters and words are flesh.608 
 
In this statement, Barth’s use of the dialectic of veiling and unveiling, which usually 
refers to the Incarnation, now also applies to scripture as well. The authority of the 
Church is an authority given to it by scripture to which the Church recognises. As the 
historical witness to God’s revelation in Christ, the authority of scripture cannot be 
found in this historical itself insofar as history is past and, as in the confines of time, 
questionable. However, for Barth, this is not a problem. 
The ground for the authority in both Scripture and the Church rests in the 
presupposition that God has spoken. In God’s speaking, states Barth, “we are 
directed, not to God himself, but to God communicating himself.”609 However, if the 
presupposition of revelation serves as the authority for both scripture, as witness to 
revelation, and the Church as witness to Scripture, to what extent, therefore, does, or 
does not, Barth’s view of revelation in relation to history moves beyond Romans II?  
In a more direct sense from Romans II, revelation is equated with God in 
Christ, in history. However, in and of itself, the discipline of historical investigation, 
in its unearthing of the past by means of investigation, offers us nothing in regard to 
our knowledge of revelation. Note, I did not say that history cannot offer anything in 
regards to the historicity of scripture nor of the life of Jesus of Nazareth. The 
                                                 
608 Ibid., 57. 
609 Ibid., 58. 
197 
 
assumption that historicism mistakenly makes is that, by means of historical 
investigation and/or speculation, “a ramp is built so that one may easily (‘casually’!) 
climb up from the general history of spirit and religion to Jesus at the top, that is to 
revelation. We must [Barth states] smash this ramp, or at least see that revelation is 
not there at the top.”610  On the other hand, Barth yet affirms that: 
Christian revelation and Christian faith are historical. But they are not so in the way that 
is commonly depicted today. The stock phrases about a turning point in world history 
with Christ’s birth, and his supposed historical effects and impact, may well be true, but 
they have nothing whatever to do with the revelation of God in the incarnation or with 
faith in it. To me a revelation that is a turning point in world history would be too tidy a 
revelation.611 
 
So, in what sense, then, is revelation to be affirmed as historical on our behalf? Barth 
writes, in perpetuating the difference: 
Revelation and faith are historical in the NT in exactly the same sense as in the OT. They 
belong to prehistory or primal history, that is, they are historical in such a way that here, 
where it is a matter of the present or the immediate past, what has happened in time 
escapes direct observation just as much as there, where the event is still future.612 
 
Any attempt to equate mere history with prehistory is, for Barth, to erect an idol in 
the place of God.613  Given Barth’s statements thus far, the relation between 
revelation and history in the Göttingen Dogmatics still parallels Romans II to the 
extent that history provides no access in affirming revelation. Therefore, in that 
revelation is now discussed as historical and yet beyond the reach of historical 
investigation, there appears to be a dialectical notion of revelation as being both a 
relaxing and a heightening of human accessibility in knowing God. 
In sum, historical investigation and human rationality are useless in 
permitting us knowledge of God in Christ. Furthermore, as in Romans II, Barth 
maintains scepticism towards historical endeavours in general, insofar as history is 
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past and therefore denies an immediate relation to those events. And yet, an account 
must be given for the sheer opposition between history and revelation in that Barth 
would not deny that humanity had more accessible knowledge to history, in general, 
than to the historicity of the Incarnation.  
By means of this dialectical relation of relaxing and heightening the tension, 
Barth can, in accord with Romans II, yet affirm God’s revelation in history, but as an 
event from eternity, it is “qualified” history.614 What Barth means by “qualified” is 
that there are two things we can affirm about the life of Jesus but that each 
affirmation is grounded differently. What this means is as follows. First, insofar as 
we affirm the Incarnation we thereby affirm that it has taken place in the person 
Jesus of Nazareth. Historically, Jesus appears like any other human being of flesh 
and blood. Thus, the first affirmation is that Jesus of Nazareth is believed to have 
been a historical figure no different from anyone else in history. Therefore, the claim 
that someone once lived can be either affirmed or denied by historical report or 
investigation. Hence, here we have the first affirmation which is that Jesus of 
Nazareth was indeed a person who lived in first century Jerusalem.  
A report of this kind is not controversial and demands no higher assent then 
that of the historical. However, what Barth also wants to affirm is something which 
transcends a mere historical witness to the historical existence of the person of Jesus 
of Nazareth, namely, that in this historical person God entered time. Thus, the second 
affirmation, that God has become a historical figure, transcends our first affirmation 
insofar as it transcends historical investigation and human reason. So, the Incarnation 
is qualified history in that it is both historical and unhistorical. In other words, the 
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medium of human flesh permits Barth simultaneously to express that in this object of 
human flesh, God is both hidden and revealed; God has overcome the barrier of time 
and eternity and yet has maintained it.  This point should become more evident 
throughout my discussion here, especially when I come to discuss the historicity of 
the Incarnation in relation to Barth’s use of contemporaneity and indirect 
communication. 
 
Indirect Communication and Contemporaneity 
 Since, for Barth, God’s revelation is his communication to humanity but a 
communication which is incognito, hidden by means of the medium of flesh in Jesus, 
God’s revelation is therefore indirect communication. In speaking of this indirect 
means of revelation, Barth writes:  
I know that I can never directly communicate that about which I speak, that I can never 
set it before my hearers as a given thing, that on pain of complete failure from a Christian 
standpoint, I can never even make the attempt to enforce direct communication 
…because this is a denial of revelation, which is always the disclosing of something 
hidden by God himself, the direct communication from one person to another of 
something that is already disclosed, of a mystery that is no longer a mystery.615 
 
Barth seeks to emphasize the total uselessness of human speech to unveil what God 
has hidden. Even more, to deny the hiddenness of God’s revelation in Christ is, for 
Barth, a denial of revelation itself. Given the problem of the certainty of history, 
insofar as history is already past, coupled with the paradox of the God-man, it 
appears that a direct communication is highly undermined if not wholly impossible 
in this respect.  
Although we, in the present, are unfortunate as to be so far removed from the 
historical event of the life of Christ, would not, however, Christ’s contemporaries 
fare much better in perceiving God in history? Barth asks: 
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The question is whether we do well to establish contemporaneity by ignoring or setting 
aside the problem of time, the ugly ditch, or whether the temporality of revelation does 
not work itself out and reflect itself in the recognition of a temporality conditioned form 
of the communication of revelation too. The question is whether in the form of a sure and 
self-established  and triumphant church we can make revelation in concealment into 
open, direct, and unequivocal revelation, or whether there is not a connection between the 
inalienable concealment of revelation and a time-related, historical form of its historical 
propagation and communication to later generations, an unforgettable and unavoidable 
connection between the cross of Christ and the necessary distance that the church of 
Christ must keep from the normative historical principle that gives it birth.616 
 
Barth’s words here are reminiscent of the problem of historicism which he addressed 
in Romans II. For Barth, this problem is still an important one and therefore his 
question should be taken seriously in light of the era in which he lived. Could not the 
efforts of eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century theology be seen as seeking 
to make the inaccessible, the indirect knowledge of God, accessible and direct? Even 
more, for Barth, the outcome of the Christology of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Harnack, 
and Herrmann reflect the problem to which he asks this question concerning the 
dubiousness of historical endeavours.  
Barth’s questioning of the limits of historicism necessitates his wrestling 
with, not only the nature of our present relation to the historical event, but also the 
relation of the historical contemporary to the event of the incarnation. Not only is 
Christ the indirect communication of God, but so too is scripture insofar as it is the 
historical witness to revelation and therefore is itself revelation. And just as Jesus 
Christ exists as both historical and divine, so too is scripture the record which is both 
historical and divine. Barth describes this relation between Christ and scripture as 
revelation in an indirect form stating: 
To say that scripture is God’s Word is to say that we do not know Christ outside or 
alongside scripture but only in scripture. We also know nothing about the Holy Spirit 
apart from scripture. We know nothing about a church where there is no scripture…There 
is a beyond in scripture. This is the Word of God, namely, revelation. But we must insist 
that revelation meets only indirectly, only in scripture…”617 
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And the authority of the Church can do nothing to remove the indirectness of God’s 
revelation.  
Therefore, for Barth, the only means whereby we become a contemporary 
with Christ is the Holy Spirit.618 And I must point out, that although Barth again 
appears critical of historicism in relation to revelation, he yet believes, as he did in 
Romans II, that “the act of historical observation is essential. It is the basis of 
knowledge of scripture.”619 
All Barth is doing is articulating the limits of a historical investigation of the 
Incarnation. In fact, with regard to our interpretation of scripture, Barth believes, “the 
sharpest historical observation and the most intensive thinking after and thinking 
with do not help me at all if first and last there does not enter in something of this 
identification between me and the author, the author and me.”620 For Barth, this 
relating of the individual and the author is a process whereby a shift takes place from 
a merely empirical and reflective sphere into an existential sphere. As a result of this 
shift, Barth states that the “historical distance and conceptual abstraction are 
overcome.”621   
Barth’s point here is tricky and one wonders, given his Kierkegaardian 
language, to what extent Kierkegaard would have agreed with Barth, that historical 
distance is overcome? It is important to remember that this movement, this relation 
between the authors of scripture and the reader is one conditioned in faith. 
Understood this way, Kierkegaard would bear no ill-will to Barth’s overcoming of 
the historical separation. Nonetheless, Barth offers us caution in regard to placing too 
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much significance on this immediacy which overcomes the gap between the past and 
the present. He states:  
We must consider that the ‘nevertheless’ or limitation which has to be set over against the 
freedom of the individual as well as the authority of the church is valid and efficacious 
only if it does not come from the world, from the outside, in this case from a human 
authority but from the source or origin of freedom, so that freedom is held in check by 
freedom…All freedoms have their source here [in the Spirit]. They also have their limit 
here. Freed from the freedom of God, all of our freedoms become irrelevant and 
meaningless liberalism, subjectivism, or spiritualism.622 
 
What Barth raises here is the question as to the benefits of being a contemporary with 
Christ, which is a question related to the impenetrability of revelation. In other 
words, would not Christ’s contemporaries have been ones who were confronted with 
direct communication rather than indirect insofar as they were historically related to 
the event? Even more, were not the apostles and those who followed Christ direct 
witnesses to the God-man and his miracles?  
If historical contemporaneity was beneficial in detecting the God-man then 
historical investigation itself exists quite substantiated in this regard, even if it is a bit 
inhibited by the issue of the historical gap. Barth’s answer to such considerations, 
which present the possibility that the historical contemporary of Christ had access to 
a more direct communication, is an adamant no! He writes: 
The gap between them [NT Apostles] and revelation is no less great than that between 
Moses and revelation, nor is their closeness to it any greater than his. The content of the 
years A.D. 1-30 certainly has the significance of the decision concerning the objective 
possibility of revelation and therefore faith. But the question of earlier or later, of greater 
or smaller distance from this period, has no decisive importance, no importance in 
principle, either for revelation or for faith. Those who think that it has, those who think 
that we have revelation in direct communication in this background, or at least in the NT, 
in historical proximity to Jesus, in the radius of his historical action, in the history that 
came under the influence, have removed in part at least the hiddenness of God and 
changed it into a simple revealedness.”623 
 
Thus Barth asks and answers: 
What is the direct communication that the first disciples have, according to the 
Synoptics? Obviously this, that after the brief shining of a new and strange and 
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uncomprehended light in the one whom they followed, they experienced a swift and 
dreadful catastrophe, the end result being that they ‘all forsook him and fled’.”624 
 
Without regard for time or place, God’s revelation is, for Barth, his “revelation in his 
concealment, the complete divine incognito, God’s dealings with us exclusively by 
indirect communication.”625 In sum, “indirect communication means God’s 
incarnation.”626  In short, the tension in Romans II between time and eternity is 
relocated in the Göttingen Dogmatics in revelation by virtue of its being in history.  
Since Barth now, as I stated, offers a truly objective form of revelation, he 
reveals that he has come to terms with the relation of revelation to history. As a 
result, he has to now, like Kierkegaard before him, address both the inaccessibility 
and the accessibility of historicity in a much more delicate fashion. Barth can no 
longer, with such dialectical fervour, maintain a one-sidedness which paints the 
Incarnation in ambiguous strokes. Therefore, like Kierkegaard, Barth has now to 
discuss those terms which previously related negatively to history as a whole in 
connection with the Incarnation; terms such as “indirect communication”, “paradox”, 
“unhistorical”, “contemporaneity”, “faith” and “offence”. With the Göttingen 
Dogmatics, all such terminology thus requires re-evaluation. And here, I believe, lies 
the difference and the significance in Barth’s new Christology.  
Earlier, in the Introduction, I questioned what was new in Barth’s Göttingen 
Christology as a result of his reading Heppe. I agree that Barth’s reading of Heppe 
has provided him with the means to conceptualize a fresh take on revelation, a new 
way of conceptualizing the God-human. The Barth of Romans II does not differ from 
the Barth of the Göttingen Dogmatics in terms of affirming the divinity of Christ, the 
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revelation of God in history, even if these were highly undeveloped in the former. 
However, as a result of the Chalcedonian formula of hypostatic union [note that the 
anhypostasis-enhypostasis distinction is not Chalcedonian but post-Chalcedonian], 
Barth was in a better position to be able to conceptualize the relation between the 
human and divine in Christ and from there to conceive of the relation between 
history and revelation. And given Barth’s highly Christological, Chalcedonian 
language in the Göttingen Dogmatics in addressing the issue of our knowledge of 
God, this seems likely. Notice Barth’s own language, “I could not speak specifically 
about the condition without finally...adopting the terms of the Chalcedonian 
Definition, [the] classical formulation...”627  Barth provides us with another example 
of his coming to construe Kierkegaardian concepts such as the IQD in dialogue with 
Church tradition. It is clear that in Romans II, Barth had found the concept of the 
IQD in Kierkegaard. But now, in the Göttingen Dogmatics, Barth writes,  
If we grant the first Christians one little thing, namely, that they understood the 
distinction between God and man qualitatively and thus posited it as infinite, then we 
have to concede that we do justice to their thinking only if we see that this first or last 
step of their Christology, whether it moved from below to above (adoptionism) or from 
above to below (hypostatizing), this first or last step in which they equate unequal things, 
precisely in its enigmatic and severely paradoxical nature, is the point of the twofold 
movement of thinking.628 
 
Again, Barth’s words here betray that he sought to understand what he holds 
necessary to understanding the relation between God and humanity, i.e., the IQD, as 
located even in the earliest Christians. But Barth had already explicitly invoked both 
the Nicene Creed and Chalcedon in Romans II. In speaking to the dialectic of God 
and man in Christ, Barth writes,  
He is ‘begotten not made’—that is, He is contrasted with every creature familiar to us. 
Therefore, He is ‘born of the Virgin Mary’—that is, He is our protest against assigning 
eternity to any Humanity or Nature or History which we can observe. Therefore, He is 
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‘very God and very Man’—that is, He is the document by which the original, lost-but-
recoverable union of God and man is guaranteed.”629 
 
Looking to Kierkegaard, his Christology is one which apparently endorses the 
union of the divine and the human, hence the paradox, hence the absurdity. Barth’s 
own Christological expressions also manifest the same endorsement. Indeed, Barth 
could not have gained the Christological development he expresses in the Göttingen 
Dogmatics from Kierkegaard. But this is not to say that the beginnings were not there 
in Romans II but only that Barth had yet to find a way to articulate this union 
conceptually. This is where Heppe was useful.  
Therefore, Barth’s indebtedness to the early Church formulations is more in 
light of his attempt to provide new grounds whereby he could understand the relation 
by means of the old grounds. What I think Kierkegaard offers Barth, then, beyond 
the early and reformed Church means of articulation, is the means whereby he could 
discuss the relation of the incarnation to history itself. One could say that 
Kierkegaard himself relied heavily on this same ground, given his readings of the 
early Church Fathers, specifically Athanasius who maintained God’s revelation in 
Christ as being God’s incognito.630 However, given that Barth had already employed, 
in Romans II and in the Göttingen Dogmatics the dialectic of veiling and unveiling, 
his debt to Kierkegaard is evident. And this being the case, those concepts which 
Barth equally employs in both works should lead us not to an over appraisal of the 
influences of the early Church but perhaps a renewal of Kierkegaardian content, even 
if the form is the traditional language of the early church.  
In conclusion of this section, I would like to offer some statements by both 
Kierkegaard and Barth which reveals Barth’s reliance on Kierkegaardian content 
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concerning the accessibility of human knowledge of the historicity of the 
Incarnation, before moving on to discuss the subjective possibility of revelation. 
First, Barth states: “This paradox, its radical outworking from every angle, its 
defence against every attempt to weaken it or dissolve it, became the theme of early 
Christian Christology.”631 Furthermore, Barth states, “The life of Jesus does not itself 
impart the knowledge of God. In itself it is a riddle, a mystery, a veiling…All the 
contemporaries of Jesus, including his most intimate disciples, finally took offense at 
him.”632 Kierkegaard states, “The paradox is composed in such a way that reason has 
no power at all to dissolve it in nonsense and prove that it is nonsense; no, it is a 
symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle about which reason must say: I cannot solve 
it, it cannot be understood, but it does not follow thereby that it is nonsense.”633   
For both thinkers, Christ as “Paradox” describes the inability of human 
thinking to either to claim the Incarnation as nonsense or to seek to prove it as such. 
Neither approach to the paradox is optional; both thinkers maintain that the life of 
Jesus is a riddle. Even more, both thinkers address not merely the inability of 
historical investigation to know God in Christ but also the inability of those who 
were direct/historical contemporaries with Christ to observe anything more than a 
man by whom they were offended and whom they eventually forsook. Thus not even 
a direct, historical encounter with the Incarnate God is useful; in fact, the possibility 
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The Subjective Possibility of Revelation 
Introduction: Observations 
 When I began the discussion of the objective and subjective possibility of 
revelation, I presented two questions which Barth thinks succinctly characterize the 
problem of revelation. The first question has to do with the objective possibility of 
revelation to which Jesus Christ is the answer. In the historical, objective medium of 
Jesus Christ, God has communicated himself to us, in short, “objectively, the 
incarnation of the Word is the condition under which revelation takes place.”634  The 
second is, “How can we humans stand before God without ceasing to be human?”635 
This question arises in the midst of Barth’s conviction that “We have no organ by 
which to receive God’s revelation...we have no quality, capacity, or possibility 
whereby to stand before God.”636  
Although the Göttingen Dogmatics does seek to present knowledge of God as 
objective, in a way unseen in Romans II, due to Barth’s even more intense dialectic 
of revelation in Christ, it would appear thus far that the human situation is at a loss. 
However, this is not the case insofar as Barth does hold that God can be known in 
Christ, in other words, that the human subject is able to come to knowledge of the 
hidden God in Christ by faith. Faith, as the means whereby we relate to knowledge of 
God is a point of parallel between Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics. And yet, 
given the historicity of revelation in Christ offered us in the Göttingen Dogmatics, 
this point of parallel is also a point of departure; this is how.  
In Romans II, the human subject knows revelation by faith, but faith in what? 
Stated differently, the mysteriousness of revelation in Romans II, insofar as it heavily 
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evades historical concreteness, results in an ambiguity in what we are, in fact, 
responding and relating to. But, in the Göttingen Dogmatics, this ambiguity no 
longer exists, at least, not in the sense of the “where” and “what” of revelation. On 
the contrary, the necessity of a clearer human relation to revelation is evident here 
insofar as Barth notes: 
If we have been right about the objective revelation of God in the incarnation of God, 
then obviously there can be no question of an immediate or direct relation to God in this 
subjective possibility either. The incarnation means that God becomes objective and 
concrete, coming into history, into the circle of human comprehension.637 
 
The question Barth posits is this, if we can say that God has revealed himself, has 
become an intuitable object for human knowledge and yet maintains that this 
knowledge is left unknowable, then whence the claim on behalf of the individual that 
God is known?  
For Barth, the objective possibility of revelation is the incarnation and “the 
subjective possibility of revelation is human receptivity for it.”638 In short, 
subjectively, “revelation is not without human faith and obedience.”639  Of course, 
there are some obstacles to overcome in this discussion of the subjective possibility 
of revelation. First, what demands our attention is the possibility of the human 
response, meaning, by what means or power can the human subject affirm 
knowledge of God in Christ? This question is important in light of the degree to 
which Barth had, earlier in Romans II, limited human ability in affirming knowledge 
of God. Second, in light of Kierkegaard interpretation, a discussion of Barth’s view 
of the human response is not problematic as is a discussion of Kierkegaard’s view of 
this same notion. In other words, any discussion of human possibility trends the 
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dangerous line of stepping too closely to an affirmation of the human subject in and 
of itself, divorced from God’s grace. Therefore, in light of these problems, I intend to 
do the following.  
First, I shall discuss how the human subject relates to the incarnation, 
meaning, I will note that although there are two possible reactions to the incarnation, 
namely either faith or offence, it is only faith which overcomes the hiddenness of 
God in Christ. I will discuss both of these reactions. Second, I will note that Barth 
here offers us a far more active role in our relating to God in faith than that in 
Romans II, a role that parallels Kierkegaard’s notion of subjective appropriation. And 
finally, I will conclude by giving some parallels between Barth and Kierkegaard in 
relation to the concept of faith as subjectivity here in the Göttingen Dogmatics. 
 
Recipients of Revelation  
As I begin this examination, allow me to offer Barth’s own questioning and 
problems in regard to the subjective possibility. Thinking over our relation to 
revelation, Barth asks, “Let us presuppose that it really is Jesus Christ or revelation 
that is mediated to us; the question then arises how we know this, how are we to 
recognize it.”640 He adds, “How can God come to us without ceasing to be God?”641 
For Barth, if the human subject was not able, by any means, to recognise revelation, 
then revelation would itself be cancelled out. And yet, Barth does presuppose that 
revelation has come to us. So, why is Barth concerned with the question of 
recognition in relation to revelation?  
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The reason is that when we address the question of human knowing we 
inevitably address the nature of human reason. As rational creatures, reason is the 
sole means in understanding, communicating, and knowledge. In other words, we are 
creatures, by means of reason, who make judgements about ourselves and the world. 
We are creatures who acknowledge or create norms from which we affirm what is 
knowable and what is not. Therefore, concerning the Incarnation, we have before us 
a human being who claimed to have been God and reason is immediately active in 
evaluating this claim.  
The problem for Barth, therefore, is reason itself. For Barth, since reason is 
fallen, any assertion made by it as to what it can and cannot know is highly 
questionable. Even more, by virtue of its own conditions, reason is limited to 
knowledge of the empirical realm. Stated differently, though objects for human 
knowledge are generally accessible, revelation has appeared in a manner in which the 
object of which we can claim knowledge has in fact hidden what is essentially to be 
known. In respect of this, Barth writes,  
Reason comes into play, not the reason beyond whose limit we are carried as in faith, but 
the reason whose limit is definitively set for us: revelation in concealment, the crucified 
Christ, the strange work of God, the possibility of offence and despair.642   
 
In short, the Incarnation affirms our very limits. It is important at this point to recall 
that, for human reason, the Incarnation is a paradox, a mystery, a riddle. And here, in 
light of the limits of reason in relation to the paradox, Barth notes that the inevitable 
human response to this paradox of the God-human is offence.  
According to Barth, the human reaction of offence is the natural result of the 
form in which God has chosen to reveal himself, namely as a human being.643  
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Therefore, in light of the inevitable result of offence in relation to the Incarnation, 
Barth writes that “God will have to bear and fill and make good our human 
incapacity by the capacity, the sufficiency, the adequacy which can be present only 
in God himself for God himself.”644 Only then, Barth adds, will there be “revelation, 
that is, the establishment of fellowship between God and us by God’s communication 
to us. Revelation will then be subjectively possible, that is, from the standpoint of the 
recipients.”645   
However, before moving on to discuss the means by which we are able to 
affirm knowledge of God in Christ, Barth wants both to offer the highly negative 
aspect of the incarnation for human knowing and, at the same time, to note how this 
aspect serves in grounding, not discovering, knowledge of God, namely, it is 
scripture which serves as the ground wherein we find revelation and thus relate to it 
in faith. Anticipating the relation of Scripture to knowledge of God, Barth states:  
If we are not to pursue a theology of glory, then a real, authenticated, and incontestably 
superior mediation of revelation which finally answers the question of truth must stand so 
much above history that in keeping with the concealment of revelation and the cross of 
Christ, as the mediation of revelation and full of the divine mystery, it stands in history 
itself. What is demanded at this point is precisely a relative historical entity, that is, 
human beings and their human words. To eliminate this contingent entity which gives 
such urgency to the question of faith or offence would be equivalent to eliminating the 
concealment of revelation and therefore revelation itself.646 
 
Scripture, which is revelation only insofar as it bears witness to revelation, is the 
“contingent entity” wherein we encounter knowledge of God in Christ. At this 
juncture, in noting the role of scripture in relation to revelation, Barth has 
simultaneously doubled the barrier in making impossible a direct relation to knowing 
God.  
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As I observed earlier, the barrier to our knowledge of God is the means of 
God’s revelation, namely, a human being in the first century. Thus, here we have 
God’s direct communication to humanity indirectly. However, as I noted above, 
history offers its own limits to our acquiring of historical knowledge any witness to 
the past is problematic in regard to its certainty. Moreover, I posited that, even 
though a contemporaraneous account of a historical event might suggest a bit more 
certainty, insofar as the account stands in direct relation to the event, Scripture 
eliminates this level of certainty with regard to what it is recounting, namely, God in 
history. Thus Scripture is indirect accounting for revelation not only as being a 
historical account of revelation but also in what it records.  
Scripture is, however, the only place wherein we know Christ, in the sense of 
a starting point and not in the sense of affirming that God is knowable in Christ.647 In 
short, Scripture, not human feeling, culture, or even theology, is the place wherein 
we find knowledge of God in Christ. But, it seems that our accepting of God in 
Christ is impossible and therefore offence is the only response in light of all such 
barriers.  
Nonetheless, Barth wants to remind us that all such talk of human 
impossibility and limitation indicates how we are to affirm knowledge of God amidst 
the contradictions. Insofar as the limiting, irrational element exists in us, Barth 
claims that “The irrational element in us is a salutary reminder that in face of 
revelation the point is not to grasp but to be grasped.”648  And now I come to stating 
the means whereby humanity may affirm knowledge of God in Christ which is posed 
in a contradiction of offering real objective knowledge and yet knowledge which is 
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hidden. The means in overcoming the hiddenness whereby revelation is indirect in 
Christ is the receptivity of this knowledge by God’s gift of faith which births the 
ability to “see” God in Christ. In short, what Barth offers is that “in faith we have to 
do with revelation in concealment.”649   
Additionally, Barth adds, “Just because revelation is given contingently in 
Jesus Christ, but given therefore in concealment, the faith that grasps and affirms it is 
a leap in the dark and never ceases to be so.”650  Note, faith described here as a leap 
also parallels Romans II. Therefore, the subjective possibility of revelation, the 
possibility of our receiving and affirming what we cannot, takes “the form of faith 
and obedience.”651  And faith, as the means whereby we perceive God in Christ, is 
one that unites us, at present, to those of the past, including the contemporaries of 
Christ. “Thus the way to it [God in Christ] is just the same now as it was then. It is 
the way of revelation and faith alone.”652   
Moreover, and here is the crux of the matter, Barth argues that it is the Holy 
Spirit who is responsible for creating in us the ability to both perceive and receive 
God’s revelation in Christ.653  Concerning this Barth states, “Apart from this reality 
of the Holy Spirit, the construction of the subjective possibility of revelation is a 
bridge that ends in the void.”654  And similarly, Scripture, “its self-evidence, that in it 
which enforces authority, corresponding to the basis of faith and obedience, is itself 
spirit. By the Spirit scripture bears witness that it is God’s Word.”655   
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Faith as Subjectivity 
By faith we come to accept scripture as God’s Word and therefore as true 
witness to God’s revelation in Christ. Note, Barth’s insistence that faith is God’s 
doing, not ours, aligns itself to his understanding of faith as offered in Romans II. 
Thus for Barth, “the words ‘being,’ ‘becoming,’ ‘child,’ ‘servant,’ ‘faith,’ and 
‘obedience’ say nothing about a quantitative or qualitative enrichment, enlargement, 
development, or out-working of man and his situation. He is man, and he remains 
man at every point and according to all the definitions.”656  However, although 
Barth’s description of faith is the same in both Romans II and the Göttingen 
Dogmatics, to the extent that it points to the primacy of God as the one from whom 
we receive faith, there is a difference between these two works with regard to how 
faith is actualized in the human subject.  
In Romans II, faith is described ambiguously by virtue of the lengths to which 
Barth goes in order to eradicate all human possibility. And yet, although the reality 
of faith is, in both works, completely removed from human possibility, the Göttingen 
Dogmatics develops the reality of faith by means of discussing it in terms of human 
actualisation and response. Thus, here, in the Göttingen Dogmatics, Barth moves 
beyond Romans II in affirming two descriptions of faith, one representing true faith 
and the other not.  
First there is an objective adherence which denotes a sheer lack of concern or 
ambivalence with regard to Christian living: this is not true faith. Second, there is a 
subjective appropriation which is true faith inasmuch as the only response to God’s 
revelation can be a passionate interest in light of the risk tied to believing what is 
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unbelievable. Thus, for Barth, “In this relation we cannot be mere objects. We must 
be just as self-conscious subjects as God himself is…we must be actors in the 
relation.”657  The significance of this distinction is that, according to Barth, God’s 
Word as given in scripture is his Word to humanity, but specifically his Word to the 
individual. Thus God’s Word in scripture is his address to the “I.”  As Barth states, 
“this claim does not come collectively to humanity or even to Christendom but to the 
individual.”658 It is God’s call for individual responsibility, for an act of freedom by 
the individual. Barth states: “There is no possibility of regarding scripture as merely 
historical. There is no possibility of folding the arms and adopting the stance of 
onlookers or spectators. The only possibility is that of seriousness, of decision, of 
being taken captive, of faithfulness, of an act of supreme spontaneity.”659  
In short, for Barth, knowledge of scripture involves the act of the individual 
who “thinks with” and “thinks after” in relation to other individuals, i.e., a 
community of interpreters of scripture. As a whole, Barth’s understanding of the role 
of the individual in relation, not merely to scripture, but to Christianity is indeed 
reflective of Kierkegaard. Even more reflective of Kierkegaard is Barth’s demand for 
individual decision against sheer objective adherence or “folding of the arms.” It is 
also important to note that, for Barth, the demand for faith in perceiving the hidden 
God is one which exists not as an irrelevant hiccup resulting from the discrepancies 
between reason and revelation. On the contrary, since God’s revelation necessitates 
God’s becoming objective, which in turn results in hiddenness, faith exists as the 
required response; concealment demands faith alone in order to pierce it.660 
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It is important to note that since Barth discusses the subjective possibility of 
revelation in terms of both faith and obedience this marks his intention to steer away 
from Lutheran dogmatics.661 This is important in that since Barth is Reformed and 
Kierkegaard Lutheran, it would seem that here these two thinkers’ might part ways. 
However, this is not the case. Both Kierkegaard and Barth offer criticism of the 
devaluing of Christian obedience in the Lutheran tradition. For Kierkegaard, Luther’s 
over emphasizing that salvation is by “faith alone” resulted in asceticism. He writes, 
“The Lutheran emphasis on faith has now simply become a fig leaf for the most 
unchristian shirking.”662  
As for Barth, he believed both Luther and Lutheranism fail to emphasise the 
importance of obedience in response to revelation and instead over-emphasise 
faith.663 In Barth’s estimation, an over-emphasising of faith poses the dangerous 
tendency to view faith in terms of inaction rather than of action. “We cannot have 
knowledge in relation to God without action” writes Barth.664  He adds, “God does 
not only justify sinners, but in a parallel and simultaneous and not a dependent action 
he also sanctifies them...With the need for faith there arises the need for repentance, 
for obedience, for the Christian life.”665 Furthermore, in light of the fact that 
“objective revelation in the incarnation is not direct revelation but revelation in 
concealment”666 Barth maintains that there arises an offence to reason which can 
only produce an active faith. In fact Barth thinks that the relation between God and 
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the individual who responds in faith and obedience will be one which consists in “a 
conversation, a drama, a struggle.”667  
Reflecting Kierkegaard’s own discussion of the struggle of faith in Fear and 
Trembling, Barth writes, “It has to be a wrestling like that of Jacob in which we must 
risk being lamed so long as we insist that we will not let God go unless he blesses us 
[Gen. 32:25ff.]. Each moment must be unique and nonrepeatable, for our other 
partner is God and he demands that we hazard our whole existence.”668 For Barth, 
“Revelation can be subjective only in full action.”669 Interestingly, Barth offers a 
point of clarification with regard to his use of subjectivity. He earnestly seeks to note 
that the subjectivity demanded by revelation is one which is responsive and not 
creative in relation to revelation and what God demands of us. Referencing 
Schleiermacher as an example of an incorrect notion of subjectivity, Barth writes, 
“Here [with Schleiermacher] instead the subjective possibility of revelation is that we 
grasp the divine subjectivity and ascribe it to ourselves.”670  
In conclusion, Barth believes that even though God’s revelation is one that is 
incomprehensible and therefore unable to be conceptualized adequately, he 
nonetheless believes that “revelation is God’s entry into the world of 
conceptuality.”671 Thus, Barth states: “The inconceivable God has come into the 
world of human conceptuality. What can all concepts of God be but elucidations of 
his inconceivability?”672 Therefore, Barth’s dialectical conception of revelation here 
is not accidental insofar as the dialectic exists in order to be comprehended by faith, 
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revelation thereby avoiding the scrutiny of reason. This means that Barth wants to 
maintain that God has become an object for human knowing, but that this knowing is 
only possible in light of God who gives faith whereby humanity, as the recipient of 
faith, knows God. Not to mention, this knowledge is one which for Barth is active 
and living. It is a faith actualized in the human response of obedience and living in 
relation to the object of revelation. Insofar as this object hides God from human 
perception, the human response of faith and obedience expresses the most subjective 
aspect of human existence. Due to the hiddenness of God’s revelation in the medium 
of human flesh, human concepts cannot have direct access to the object itself, i.e. the 
Son of God. Thus, by virtue of faith, human knowledge claims the revelation of God 
hidden in Christ. “In faith” Barth states, “we should speak of God.”  That outcome of 
Barth’s use of what appears to be a Kierkegaardian dialectic of revelation is one 
intended ultimately, as McCormack has stated, to guard the divine subjectivity.  
However, inasmuch as the object itself, Christ, appears under the category of the 
human being, God is hidden and thus remains subject. “Precisely, as subject, 
precisely in revelation, God is concealed from us.”673  
And so here, with the dialectic of veiling and unveiling, Barth of the 
Göttingen remains the Barth of Romans II. Even more, Barth of Romans II and 
Göttingen bears a strong affinity to Kierkegaard’s own use of the dialectic of veiling 
and unveiling. The differences between the Barth of Romans II and the Barth of the 
Göttingen Dogmatics rest in Barth’s ability, here in the Dogmatics, to explicate the 
relation of God’s revelation in history to humanity in a way unknown in Romans II. 
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And by way of such explication on behalf of Barth, he has himself offered a more 





















In the Introduction to this thesis, I presented Barth’s question, “Did not a new 
anthropocentric system announce itself in Kierkegaard’s theoretical groundwork – 
one quite opposed to that at which we aimed?”674 It can now be said with confidence 
that the answer to his question is “No.” 
The main objective of this project was to offer a conceptual analysis between 
Kierkegaard and the early Barth of Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics in order 
to account for the significant amount of parallels between these two thinkers. This 
objective becomes significant in light of Barth’s mysterious relation to Kierkegaard, 
a relation which admits the presence of Kierkegaard in his early thought in contrast 
to his later thought wherein Kierkegaard’s name is rarely mentioned, and where so, 
in a mostly negative tone. As discussed, Barth’s gradual move away from 
Kierkegaard had been the result of his growing suspicion that Kierkegaard’s thought 
was in sum theological anthropology. However, as this project has also endeavoured 
to show, the existentialist Kierkegaard which Barth believed that he encountered at 
Göttingen was not the Kierkegaard I have presented here. The Kierkegaard with 
which Barth then became acquainted was the Kierkegaard of the pseudonymous 
literature, not the Christian thinker who sought to maintain the IQD between God 
and humanity. As a result of this encounter, Barth had begun to see Kierkegaard’s 
various concepts negatively against the backdrop of his own desire to maintain the 
IQD God.  
In sum, in looking at Kierkegaard’s understanding of the individual, God, 
revelation, and the individual’s relation to God, in relation to the early Barth of 
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Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics, my hope is that Barth’s reading of 
Kierkegaard, as expressed in the 1963 Sonning speech, appears wholly unwarranted. 
In providing this conceptual analysis, the aim was to prove that despite Barth’s 
opinion of Kierkegaard, as seen in 1963, the relation between Barth’s early thought 
in both Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics with regard to the foundational 
presence of the time and eternity dialectic and of the dialectic of veiling and 
unveiling, betrays a lack of awareness on Barth’s part that although he had 
announced his distance from Kierkegaard, his thought reveals the contrary. In other 
words, in light of the presence of these dialectics and concepts, which Barth notes are 
Kierkegaardian, throughout Barth’s thought as a whole, one wonders in what sense 
Barth has actually moved away from Kierkegaard.   
For example, McCormack states, “The time-eternity dialectic thus gives rise 
to a further sub-class of dialectic, the dialectic of veiling and unveiling in God’s self-
revelation.”675 Given that Kierkegaard is acknowledged as providing Barth with this 
dialectic it is logical to think that Barth had also learned from Kierkegaard the 
implication of the time-eternity dialectic for revelation. In fact, Barth evidences a 
Kierkegaardian conception of the relation between these two dialectics in his use of 
Kierkegaardian terms such as paradox, incognito, offence, direct communication, etc. 
Keeping in mind what has just been stated above, McCormack adds, “The dialectic 
structuring of God’s self-revelation would remain a permanent feature of Barth’s 
thought, leaving its stamp on all works of the 1920’s and continuing on into the 
Church Dogmatics.”676 If McCormack is correct, and I think he is, then Kierkegaard 
remains with Barth up until the end.   
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In pointing the way forward to a reconsideration of Kierkegaard’s presence in 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics, my research has led to me to the conclusion that much of 
the foundations in the Church Dogmatics have been laid down in Romans II and the 
Göttingen Dogmatics. Furthermore, if this project has been successful in extracting 
the parallels between Kierkegaard and Barth with regard to these foundational 
concepts in Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics, it is fair to suggest that 
Kierkegaard’s voice is still heard clearly in Barth’s later works. Barth himself admits 
as much in his 1963 address stating, “His peculiar sound has not become silent, but 
has been muted by other sounds and has become a strong accompaniment (Unterton) 
next to others.”677 In short, Barth thought of himself, even then in 1963, as one who 
has “remained faithful to Kierkegaard’s reveille, as we heard it then, throughout my 
theological life.”678 Of course, what Barth suggests is that he has remained faithful to 
Kierkegaard’s method of diastasis which for Barth always offers a fresh reminder of 
the distance which separates God and humanity. However, in light of the growing 
concern of theological endeavour with theological anthropology, Barth believes his 
path has left much of Kierkegaard behind. And yet, as I have stated, given the 
parallels between Romans II, the Göttingen Dogmatics and the Church Dogmatics, it 
appears Barth had remained faithful to Kierkegaard beyond this reveille.  
Even in the Church Dogmatics, God is depicted by Barth as being infinitely 
qualitatively distinct from humanity and from time. Barth writes, “But inscrutability, 
hiddenness, is of the very essence of Him who is called God in the Bible. As Creator, 
this God is different from the world, i.e., as the One he is, He does not belong to the 
sphere of what man as a creature can know directly. Nor can He be unveilable for 
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man indirectly in the created world, for He is the Holy One to see whom, even 
indirectly, other eyes are needed than these eyes of ours which are corrupted by 
sin.”679 Barth words here are pregnant with regard to the relation between humanity 
and God’s revelation. In accord with Barth’s Romans II and the Göttingen 
Dogmatics, Barth maintains that Jesus of Nazareth “is the self-revealing God,”680 
even if the means whereby revelation is made known separated Romans II from the 
Göttingen Dogmatics and the Church Dogmatics. Barth, unlike in these earlier two 
works [there is more of a reluctance in Romans II than in the Göttingen Dogmatics], 
never tires of speaking of the God in history, the God who “takes form” by means of 
human flesh.681  
With Barth’s highly articulate notion of revelation, he moves beyond his 
earlier works only to come to parallel Kierkegaard even more than before. In the 
Church Dogmatics, Barth continues to speak of the God who has entered human 
history, who has taken on human flesh in order to become an object of knowledge. 
Barth writes, “He [Christ] makes Himself present, known and significant to them as 
God. In the historical life of men He takes up a place, and a very specific place at 
that, and makes Himself the object of human contemplation, human experience, 
human thought and human speech.”682 In short, for Barth, “Revelation in the Bible 
means the self-unveiling, imparted to men, of the God who by nature cannot be 
unveiled to men.”683 Although Barth speaks more directly to God’s unveiling than 
before, he yet has retained that even in God’s unveiling, God remains veiled in 
mystery.  
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The mystery for Barth still exists by virtue of the form of revelation, namely, 
the humanitas Christi.684 In seeking to maintain the dialectic of veiling and unveiling 
of revelation, Barth enunciates the relation of this dialectic to revelation very 
carefully. In maintaining that the humanity of Christ is the form of revelation Barth 
ask, “Is the humanitas Christi as such the revelation?”685  Barth’s reply to this 
question is one carefully fashioned in light of the earlier Christologies of his 
theological and philosophical predecessors. He states: 
At this stage we can only reply that when this view [equating the divine sonship of Jesus 
Christ with the man Jesus of Nazareth] has really been held, there has always been more 
or less clearly discernible the very thing which, as we have seen, the Old Testament tried 
to avoid with its concept of the holiness of the revealed God, namely the possibility of 
having God disclosed Himself through man, of allowing man to set himself on the same 
platform as God, to grasp Him there and thus to become His master.686 
 
Barth words here yet echo Kierkegaard’s IQD between God and humanity as well as 
the maintaining of this difference even in God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. In seeking 
to prevent the confusion of earlier views as to the meaning of the divine in Christ, 
Barth’s maintaining of the IQD in relation to the revelation seeks to articulate that 
the humanity of God, “the form as such, the means, does not take God’s place.”687  
In this articulation Barth reveals both a moving away and yet a continuing 
link with Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics and thus with Kierkegaard. In light 
of my task in Chapter One to examine Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity, 
one objective this project has sought to accomplish was to offer a correction to 
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Kierkegaard’s view of the revelation of God in Christ. Kierkegaard’s conception of 
the Incarnation is, as we observed, thoroughly objective in that God has made 
himself known in history in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. And yet, amidst his 
view of the concreteness of revelation, God’s taking on of human flesh has allowed 
for the ultimate veiling of God in his unveiling. Barth, here in the Church Dogmatics, 
continues along this path. Therefore, Barth’s Church Dogmatics parallels Roman II 
and the Göttingen Dogmatics in presenting the mystery of God in Christ, the 
dialectic of veiling and unveiling. However, the Göttingen Dogmatics and the 
Church Dogmatics separate from Romans II in light of Barth’s appropriation and 
Christological utterances of the post-Chalcedonian formula.  
In this view, Barth and Kierkegaard move closer together after Romans II 
with regard to their views of revelation in Christ. Romans II’s used the resurrection 
in making known the revelation of God in Christ. But here, Barth holds that, “The 
fact that God takes form does not give rise to a medium, a third thing between God 
and man, a reality distinct from God that is as such the subject of revelation. This 
would imply that God would be unveilable for men.”688 In short, Barth continues 
with Kierkegaard’s notion of the mystery of God in Christ’s revelation, the inability 
of the object of revelation to fully disclose the divine Subjectivity.  Barth writes,  
Mystery is the concealment of God in which he meets us precisely when he unveils 
Himself to us, because He will not and cannot unveil Himself except by veiling Himself. 
Mystery thus denotes the divine givenness of the Word of God which also fixes our own 
limits and by which it distinguished itself from everything that is given otherwise…This 
means that we cannot establish its distinction.689 
 
Barth’s continuing use of the dialectic of veiling and unveiling reveals the way in 
which the limits expressed in God’s revelation in the Göttingen Dogmatics differ 
from Romans II. In Romans II, although the limits of human reason in relation to 
                                                 




God exist in relation to the Incarnation and the paradox, human limitation was 
discussed mainly in terms of the IQD. However, in the Göttingen Dogmatics, Barth 
has moved these limits to the Incarnation itself, a path which finds its extension here 
in the Church Dogmatics.  
Nevertheless, Barth’s present employment of the dialectic of veiling and 
unveiling lends itself to another parallel with Kierkegaard in the Church Dogmatics, 
in respect of revelation’s relation to history. Indeed, Barth, again, like many of the 
concepts found in Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics, presents a far richer 
understanding of these concepts in the Church Dogmatics due to his more historical 
and objective articulation of revelation. Nonetheless, history yet maintains its futility 
in relation to lessening the paradox of revelation.  Barth writes, “Part of the concept 
of the biblically attested revelation is that it is a historical event. Historical does not 
mean historically demonstrable or historically demonstrated.”690 Barth here reveals 
that he has maintained the time and eternity dialectic in its expression between 
history and sacred history. 691 
Again, the distinction Barth makes between history and Christian history does 
not seek to undermine the truly historical nature of revelation. Barth writes, “Without 
God’s being historically revealed in this way, revelation would not be revelation.”692 
What Barth seeks to undermine is the disintegration of IQD between God and 
humanity even in the midst of a truly historical revelation. In other words, Barth yet, 
in continuity with Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics, wants to prohibit the 
revelation of God of becoming “apprehensible by a natural observer or apprehended 
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by such an observer.”693 Furthermore, in Barth’s considerations of the limits of 
history in relation to revelation, he echoes Kierkegaard’s scepticism with regard to 
historical knowledge in general, or to “general history” as approximate knowledge. 
Barth writes,  
All that might be said is that according to the standards by which “historical” truth is 
usually measured elsewhere or generally, this story [the biblical story] is one that to some 
degree eludes any sure declaration that it happened as the narrative says…There is no 
story in which we do not have to reckon with this aspect, and therefore with elements of 
saga or legend according to the general concept of ‘historical’ truth. This applies also to 
the stories told in the Bible. Otherwise they would have to be without temporal form.694 
 
We have observed that for Kierkegaard historical knowledge too is an 
approximation by virtue of its being past as well as temporal, i.e. under the guise of 
human error. Moreover, if one holds to a truly historical notion of revelation then one 
must allow for the historical uncertainty which revelation carries with it. This, 
however, for Kierkegaard, as well as for Barth, is not a problem in that all human 
knowledge is approximation knowledge.   
Insofar as Barth maintains the limits of historical knowledge in relation to the 
minimization of the paradox of revelation, he also continues with the Kierkegaardian 
notion of contemporaneity.  Barth writes, “The fact that God’s Word is God’s act 
means first its contingent contemporaneity.”695 Although Barth understands that  
the time of the direct, original speech of God Himself in His revelation, the time of Jesus 
Christ, the time of that which the prophets and the apostles heard so that they could bear 
witness to it—that is one time…[and]…the time of this witness, the time of the prophecy 
and the apostolate…this is another time…estimating the difference along these lines need 
then be no obstacle to a direct insight into the continuity and unity of the times, to an 
insight into our contemporaneity with Christ and all His saints.696  
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However, to eliminate the distinctiveness of these times in relation to us at present 
would be, for Barth, to humanize the Word of God.697 Therefore, our 
contemporaneity with Christ is one not which eliminates the distinctiveness of the 
particularity of God’s revelation in Christ but rather allows for our relation to Christ 
by faith despite the distinctiveness.   
In the end, as in Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics, the continual 
limitations which Barth gives to time in relation to its access to eternity, exist in 
order to allow the only means whereby we, as human beings, are able to espouse the 
relation of time and eternity in Christ, namely, the means of faith. For Barth, faith is 
the miracle in which we know God. 698 In promoting the primacy of faith as the 
means whereby humanity knows God and all that pertains to revelation in history, 
Barth maintains with Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics that, outside of faith, 
“we have no organ or capacity for God.”699 
But what is more perplexing than anything we have discussed with regard to 
parallels is that Barth, himself, offers evidence in Romans II against his later view of 
Kierkegaard’s thought as one which is centred in the human being rather than God. 
Outlining his view that in order for the individual to be refashioned as he is meant to 
be, he must be in relation to God, Barth, in fact, quotes Kierkegaard, stating,  
God cannot be refashioned according to thy good pleasure: thou it is that must be 
refashioned according to His good pleasure…As the arrow, loosed from the bow by the 
hand of the practiced archer, does not rest till it has reached the mark; so men pass from 
God to God. He is the mark for which they have been created; and they do not rest till 
they find their rest in Him.700 
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This means that Barth’s growing suspicion of Kierkegaard’s conception of the self as 
one in which the self looks to its own resources in defining and understanding the 
self first, and then, from there, considers itself in relation to God, had developed 
against Barth’s own knowledge of Kierkegaard. It could be that Barth had, then, not 
paid any attention to the evidence he had encountered in Kierkegaard himself by way 
of which he could have later counteracted the accusations that Kierkegaard’s thought 
is mere anthropology. Given Barth’s questioning of Kierkegaard’s relation to the 
resurgence of theological anthropology in the Church Dogmatics, it appears that 
even at this time, Barth was not yet sure as to where to place Kierkegaard within this 
movement.  
In light of our examination, two periods can be detected with regard to Barth 
relation to Kierkegaard. The first, as we observed, is the Romans II period wherein 
Barth finds in Kierkegaard an ally in combating the disintegration of the IQD 
between God and humanity which was prevalent in the theological arena of Barth’s 
day. The second period commences while at Göttingen, where Barth had become 
acquainted with a Kierkegaard who was being interpreted to support anthropological, 
or existential, concerns, concerns which were very different from “that at which he 
aimed” in Romans II.  It is in the context of this second period in which Barth’s 1963 
speech discloses his final stance on Kierkegaard’s thought which had begun in the 
mid 1920’s. The 1963 speech is where we have Barth’s “last word” on the matter, 
where Barth’s suspicion has been solidified into a warning of supreme caution for 
those who encounter Kierkegaard.  
What is unfortunate about this relation is that Barth was not fully aware of the 




extent to which Kierkegaard had influenced him or of the parallels which they 
shared. It seems, in the end, given his resistance to any and every form of theological 
anthropology which threaten the IQD between God and humanity, Barth thought it 
best wholly to separate from Kierkegaard’s thought. This is evident given that in his 
book, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl, wherein Barth discusses those 
central figures of the 19th century, Kierkegaard is not even found.  
In the end, Barth’s misreading of Kierkegaard can be attributed to two factors 
which are observed in the respective works of Oh and Podmore. First, as Podmore 
argues, Barth had only acknowledged the negative side of diastasis in the IQD 
thereby missing the positive aspect of the forgiveness of sin.701 Second, in light of 
the forgiveness of sin, Oh notes that Barth had not perceived that the negative aspect 
of “religiousness A” is, for Kierkegaard, overcome by faith as observed in 
“religiousness B.”702 Nevertheless, Barth’s 1963 declaration of having moved away 
from Kierkegaard, and his consequent warning to those who encounter Kierkegaard, 
need not imply that Barth did not find some useful tools in Kierkegaard, regardless of 
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